Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions related to an alien smuggling organization, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on two grounds. First, he argued that there was insufficient evidence of alienage with respect to the ten material witnesses named in the indictment who did not testify at trial. Second, as to his conviction for aiding and abetting the bringing of illegal aliens to the United States for financial gain, he contended that there was insufficient evidence linking him to the cross-border transportation of the named material witnesses before they were dropped in the United States, as required by United States v. Lopez. The court held that the jury could reasonably find that defendant rented properties knowing they would be used as load houses long before the named material witnesses were brought across the border. The court also held that defendant knowingly and intentionally aided in bringing about the smuggling of the named material witnesses into the United States. Therefore, a reasonable jury could find sufficient "specific evidence" linking defendant to "intentionally aiding...the cross-border transportation" of the named material witnesses prior to when they were dropped off in the United States. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, appealed his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry into the United States after removal. Petitioner challenged the validation of his underlying removal, contending that he automatically derived U.S. citizenship upon his father's naturalization when he was 14 years old. At the time, the controlling statute, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a), granted automatic derivative citizenship to foreign-born children of married parents only when both parents naturalized before the foreign-born child's 18th birthday. Petitioner's mother did not naturalize until he was 21 years old. Therefore, the district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not a citizen. The court also held that, under Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, the distinction between married and legally separated parents had a rational basis in protecting the parental rights of a non-citizen, custodial parent. The court also held that the sentence in this case was neither substantively nor procedurally unreasonable.

Petitioner, a native of Australia, appealed the BIA's order of removal as an alien convicted of a controlled substance, arguing that the BIA erred when it decided that she was not eligible to seek section 212(c) discretionary relief from removal pursuant to the former Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), which was repealed in 1996 as to aliens with certain criminal convictions. The court concluded that the repeal of section 212(c) imposed an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens like petitioner, who in reliance on the possibility of discretionary relief, agreed to a stipulated facts trial. The record demonstrated that petitioner reasonably relied on the law that existed when she faced criminal proceedings in 1980; therefore, the repeal of section 212(c) could not be applied retroactively to her conviction. The court reversed the BIA's decision and remanded with instructions to consider the merits of her section 212(c) application.

Petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, petitioned for review of a decision by the BIA affirming the IJ, who made an adverse credibility determination and denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief pursuant to the CAT. The court held that the BIA sufficiently complied with the court's mandate because it considered the REAL ID Act's, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, impact on the IJ's finding that petitioner's claims were not sufficiently corroborated. Even assuming that the REAL ID Act mandated notice that corroborating evidence was required, such notice was provided in this case. Therefore, the IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and petitioner's due process rights were not violated.

Defendant appealed his conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) for illegal reentry into the United States after being deported. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction based on a collateral attack of the underlying removal order. The court held that a defect in defendant's 1997 immigration proceedings, that he was not meaningfully informed of his eligibility for voluntary departure, violated his due process rights. However, the district court did not consider fully whether defendant suffered prejudice. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider this issue.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that the Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) properly terminated petitioner's lawful permanent resident status and dismissed his appeal. At issue was whether the CIS lost jurisdiction of a petition to remove conditions placed on residence if it did not adjudicate the petition within 90 days, as required by 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(3)(A). The court held that the BIA was correct to conclude that the 90 day deadline did not start "running after the first scheduled interview" because this interview "was not intended by CIS to be the final interview." The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's due process argument. Accordingly, the petition was denied in part and dismissed in part.

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government provided clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that left no issue in doubt that defendant, a naturalized citizen, obtained his citizenship illegally. The court held that the district court improperly weighed the evidence in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the government could strip defendant of his citizenship. The existence and nature of the cooperation agreement were the subjects of pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests, and further evidence should have been allowed. Because of the importance of citizenship, which in turn conferred significant rights and responsibilities, the government bore a heavy burden when it sought to take away an individual's citizenship. The court also vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue, and remanded with instructions that the district court conduct the proper inquiry consistent with the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(33).

Petitioner, born in El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal. The BIA found that petitioner was removable because he had committed a crime of violence and failed to establish entitlement to relief from removeability. The court held that the BIA committed no error when it dismissed petitioner's appeal because he failed to establish a claim of derivative citizenship due to his legitimation under Salvadoran law. In the absence of derivative citizenship, petitioner was subject to removal due to his commission of a crime of violence. Accordingly, the petition was denied.

Petitioner, a native of the Philippines, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA directing his removal, as well as the BIA's order denying reconsideration. The court held that the IJ was entitled to rely on petitioner's pleading-stage admission that he had been convicted of a removable drug offense; petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that he was entitled to relief from removal, or that the IJ violated his due-process rights; and therefore, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed on the ground that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the crime of which he was convicted was an aggravated felony. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction of first-degree burglary was a conviction of an aggravated felony, and was sufficiently established by the state court's abstract of judgment. The court also rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and accordingly denied the petition for review.