Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Morocco, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 1998, married a citizen. and adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis. When he filed an I-751 petition to remove the conditions on his residency, he falsely represented that he and his wife were living together. The falsehood came to light, and in 2006, he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit application fraud and was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 for conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). An immigration judge found petitioner removable and denied a petition for waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H). The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal, finding that petitioner was removable as a result of his conspiracy conviction and was not eligible for waiver. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal. A conviction for conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. 1546 is grounds for removal under paragraph (3) of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a), and not under paragraph (1), so petitioner is ineligible for a 1227(a)(1)(H) waiver.

Petitioner entered the U.S. from Mexico illegally and married another undocumented alien. Their three children are U.S. citizens. Removal proceedings began after he was convicted for DUI at least four times, for driving without a license three times, and for other driving offenses. An immigration judge denied a petition for cancellation of removal, finding that petitioner lacked the requisite "good moral character." The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, noting its bewilderment at an attempt to argue due process. Aliens do not have a liberty or property right in cancellation of removal; it is a discretionary matter. The determination of good moral character is not a matter of law, but an administrative decision not subject to judicial review.

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala and a lawful permanent resident in the U.S. since 1980, faced removal as a result of a 1989 Illinois conviction for sexual abuse of a minor. He initially argued that he was not subject to removal because the judge who convicted and sentenced him issued a judicial recommendation against deportation. Before the immigration judge, petitioner's attorney conceded, without consulting his client, that the JRAD was invalid because it was entered outside the 30-day postsentencing window specified in the JRAD statute 8 U.S.C. 1251 (repealed in 1990). He retained new counsel, but the Board of Immigration Appeals held that prior counsel had waived the issue and denied a motion to reopen. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The JRAD was valid. Although it was entered about a month outside the 30-day postsentencing window, the state-court record confirms that the judge unequivocally indicated her intent to retain jurisdiction for the express purpose of considering a JRAD, and the JRAD entered without opposition from immigration authorities or the prosecutor.

In 2000 husband and wife, citizens of Lithuania, entered the U.S. with illegally-obtained visas. They have two children born in Lithuania and a third born in the U.S. When the visa fraud was discovered, they cooperated and were sentenced to one year of probation. The government charged them with removability for being inadmissible at the time of entry and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A), 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II), and 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Petitioners applied for asylum and withholding of removal. The Immigration Judge denied the request for asylum; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The affidavits established, at best, that the government of Lithuania is unstable and does little to protect its citizens. Fear of retribution from co-defendants for an alien's cooperation with the U.S. government, in exchange for a reduced sentence, is not a well-founded fear based on a protected ground.

Petitioner fled Colombia after the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia pursued him relentlessly, subjecting him to multiple hijackings at gunpoint, directing death threats at him and his family, and burning his trucks. He applied for asylum, asserting that the government sat by and allowed FARC to persecute him because of his affiliation with the Liberal Party and his status as a pro-government trucker who refused to cooperate with FARC. The Immigration Judge found him credible and determined that he was eligible for asylum.The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected the IJ’s decision and ordered removal. The Seventh Circuit granted review and remanded, stating that the Board failed to take account of all the evidence in the record.

Citizens of Jordan received visitor visas and came to the U.S. in the 1990s. The family stayed beyond the expiration of the visas because a child born in the U.S. had health problems. Wife was told that, because of rumors of adultery spread by her sister-in-law, wife's brother planned to kill her when she returned to Jordan in order to restore the family's honor. An immigration judge denied asylum and other relief and the BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Withholding of removal is mandatory if an applicant establishes that it is more likely than not that she would be persecuted in the country of removal because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). To obtain protection under the Convention Against Torture, one must show that it is more likely than not that one would be tortured if removed. Wife is a member of the group of women in Jordan who have, allegedly, flouted moral norms, and who face a high risk of honor killing. It is more likely than not that brother will severely harm or murder wife if she is returned. The agency ignored strong evidence of governmental toleration of, or indifference to, honor crimes.

Petitioner entered the U.S. in 1993 as a minor and became involved with a gang. In 2000, he was serving an Illinois sentence for robbery and aggravated battery. He was removed to Mexico in 2001 and was prohibited from re-entering without first seeking waiver of his inadmissible status. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii). Petitioner re-entered illegally and claims he was attacked by strangers in 2002. In 2010 he was arrested and the removal order was reinstated. He sought a U Visa (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)), which would grant him temporary lawful status based on the 2002 attack and his cooperation with the police at that time and waiver of his inadmissible status. Both were denied. The Seventh Circuit upheld reinstatement of removal and declined to review the visa denial for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner left China to seek asylum in the U.S. and claims that family-planning authorities forced her to have an abortion. Her evidence included a letter from her mother, confirming her version of events and documents that she said were issued by the hospital. One was an outpatient medical record stating that the procedure was due to pregnancy without marriage; the other was a disease certificate. An immigration judge denied the application, concluding that, although she credibly testified to having an abortion, she failed to establish that it was involuntary. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted review and remanded, concluding that the agency misread precedent. The agency did not identify other readily- available evidence that might have helped prove the forced nature of her abortion, especially when the IJ found her testimony about her strenuous efforts to avoid the abortion as being credible.

South Sudan declared its independence from Sudan in July, 2011. President Obama formally recognized the new republic on the same day. One month earlier, the Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments in a case claiming that the Board of Immigration Appeals erroneously denied petitioner deferral of removal to Sudan under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner's home is in the new republic. The Seventh Circuit remanded, in light of the changed circumstances, the government's acknowledgement of legal errors in the opinion of the Immigration Judge, and the government's assertion that it no longer plans to remove petitioner to Sudan.

Petitioner entered the U.S. from Mexico as a three-year-old and grew up in Los Angeles. In 2001 he was arrested for importation and sale of a significant amount of cocaine; while on bail, he was twice arrested for driving on a suspended or revoked license. In 2002, he consented to a search of his car that turned up cocaine. Before petitioner could complete his sentence on the importation and sale conviction, he was removed to Mexico in 2004. He returned to Los Angeles without authorization, primarily to take care of his daughters. Following another traffic stop, he was deported and again returned unlawfully. He was arrested for possession of cocaine in 2009. Though that charge was dismissed, petitioner admits that he used cocaine that day. He pled guilty to illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326(a)). The district court rejected arguments for a lighter sentence than the guidelines range of 46-57 months and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on petitioner's risk of recidivism, the court acted within its discretion in declining to consider his cultural assimilation and the absence of a "fast track" program that would have given him the opportunity to receive a lighter sentence in exchange for waiving certain rights.