Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of three counts of medical assistance fraud in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.466. DHS commenced removal proceedings based on the ground that petitioner was removable because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The BIA agreed and ordered petitioner removed to Ghana. Petitioner seeks review of the BIA's decision. In this case, there is one conviction, and the total loss is directly tied to three specific fraud counts “covered by the conviction.” The court need not decide whether totally unrelated fraud counts in a single conviction may be aggregated. As the BIA recognized, petitioner's three fraud counts of conviction were part of a sufficiently interrelated fraud to warrant aggregation, whether or not the criminal complaint included an express allegation of conspiracy or scheme to defraud. Likewise, the order to pay an aggregated restitution amount demonstrated that petitioner did not commit multiple, unrelated frauds. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sokpa-Anku v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, limits who may file a petition for a visa on behalf of an immediate family member who is a foreign national. In 2009, Joel Bremer, who had previously been convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, petitioned for a spousal visa on behalf of his wife, a native and citizen of the Philippines. The USCIS, exercising discretion delegated to it by the Secretary, determined that Mr. Bremer failed to show that he posed no risk to his wife and denied his petition. The Bremers filed a class action suit contending that the manner in which the USCIS makes the no-risk determinations violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1), and the Constitution. The district court granted in part the Bremers' motion for class certification, dismissed the case, and concluded that the Bremers sought judicial review of determinations that were committed to the “sole and unreviewable discretion” of the Secretary. The court remanded to the district court for further consideration of Count II where the Bremers allege that the Adam Walsh Act no longer applies to Mr. Bremer's petition; the court agreed with the Bremers that whether Mr. Bremer’s petition has already been filed, and if so, whether Clause (viii) is inapplicable, are predicate legal questions over which the district court has jurisdiction; the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., bars judicial review of the Bremers' challenges to how the Secretary has exercised his discretion to make a no-risk determination under the Act; and the court rejected the Bremers' remaining claims. View "Bremer v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA found that the IJ did not clearly err in its findings of fact and provided cogent reasons for the IJ’s credibility determination. Even in light of petitioner's plausible explanations, based on the specific, cogent reasons identified by the IJ, the court concluded that a reasonable adjudicator could reach the same credibility determination as the IJ and BIA. Because petitioner provided the same evidence to support all three claims, and the evidence was insufficient to meet even the burden of proof required for asylum, her remaining claims also fail. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Arevalo-Cortez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen and national of Mexico, seeks review of DHS's orders reinstating a removal order and denying petitioner's motion to reopen the reinstatement order. The court found that substantial evidence supports DHS's decision to reinstate petitioner's prior removal order. In this case, petitioner was presented with the Form I-871 stating that he was an alien subject to removal, but he still did not claim compliance or submit any evidence of compliance during the reinstatement proceeding. Instead, he chose not to make a statement. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to establish the prejudice required to establish a due process violation with regard to the reinstatement proceedings, and the court rejected petitioner's argument that DHS’s procedure in deciding to reinstate a removal order rather than issue a notice to appear to petitioner was arbitrary and capricious. Finally, the court concluded that DHS did not erroneously deny petitioner's motion to reopen the reinstatement where he failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing that he complied with his grant of voluntary departure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Perez-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, seeks review of the BIA's denial of her motion to reopen her removal proceedings to apply for asylum. Petitioner filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings to seek asylum based on fear of harm in Nigeria because of allegedly new, widespread violence from the terrorist group Boko Haram. The court held that petitioner's motion to reopen was untimely due to her inability to show a material change in country conditions in Nigeria, which would have excused her from the 90-day time limitation for filing the motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the BIA's judgment and denied the petition for review. View "Zeah v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya and a member of the Kikuyu ethnic group, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming an IJ's denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. The court concluded that petitioner did not suffer persecution on account of his membership in two particular groups: witnesses to criminal activities of the Mungiki and Kikuyus who resist recruitment by the Mungiki. The court concluded that neither group forms a cognizable particular social group. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership upon return to Kenya. Because petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum, he necessarily fails to meet the higher burden of proof required for withholding of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ngugi v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her minor sons, natives and citizens of Guatemala, seek review of the denial of their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In this case, petitioners failed to establish past persecution because they have not shown that a gang persecuted them on the basis of their membership in their family. Nor have petitioners shown a well founded fear of future persecution on the basis of their family membership. Therefore, the court concluded that the BIA's determination that petitioners are not eligible for asylum is supported by substantial evidence. Since petitioners are not eligible for asylum, they necessarily cannot meet the more rigorous standard of proof for withholding of removal. Finally, the court concluded that petitioners failed to present a case of willful non-intervention by law enforcement sufficient to meet the requirements under the CAT. The court denied the petition for review. View "Garcia-Milian v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order of removal based on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(1). Petitioner's conviction under Arkansas Code Annotated 5-13-205, assault in the first degree, as in effect in 2004, is not a CIMT. After the BIA reopened and remanded, the IJ reconsidered the status of the Arkansas conviction and determined that it constitutes a CIMT. The court held that the IJ was not collaterally estopped from reconsidering the CIMT issue because the CIMT issue was not previously determined by a valid and final judgment in a prior action between petitioner and DHS; rather, the CIMT issue was determined at an earlier stage of the same action and was reconsidered pursuant to the reopening of the action; in regard to the law of the case doctrine, it was not an abuse of discretion for the IJ to deem the CIMT issue appropriate for reconsideration; even applying Skidmore deference, the court affirmed the BIA's decision and agreed with the BIA that petitioner's conviction, in its 2004 form, categorically is a CIMT; and the court declined to address petitioner's due process argument. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, moved to reopen an in absentia removal order, arguing he never received the Notice of Hearing. Alternatively, he moved to reopen to apply for asylum. The IJ denied both motions and the BIA affirmed. The court concluded that petitioner's affidavit claiming that he never received the Notice of Hearing is insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery. The court also concluded that there is no error in denying the motion to reopen where petitioner did not file his motion until two years after the IJ entered the order of removal. Therefore, the motion to reopen is time-barred, and petitioner failed to demonstrate a change in conditions between the 2011 hearing and his 2013 motion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Diaz v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit against appellant under 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), seeking revocation of appellant's citizenship and cancellation of his certificate of naturalization. The United States alleged that appellant procured his naturalization illegally, or alternatively, that appellant procured naturalization by material misrepresentation or concealment. The court granted the United States summary judgment. The court concluded that, because circumstantial evidence is compatible with the evidentiary standard applicable to denaturalization proceedings, the district court did not err by considering circumstantial evidence to find appellant had willfully concealed or misrepresented material facts; the district court did not err by considering appellant’s prior use of the names Rakeshkumar Patel and Rakesh Hirani outside the naturalization context; the undisputed facts established clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to revoke appellant’s citizenship and to cancel appellant’s certificate of naturalization on the basis of representation or concealment of a material fact; and the court declined to consider a collateral challenge to the 1995 deportation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hirani" on Justia Law