Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's pretermission of her adjustment of status application. The BIA pretermitted petitioner's application on the ground that she did not satisfy the definition of "child" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E) because she was not adopted before her 16th birthday. The court held that the BIA's blanket rule against recognizing state courts' nunc pro tunc adoption decrees constituted an impermissible construction of section 1101(b)(1)(E) under Chevron because it gave little or no weight to the federal policy of keeping families together, failed to afford deference to valid state court judgments in an area of the law that was primarily a matter of state concern, and addressed the possibility of immigration fraud through a sweeping, blanket rule rather than considering the validity of nunc pro tunc adoption decrees on a case-by-case basis. The court also held that the BIA's determination that petitioner engaged in marriage fraud violated her rights to due process of law. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Amponsah v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a class of individuals from China who were seeking to acquire permanent resident status in the employment-based third preference category (EB-3). Plaintiffs alleged that during the 2008-2009 fiscal years, defendants did not allocate immigrant visas to eligible applicants in the correct order, thereby delaying their applications, and their eligibility for adjustment of status. The court held that the district court properly dismissed the complaint because there was no live case or controversy about the establishment of visa cut-off dates, and the allocation of visa numbers, in the 2008 and 2009 fiscal years. The district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because they did not allege that defendants failed to take discrete actions they were legally required to take. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Li, et al. v. Kerry, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Armenian native, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, injunctive and declaratory relief, and mandamus (District Court Petition) seeking to enjoin her imminent removal, reverse the USCIS's denial of her first adjustment-of-status application, and order USCIS to approve her then-pending second and third adjustment-of-status applications. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, sought to convert her appeal into a petition challenging the USCIS's denial of her adjustment-of-status applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D). The court affirmed and declined to convert petitioner's appeal into a petition to the court. The court held that district courts had jurisdiction to hear cases challenging determinations made on nondiscretionary grounds respecting eligibility for the immigration benefits enumerated in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), provided there were no pending removal proceedings in which an alien could apply for such benefits. The district court did not have jurisdiction over the petition because there had been no final agency action by USCIS on her pending adjustment-of-status applications at the time she filed her petition. However, because USCIS has since denied all of petitioner's applications, barring the discovery of new facts, the district court would now have jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704, to hear petitioner's claim that her application was improperly denied. View "Mamigonian v. Biggs, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his mandamus petition, where he sought to compel the DOE to issue him a Stafford Loan. While plaintiff's immigration status was still pending, he obtained valid employment authorization, graduated from college, and was accepted to law school. Plaintiff then filed a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and requested a Stafford Loan to pay his tuition. The law school declined to find him eligible for any form of federal student aid and plaintiff was unable to obtain a Stafford Loan. The court held that, in these circumstances, the jurisdictional question merged with the merits question. Plaintiff's mandamus petition fell within the scope of the sue-and-be-sued clause of 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(2). Notwithstanding that clause, however, section 1082(a)(2)'s ani-injunction clause barred the suit for declaratory relief. The Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff's petition under 28 U.S.C. 1361. When plaintiff's Stafford Loan eligibility was reviewed, he did not provide any evidence from the INS or USCIS that he was in the United States for other than a temporary purpose. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's petition on the merits. View "Mashiri v. Dept. of Education, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that there was no "realistic probability" that California would apply California Penal Code 243.4(e) to conduct that was not normally turpitudinous and the BIA's decision denying his motion to reconsider. The court held that section 243.4(e)(1)'s requirement that defendant specifically intended to damage his victim psychologically evidenced the malicious intent that was the essence of moral turpitude. The BIA's decision that this kind of behavior was per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong was persuasive. Because the court agreed that there was no "realistic probability" that California courts would apply section 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude, the court denied the petitions. View "Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, born in Mexico, petitioned for review of the government's reinstatement of a prior order of removal, following his illegal reentry into the United States after having been removed. The court rejected, as unsupported and as contrary to the text of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), petitioner's assertion that the 1989 removal order was "superseded" or otherwise invalidated simply because a later removal order existed. The court held that petitioner's substantively illegal reentry met the requirements of section 1231(a)(5) that he had "reentered the United States illegally," notwithstanding the fact that he tricked the border official into allowing him physically to enter. The government's decision to arrest and remove petitioner when he showed up for his interview did not prejudice him. Accordingly, the court need not decide whether there was a due process violation. View "Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of her asylum application as time-barred. Petitioner claimed that her untimely application should be excused because she suffered from a mental illness that constituted an extraordinary circumstance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(D) and 8 C.F.R. 1208.4(a)(5). To the extent that petitioner challenged the merits of the BIA's extraordinary circumstances determination, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because the underlying facts were disputed. Further, the BIA did not err in its application of the regulations and therefore, the court rejected petitioner's claim to the contrary. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Gasparyan v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's affirmation of the IJ's conclusion that petitioner's application for cancellation of removal was abandoned after petitioner's counsel did not file the application on time. The BIA found that petitioner had not complied with one of the procedural requirements announced in Matter of Lozado. The court read the BIA's decision as denying petitioner's motion to reopen, over which the court had jurisdiction. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion in applying Lozado where the record was undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to file his application; petitioner lost his opportunity to apply for cancellation of removal; and therefore, petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, reversed, and remanded for the BIA to reopen petitioner's case and allow him to file his application for cancellation of removal. View "Correa-Rivera v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his application for adjustment of status and its denial of his motion to reopen based on new evidence. The BIA concluded that petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status because of a 1997 conviction for possession of marijuana for sale in violation of California Health & Safety Code section 11359. Petitioner contended that the conviction was actually for simple possession of marijuana in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11357, and that, as a result, he was eligible for relief. The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish that the state court changed his 1997 drug conviction from possession of marijuana for sale under section 11359 to simple possession of marijuana under section 11357. Because petitioner remained inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182 notwithstanding the state court's expungement of his section 11359 offense, he was ineligible for adjustment of status. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's order of removal. Petitioner had pled guilty to false imprisonment in violation of California Penal Code 210.5 and the IJ held that petitioner's conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The court concluded that California Penal Code 210.5 was categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) and was therefore an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court otherwise lacked jurisdiction to review petitioner's final order of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Barragan-Lopez, et al v. Holder" on Justia Law