Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners are citizens of Mali who remained in the U.S. longer than authorized under their visitors’ visas. In 2006, Camara sought asylum and withholding of removal based on past persecution she suffered in the form of female genital mutilation (“FGM”); she listed her husband as a derivative applicant. She testified that she was unable to submit her asylum application by the one-year filing deadline because she and her husband had experienced medical problems. The IJ denied Petitioners’ applications, finding that Camara’s FGM constituted past persecution; however, he found that even if Camara’s illness was an “extraordinary circumstance” sufficient to excuse the filing deadline, Camara had failed to show she filed within a reasonable period. On remand, the IJ again rejected the applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding Kalle removable because: Camara’s lead asylum application was denied; Kalle never applied for individual relief; and withholding of removal is not available derivatively. The Sixth Circuit denied review, rejecting arguments that Kalle was denied due process when the Board failed to consider evidence of his intent to apply for individual withholding of removal and that withholding of removal ought to be available derivatively.View "Camara v. Holder" on Justia Law

Zhang is a Chinese citizen. She was stopped by INS upon her entry to the U.S. without valid documents in 2001. In 2002, Zhang was ordered removed; the BIA affirmed. Zhang did not leave the country; she converted to Roman Catholicism, was married in the Catholic Church, and had two children. In 2011, Zhang moved to reopen her case based upon the claim that conditions in China had materially worsened with respect to: religious persecution and enforcement of China’s coercive population control program. She also challenged the adverse credibility finding made during her 2002 proceedings and alleged that she was denied an opportunity to seek new legal representation after her counsel withdrew. The Board denied the petition on all claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Board abused its discretion in summarily dismissing certain evidence regarding Zhang’s claims of religious persecution. The court affirmed dismissal of the claim regarding the enforcement of coercive population control because Zhang failed to demonstrate that country conditions in this respect have worsened in her native province. View "Zhang v. Holder" on Justia Law

Lo, a citizen of Senegal, entered the U.S. in 1997 with a non-immigrant student visa, and reunited with Dieng. Dieng had used a false passport to enter the U.S. in 2003. They married in 2005 and their daughter was born in 2006. Dieng has another daughter who remained in Gambia. The couple submitted affirmative asylum applications in 2007. USCIS denied the application and initiated removals. Dieng alleged persecution based on her race, religion, and membership in a particular social group (Fulani ethnic group), stemming from past unsuccessful attempts by relatives to circumcise her, and her fear that, if removed to Senegal, she and her daughters would be at risk of being subjected to genital mutilation. Despite acknowledgment that his people do not practice circumcision, Lo thought that their daughter was at risk at any location in Senegal. The IJ rejected the claims. The BIA and Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. Substantial evidence supported a finding that Dieng does not harbor a well-founded fear of persecution for herself or her daughters. View "Dieng v. Holder" on Justia Law

Castilla entered the U.S. for a third time after two deportations and moved to Michigan, where Reyes lived. Reyes made and sold false identification documents to illegal immigrants. Castilla joined the operation. Reyes kept the work room locked, let the others live in the apartment-production facility, gave them false documents for themselves, provided them business cards and cell phones, and kept track of each associate’s sales in a notebook. In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement began investigating. In 2010, executing a search warrant on the apartment, they found Castilla and others. In Castilla’s bedroom, agents found a box of his own fraudulent business cards, a manual with instructions for changing the ribbon on the Zebra card printer, a CD for the Zebra card printer, and a fraudulent driver’s license that was matched to a used Zebra printer ribbon. Convicted of conspiracy to produce and traffic fraudulent identification documents and for possession of document-making implements, Castilla was sentenced to 63 months. The district court applied the three-level managerial/supervisory role enhancement, USSG 3B1.1(b) and a nine-level enhancement under USSG 2L2.1(b)(2)(C), for the offense involving at least 100 documents. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Castilla-Lugo" on Justia Law

