Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner and her minor sons, natives and citizens of Guatemala, seek review of the denial of their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In this case, petitioners failed to establish past persecution because they have not shown that a gang persecuted them on the basis of their membership in their family. Nor have petitioners shown a well founded fear of future persecution on the basis of their family membership. Therefore, the court concluded that the BIA's determination that petitioners are not eligible for asylum is supported by substantial evidence. Since petitioners are not eligible for asylum, they necessarily cannot meet the more rigorous standard of proof for withholding of removal. Finally, the court concluded that petitioners failed to present a case of willful non-intervention by law enforcement sufficient to meet the requirements under the CAT. The court denied the petition for review. View "Garcia-Milian v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order of removal based on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(1). Petitioner's conviction under Arkansas Code Annotated 5-13-205, assault in the first degree, as in effect in 2004, is not a CIMT. After the BIA reopened and remanded, the IJ reconsidered the status of the Arkansas conviction and determined that it constitutes a CIMT. The court held that the IJ was not collaterally estopped from reconsidering the CIMT issue because the CIMT issue was not previously determined by a valid and final judgment in a prior action between petitioner and DHS; rather, the CIMT issue was determined at an earlier stage of the same action and was reconsidered pursuant to the reopening of the action; in regard to the law of the case doctrine, it was not an abuse of discretion for the IJ to deem the CIMT issue appropriate for reconsideration; even applying Skidmore deference, the court affirmed the BIA's decision and agreed with the BIA that petitioner's conviction, in its 2004 form, categorically is a CIMT; and the court declined to address petitioner's due process argument. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, moved to reopen an in absentia removal order, arguing he never received the Notice of Hearing. Alternatively, he moved to reopen to apply for asylum. The IJ denied both motions and the BIA affirmed. The court concluded that petitioner's affidavit claiming that he never received the Notice of Hearing is insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery. The court also concluded that there is no error in denying the motion to reopen where petitioner did not file his motion until two years after the IJ entered the order of removal. Therefore, the motion to reopen is time-barred, and petitioner failed to demonstrate a change in conditions between the 2011 hearing and his 2013 motion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Diaz v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit against appellant under 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), seeking revocation of appellant's citizenship and cancellation of his certificate of naturalization. The United States alleged that appellant procured his naturalization illegally, or alternatively, that appellant procured naturalization by material misrepresentation or concealment. The court granted the United States summary judgment. The court concluded that, because circumstantial evidence is compatible with the evidentiary standard applicable to denaturalization proceedings, the district court did not err by considering circumstantial evidence to find appellant had willfully concealed or misrepresented material facts; the district court did not err by considering appellant’s prior use of the names Rakeshkumar Patel and Rakesh Hirani outside the naturalization context; the undisputed facts established clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to revoke appellant’s citizenship and to cancel appellant’s certificate of naturalization on the basis of representation or concealment of a material fact; and the court declined to consider a collateral challenge to the 1995 deportation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hirani" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Burma, pleaded guilty to one count of failing to depart because he willfully failed or refused "to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary" for his departure after the BIA held that he was removable. Reviewing defendant's due process challenges de novo, the court concluded that the IJ did not violate due process by proceeding without an affirmative waiver of counsel from defendant where defendant waived his right to representation. Furthermore, defendant suffered no prejudice from not having been told of his right to appeal. The court rejected defendant's contention that he was given no reasonable opportunity to examine evidence against him because he did not receive a translated copy of the 2011 State Department report on human rights in Burma used to reject his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Finally, the court concluded that the district court committed no error precluding defendant from raising a coercion defense because the evidentiary predicate for a successful coercion defense is lacking. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Yan Naing" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his wife and kids seek review of the BIA's denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioners contend that members of the Matazetas gang in Mexico will persecute them if they are returned to Mexico. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision based on alternative grounds concerning whether petitioners established a well-founded fear of “persecution” within the meaning of the asylum statute. The evidence supports the Board's conclusion that internal relocation was reasonable and could avoid persecution of petitioners. That police in Veracruz could not solve a crime committed by masked men and reported well after the fact does not dictate a finding that the government is unable to control persecution by the gang. Nor does the decision of police in the state of Puebla compel a finding of unwillingness or inability to control. Likewise, petitioners are not eligible for withholding of removal and substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Saldana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's decision (1) finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, and (2) denying his application for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that all four of petitioner's convictions under Iowa Code Annotated 708.2A, including his third and fourth convictions under the section 708.2A(4)'s recidivist provision, are dependent upon the definition of "assault" in section 708.1(2). "Because [§ 708.1] is divisible into discrete subsections of turpitudinous acts and nonturpitudinous acts," petitioner's domestic-abuse assault convictions do not categorically constitute CIMTs. Therefore, the BIA erred in declining to review petitioner's record of convictions, under the modified categorical approach, to determine whether he was convicted under a subsection that describes a CIMT. The court granted the petition for review, vacated, and remanded for the BIA to consider the issue in the first instance. View "Perez Alonzo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's decision finding him removable as an alien who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of his admission to the United States. The court found the Fifth Circuit's reasoning persuasive and held that petitioner's submission of the I-751 petition constituted an overt act in furtherance of his conspiracy to commit marriage fraud, thereby extending his conspiracy crime to a date within five years of his admission to the United States. Accordingly, the court upheld the BIA's finding of removability. View "Ashraf v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of asylum and voluntary departure. The court concluded that the BIA's findings regarding past persecution are supported by substantial evidence; petitioner failed to show why rather dated events provide an objectively reasonable basis for a present fear of particularized persecution directed at him personally on the basis of his political opinion; the court agreed with the BIA that the particular social group claimed by petitioner - “Guatemalan repatriates who have lived and worked in the United States for many years and are perceived to be wealthy” - is too amorphous because it turns on whether an individual is perceived as being wealthy; substantial evidence supports the BIA's finding that petitioner failed to prove he and his family would be unable to relocate within Guatemala; the BIA did not err in concluding that the IJ abused his discretion in denying voluntary departure; and the court may not grant relief based on a re-translation of an extortion letter where the court's review is limited to the administrative record before the agency. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Cinto-Velasquez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners, natives of Iraq, appealed the denial of their petitions for naturalization. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by determining that Petitioner Hamod had not lawfully been admitted to permanent residence status because he accepted employment from the Islamic Cultural Community Center (ICCC) "starting at least in early to mid-2000," before he was authorized to do so. Therefore, Hamod was not eligible for naturalization. Consequently, Petitioner Al-Saadoon's petition for naturalization was denied because her status is dependent upon Hamod's. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Al-Saadoon v. Lynch" on Justia Law