Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Moral, a citizen of Ecuador, was admitted to the U.S. in 1988 as an immigrant. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings in 2011 because of his multiple criminal convictions, including unlawful use of a weapon and sexual abuse of a minor. The Immigration Judge granted five continuances, four of which allowed Moral to pursue state-court post-conviction proceedings seeking to set aside his guilty plea for sexual abuse of a minor occurring in 2002. After the state criminal court dismissed his petition, the IJ denied his request for another continuance and ordered removal. The BIA denied an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). The court reasoned that the provision, which is phrased more broadly than subsection (B), applies to denial of a continuance. View "Moral-Salazar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Vahora is a Muslim citizen of India. In 2002, a train caught fire in Gujarat, India. Many Hindu pilgrims and activists were killed, and violence between Hindus and Muslims followed. Vahora testified that he and several Muslim friends were shot and that Hindu leaders continued to pursue him during the four years he remained in India before travelling to Guatemala, then to the U.S. He applied for asylum one year after arriving. An immigration judge ruled that, assuming the application was timely, and even accepting Vahora’s testimony as true, Vahora had not presented a cognizable claim of past persecution or shown that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution because he did not demonstrate that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding that the persecution of which Vahora complains was not carried out by persons the government of India was unable or unwilling to control. The Seventh Circuit denied review, noting that Vahora never sought help from any authorities. View "Vahora v. Holder" on Justia Law

A Lithuanian national, Smykiene entered the U.S. in 1995 on a visitor’s visa. Six months after it expired, she was arrested by Border Patrol officers in New York. The officers gave her an order to show cause why she should not be deported and also told her to provide an address. The Immigration Court sent certified mail to the address that Smykiene with her hearing notice. The Postal Service returned the mail with the notation “Attempted—Not Known.” There was no follow-up. Smykiene did not appear and the immigration judge ordered her deported. A year later she married a man who, two years after that, became a naturalized U.S. citizen. In 2010, when authorities located her, Smykiene swore that she had not received the notice and that at the time she was handed the order to show cause she couldn’t understand English. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed an order of removal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that: “The government cites no authority for the proposition that an innocent mistake, especially of the kind likely to be made by a newcomer … from a non-English-speaking country, forfeits the right to reopen an order of removal in absentia.” View "Smykiene v. Holder" on Justia Law

Mustafa, a citizen of Pakistan, and his family entered the U.S. legally as non-immigrant visitors in 2003. Two days before the expiration of his visa, Mustafa filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal. Mustafa claimed that as a member of the Nawaz faction of the Pakistani Muslim League political party, he fears if he were to return to Pakistan, he would be targeted for having cooperated with the opposition government by providing information about the financial affairs of his former employer, who is also a former Pakistani Senator. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of their applications, finding that Mustafa could not establish a fear of future persecution on account of a protected statutory ground because the threats and attacks Mustafa had experienced before coming to the U.S. were motivated solely by a personal dispute between Mustafa and his former boss and that he had not shown that the current government would persecute him on account of his membership in the PML-N. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings because the conclusion that Mustafa’s attackers were motivated solely by a desire for personal revenge was unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Mustafa v. Holder" on Justia Law

Boadi legally entered the U.S. in 2000 but overstayed and married Bonds, a U.S. citizen, in 2001. He adjusted his status to conditional lawful permanent resident in 2003, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a)(1). In 2007, Boadi and Bonds sought removal of the “condition” to his permanent resident status, with documentation supporting the authenticity of their marriage. DHS’s interview with the couple revealed that Boadi lived in Ohio and Bonds in Illinois and that Boadi may have lived with his ex-wife, another Ghanian national. Bonds could neither name Boadi’s three children nor the street on which Boadi lived. They gave conflicting answers regarding their respective children’s relationships and who paid the bills. Boadi failed to respond to a letter and DHS terminated his legal status in 2009 and issued a notice to appear. Boadi and Bonds divorced only weeks after the notice to appear, which automatically terminates an alien’s conditional legal status, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii), distinct from DHS’s existing allegation of fraud. Boadi unsuccessfully requested a good-faith marriage waiver. Removal proceedings began. The immigration judge made an adverse credibility determination and found Boadi removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. View "Boadi v. Holder" on Justia Law