In 1991, petitioner, a Mexican national, falsely told a border inspector that he was a U.S. citizen. He pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. 1325, then returned to Mexico. In 1993 petitioner failed to disclose that same conviction on his application for an immigration visa as the spouse of a citizen. The INS granted the visa. The government then commenced removal under 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa ... or admission ... is inadmissible.” Section 1227(a)(1)(H) gives the Attorney General discretion to waive the 1993 fraud as a ground for removal. The Attorney General claimed to lack discretion to waive the 1991 fraud. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The Attorney General can waive section 1227(a)(1)(A) to the extent it renders petitioner removable as a result of both the 1991 and the 1993 misrepresentation View "Avila-Anguiano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Abdallahi entered the U.S. lawfully in 2000 as a visitor, remained longer than permitted, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Those claims were withdrawn with his 2005 request for adjustment of status, following his marriage to a citizen. At a hearing, Abdallahi testified about his experience as a gendarme in the Mauritanian military, 1989 to 1998, stating that his duties required that he pour cold water on black prisoners, kick them, and ensure that they had no food or toilet access. Abdallahi witnessed others, including those ranked beneath him, mistreat prisoners. Abdallahi stated that he could not stop the acts, even though he thought them “against humanity,” because he feared they would torture him. Abdallahi was regarded as a black African. Abdallahi decided to leave Mauritania when his cousin disappeared, believing that the government would “eliminate” him. Over Abdallahi’s objections, the decision finding him inadmissible was made by an immigration judge who had not personally heard his testimony. The BIA affirmed, finding that he had “committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of . . . any act of torture,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii). The Sixth Circuit denied review. . View "Abdallahi v. Holder" on Justia Law

Lateef became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. Weeks later she returned to Pakistan to complete medical school. She returned to the U.S. in 1993. She married in Pakistan in 1995. Her daughter obtained LPR status as “born during [a] temporary visit abroad.” Her husband and children obtained immigrant visas in 2000, but did not attempt to enter until 2001. Although she had not been in the U.S. since November 1999, Lateef stated that she was last present in July 2000. During secondary screening Lateef admitted the truth. Lateef’s only ties to the U.S. are LPR parents and brothers. She had never been employed or owned property in the U.S. From 1991 until February 2001, she spent 40 months in the U.S. and 76 months in Pakistan. All were charged with attempting to enter without valid documentation, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Lateef was charged with misrepresenting a material fact, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); her husband was charged with attempting to enter to work without certification, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A). In 2004, the IJ ordered removal, finding that Lateef had abandoned LPR status. The BIA affirmed. On remand, the IJ held that once Lateef had abandoned LPR status it was imputed to her daughter. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Lateef v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally in 1991. In 1997, he pleaded guilty to felony flight after attempting to elude a police officer who had signaled him to stop for speeding. As a first-time offender, he received a sentence of 40 days. In 2006, INS issued a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), which permits removal of an alien present without being admitted or paroled, and 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), which permits removal of an alien convicted of acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude. Petition conceded the first ground for removability but challenged the second ground. The IJ concluded that because of the wanton or willful mental state required under the state statute and the resulting inference that petitioner had disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the safety of others, his Washington law categorically rose to the level of a CIMT, and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied review. View "Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2010 defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and without a license. He admitted that he had reentered the U.S. without permission in 2007, having been removed to Mexico in 2003. The 2003 removal followed a conviction in New Mexico for aggravated assault involving a deadly weapon. He pled guilty to reentering the U.S. after being removed following a conviction for an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). The presentence report utilized U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, which provides for a 16-level enhancement if the defendant previously was deported after conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence. The PSR subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The recommended guidelines range was 57-71 months of imprisonment. The court departed downward one criminal history level, which reduced the range to 46-57, and, reasoning that the offense was a relatively minor crime of violence and that defendant would not be able to take advantage of certain rehabilitative programs while confined, the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Aggravated assault under New Mexico law is not categorically a crime of violence and available documents do not reveal what version of the offense defendant committed. View "United States v. Rede-Mendez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, born in 1946 in Mexico to a U.S.-citizen mother and a Mexican national father, allegedly entered the U.S. in 1949. It is disputed whether the entry was legal. His mother remarried a U.S. citizen in 1960. Plaintiff alleges that he has lived in the U.S. continuously for 60 years, has been married to a U.S. citizen since 1967, and is the primary caretaker of his son, who has spinal meningitis and requires constant care. In 2003 plaintiff requested a Certificate of Citizenship based on his mother’s citizenship (8 U.S.C. 1401); he separately claimed citizenship through his stepfather. The Administrative Appeals Office denied both, ruling that plaintiff’s mother did not meet the physical presence requirement of law in effect at the time because she gave birth at age 16 and there was no evidence that his stepfather had adopted him. Plaintiff had not proven that he had been admitted as a lawful resident prior to age 18, as required to establish prima facie eligibility. The district court dismissed claims that the Nationality Act of 1940 violates the equal protection clause and that this interpretation of the Act creates an arbitrary and inequitable outcome. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the language of the statute is clear.View "Guzman v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law