Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a citizen of Burma, pleaded guilty to one count of failing to depart because he willfully failed or refused "to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary" for his departure after the BIA held that he was removable. Reviewing defendant's due process challenges de novo, the court concluded that the IJ did not violate due process by proceeding without an affirmative waiver of counsel from defendant where defendant waived his right to representation. Furthermore, defendant suffered no prejudice from not having been told of his right to appeal. The court rejected defendant's contention that he was given no reasonable opportunity to examine evidence against him because he did not receive a translated copy of the 2011 State Department report on human rights in Burma used to reject his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Finally, the court concluded that the district court committed no error precluding defendant from raising a coercion defense because the evidentiary predicate for a successful coercion defense is lacking. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Yan Naing" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his wife and kids seek review of the BIA's denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioners contend that members of the Matazetas gang in Mexico will persecute them if they are returned to Mexico. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision based on alternative grounds concerning whether petitioners established a well-founded fear of “persecution” within the meaning of the asylum statute. The evidence supports the Board's conclusion that internal relocation was reasonable and could avoid persecution of petitioners. That police in Veracruz could not solve a crime committed by masked men and reported well after the fact does not dictate a finding that the government is unable to control persecution by the gang. Nor does the decision of police in the state of Puebla compel a finding of unwillingness or inability to control. Likewise, petitioners are not eligible for withholding of removal and substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Saldana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's decision (1) finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, and (2) denying his application for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that all four of petitioner's convictions under Iowa Code Annotated 708.2A, including his third and fourth convictions under the section 708.2A(4)'s recidivist provision, are dependent upon the definition of "assault" in section 708.1(2). "Because [§ 708.1] is divisible into discrete subsections of turpitudinous acts and nonturpitudinous acts," petitioner's domestic-abuse assault convictions do not categorically constitute CIMTs. Therefore, the BIA erred in declining to review petitioner's record of convictions, under the modified categorical approach, to determine whether he was convicted under a subsection that describes a CIMT. The court granted the petition for review, vacated, and remanded for the BIA to consider the issue in the first instance. View "Perez Alonzo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's decision finding him removable as an alien who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of his admission to the United States. The court found the Fifth Circuit's reasoning persuasive and held that petitioner's submission of the I-751 petition constituted an overt act in furtherance of his conspiracy to commit marriage fraud, thereby extending his conspiracy crime to a date within five years of his admission to the United States. Accordingly, the court upheld the BIA's finding of removability. View "Ashraf v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of asylum and voluntary departure. The court concluded that the BIA's findings regarding past persecution are supported by substantial evidence; petitioner failed to show why rather dated events provide an objectively reasonable basis for a present fear of particularized persecution directed at him personally on the basis of his political opinion; the court agreed with the BIA that the particular social group claimed by petitioner - “Guatemalan repatriates who have lived and worked in the United States for many years and are perceived to be wealthy” - is too amorphous because it turns on whether an individual is perceived as being wealthy; substantial evidence supports the BIA's finding that petitioner failed to prove he and his family would be unable to relocate within Guatemala; the BIA did not err in concluding that the IJ abused his discretion in denying voluntary departure; and the court may not grant relief based on a re-translation of an extortion letter where the court's review is limited to the administrative record before the agency. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Cinto-Velasquez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners, natives of Iraq, appealed the denial of their petitions for naturalization. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by determining that Petitioner Hamod had not lawfully been admitted to permanent residence status because he accepted employment from the Islamic Cultural Community Center (ICCC) "starting at least in early to mid-2000," before he was authorized to do so. Therefore, Hamod was not eligible for naturalization. Consequently, Petitioner Al-Saadoon's petition for naturalization was denied because her status is dependent upon Hamod's. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Al-Saadoon v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's pretermitting his application for removal because petitioner committed theft in the fourth degree, a crime involving moral turpitude. The court concluded that, while the government bears the burden to prove the alien is deportable or removable, it is the alien's burden under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i), to prove he is eligible for cancellation of removal; petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that the Iowa state court vacated his conviction for a substantive or procedural reason, and not for immigration purposes; and the IJ properly found his conviction for theft in the fourth degree qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude despite its vacatur. The court held that the BIA's interpretation that the cross-reference in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) to an offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) should be read only as a cross-reference to the list of offenses in the statute, not as a cross-reference to the statute as a whole. Therefore, the IJ did not err when it pretermitted petitioner's application for cancellation of removal on the grounds that he committed an offense under section 1227(a)(2), even though he was never admitted to the United States. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the IJ and BIA's denial of relief from removal based on asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the BIA did not err in rejecting petitioner's claims of persecution on account of his membership in two family-based social groups: (1) male, gang-aged family members of murdered gang members, and (2) male, gang-aged family members of his cousin. Nor is “male, gang-aged members of the Institute” a cognizable social group under the relevant statute. Therefore, the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's claim for withholding of removal. The court also concluded that the BIA properly determined that petitioner does not qualify for relief under the CAT because the same documents petitioner relies on to demonstrate police-corruption in El Salvador, also identify government efforts to end gang violence, including a stimulus program to rehabilitate gang members. Certainly, El Salvador has struggled to protect against gang violence, but it has not acquiesced to gang violence. The court denied the petition for review. View "Aguinada-Lopez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Haiti, petitioned for review of the IJ and BIA's denial of her application for relief and finding that she had not established that she would suffer torture if returned to Haiti. The court concluded that the BIA applied the correct legal standard in determining whether petitioner had established that she would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Haiti, and concluded that she had not. Accordingly, the court concluded that the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's application for relief and affirmed the judgment. View "Mervil v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from an order of removal. The court held that the IJ did not commit a fundamental error by failing to inform petitioner about asylum or other possible avenues of relief. Therefore, petitioner's due process argument fails because he has not shown that the IJ committed a fundamental procedural error. The court further held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen or remand the case because the evidence was previously discoverable and because petitioner points to no other reason why he could not have found the evidence through the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Alva-Arellano v. Lynch" on Justia Law