Chen illegally entered the U.S. in 2006. Shortly thereafter, his wife gave birth to the couple’s second child in China. Chinese authorities then forcibly sterilized her. Chen filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he suffered persecution when he learned that his wife had been forcibly sterilized. While his removal proceedings were pending, Chen began practicing Falun Gong, a spiritual practice, then supplemented his requests for relief from removal arguing that he feared future persecution because of his Falun Gong activities. Concluding that Chen had not suffered past persecution and lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution, an Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. There was substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Chen had not shown that his Falun Gong practices were likely to attract the attention of the authorities.View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Chaudhry family, citizens of Pakistan, lawfully entered the U.S. in 2003, under a business visitor visa. Before the expiration of that status, Chaudhry and his employer Amtal obtained a status change to skilled worker, extending Chaudhry’s lawful nonimmigrant status through January 21, 2005. Amtal filed a Form I-140 petition that sought to designate Chaudhry a multi-national executive or manager; Chaudhry simultaneously submitted Form I-485 for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. CIS rejected both applications because Chaudhry no longer worked for Amtal. Supported by his new employer, Sarus, Chaudhry submitted new documents. CIS approved Sarus’s I-140 employment-based visa petition in 2007, but in 2008, rejected Chaudhry’s I-485 adjustment-of-status application because more than 180 days had elapsed between the expiration of lawful nonimmigrant status and the filing of the final adjustment application. The IJ rejected Chaudry’s argument that he remained in lawful status through the date CIS rejected his first and second adjustment applications. The Board acknowledged that “unlawful presence” and “unlawful status” are distinct concepts, but held that the pendency of prior adjustment applications had no bearing on Chaudhry’s nonimmigrant status after it expired. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. View "Chaudhry v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Mungiki are a violent, outlawed sect, notorious for extortion, torture, and murder by dismemberment. The Kenyan government has been unable to bring the group under control. At age 14, Wanjiru accepted his teacher’s invitation to join the Mungiki, unaware of the group’s character. He was afraid to leave because the Mungiki punish defectors by execution. At age 20 he came to the U.S. on a student visa in 2005. He briefly attended school. He was arrested in 2009, following a sexual encounter with a woman he met in a nightclub while intoxicated. Wanjiru pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and received a suspended sentence, requiring surrender to immigration authorities. He petitioned for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) and deferral under the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The IJ found that Wanjiru was convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” was not persuaded of the Kenyan government’s acquiescence in the threat to Wanjiru, and denied relief. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the CAT does not exist only for persons with unblemished records. The possibility of deferring removal rather than withholding it exists for people who might be undesirables but who are entitled not to be sent to experience torture.View "Wanjiru v. Holder" on Justia Law

Clarke cooperated in a scheme to defraud her employer. The scheme netted more than $250,000; Clarke’s share was $50,000. She pled guilty to committing a fraudulent act that caused a loss of $8,000 and was sentenced to 14 months. Clarke was a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. An alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); “aggravated felony” includes an offense that involves fraud in which the loss exceeds $10,000. Removal proceedings were instituted after Clarke completed her prison sentence. She filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asking that her conviction be set aside because neither the judge nor her lawyer had advised her that she could be removed if convicted. Her lawyer had told her there might be “immigration consequences.” The district court denied the motion. She has been removed to Jamaica. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The one-year statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final. A lawyer’s failure to advise his client concerning a critical consequence of conviction can be a “fact” supporting a claim of ineffective assistance, but in this case it could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence within a year after the plea. View "Clarke v. United States" on Justia Law

Moyaho, a Mexican citizen, first entered the U.S. in 1995, “without inspection.” Since then, he has lived and worked in the U.S., paid taxes, and, with his wife, raised three children, each born in the U.S. In 2005, DHS instituted removal proceedings. -Moyaho admitted his unlawful status, but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), which provides for cancellation if the alien has been continuously present for 10 years; displays good moral character; has not been convicted of specified offenses; and removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. The application was denied on the ground that Moyaho did not demonstrate that his children would suffer qualifying hardship. The Board affirmed. He brought a number of motions, which were denied. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over most of Moyaho’s claims and that the Board did not err in denying his other motions. View "Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder" on Justia Law