Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, natives of Iraq, appealed the denial of their petitions for naturalization. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by determining that Petitioner Hamod had not lawfully been admitted to permanent residence status because he accepted employment from the Islamic Cultural Community Center (ICCC) "starting at least in early to mid-2000," before he was authorized to do so. Therefore, Hamod was not eligible for naturalization. Consequently, Petitioner Al-Saadoon's petition for naturalization was denied because her status is dependent upon Hamod's. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Al-Saadoon v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's pretermitting his application for removal because petitioner committed theft in the fourth degree, a crime involving moral turpitude. The court concluded that, while the government bears the burden to prove the alien is deportable or removable, it is the alien's burden under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i), to prove he is eligible for cancellation of removal; petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that the Iowa state court vacated his conviction for a substantive or procedural reason, and not for immigration purposes; and the IJ properly found his conviction for theft in the fourth degree qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude despite its vacatur. The court held that the BIA's interpretation that the cross-reference in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) to an offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) should be read only as a cross-reference to the list of offenses in the statute, not as a cross-reference to the statute as a whole. Therefore, the IJ did not err when it pretermitted petitioner's application for cancellation of removal on the grounds that he committed an offense under section 1227(a)(2), even though he was never admitted to the United States. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the IJ and BIA's denial of relief from removal based on asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the BIA did not err in rejecting petitioner's claims of persecution on account of his membership in two family-based social groups: (1) male, gang-aged family members of murdered gang members, and (2) male, gang-aged family members of his cousin. Nor is “male, gang-aged members of the Institute” a cognizable social group under the relevant statute. Therefore, the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's claim for withholding of removal. The court also concluded that the BIA properly determined that petitioner does not qualify for relief under the CAT because the same documents petitioner relies on to demonstrate police-corruption in El Salvador, also identify government efforts to end gang violence, including a stimulus program to rehabilitate gang members. Certainly, El Salvador has struggled to protect against gang violence, but it has not acquiesced to gang violence. The court denied the petition for review. View "Aguinada-Lopez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Haiti, petitioned for review of the IJ and BIA's denial of her application for relief and finding that she had not established that she would suffer torture if returned to Haiti. The court concluded that the BIA applied the correct legal standard in determining whether petitioner had established that she would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Haiti, and concluded that she had not. Accordingly, the court concluded that the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's application for relief and affirmed the judgment. View "Mervil v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from an order of removal. The court held that the IJ did not commit a fundamental error by failing to inform petitioner about asylum or other possible avenues of relief. Therefore, petitioner's due process argument fails because he has not shown that the IJ committed a fundamental procedural error. The court further held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen or remand the case because the evidence was previously discoverable and because petitioner points to no other reason why he could not have found the evidence through the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Alva-Arellano v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In consolidated petitions for review, petitioner seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that he is removable as an alien convicted of two separate crimes involving moral turpitude, and the BIA's decision denying petitioner's "Motion to Reconsider or Reopen Notwithstanding his Removal from the United States.” Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States as a child. On September 27, 2006, petitioner was convicted of soliciting prostitution in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.324, subd. 2. The court concluded that, because petitioner failed to establish a realistic probability Minnesota courts would apply section 609.324, subd. 2, to crimes that did not involve moral turpitude, the Board did not err in deciding that petitioner’s solicitation conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. The court also concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner's arguments did not warrant further review or a fuller explanation, and therefore the Board properly denied petitioner's motion. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions. View "Gomez-Gutierrez v.Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya, seeks review of the BIA's order upholding the IJ's denial of her applications for adjustment of status and waiver of removal. The court agreed with the government that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision to deny an adjustment of status and a fraud waiver. The court concluded that, notwithstanding the approved Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1229b(b)(2)(A), petition, the IJ was authorized to determine, based on the evidence and testimony, that petitioner’s application for an adjustment of status and a fraud waiver should be denied in the exercise of discretion. Further, the court denied the petition for review with respect to petitioner's due process claims because she has not shown both a fundamental procedural error and prejudice as a result of the error. View "Mutie-Timothy v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Tanzania, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his application for adjustment of status. The court concluded that, although the IJ did misquote Form I-9, the entirety of his analysis shows he was properly analyzing the key legal issue: whether petitioner intended to represent himself as a citizen or a national. Further, substantial evidence supports the IJ's finding that petitioner falsely represented himself to be a citizen. The court also concluded that petitioner is not eligible for waiver of his ineligibility and the IJ did not violate petitioner's right to due process when he admitted evidence of petitioner's false representation on the I-9 Form. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Godfrey v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, appealed the BIA's denial of his claim for withholding of removal based on harm he suffered at the hands of a drug cartel in Mexico when he was twelve years old. The court concluded that the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner failed to establish a causal nexus between the persecution he suffered and his membership in the proposed particular social group: “escapee Mexican child laborers.” Accordingly, because the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's application for withholding of removal, the court denied the petition for review. View "Cano v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Tanzania, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the denial of his motion to reopen. The court concluded that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen because his newly submitted evidence was previously discoverable. The BIA noted that the "new" documents petitioner submitted - including his marriage license from 2003, rental agreement from 2006, anniversary cards, sales receipts, tax returns, and photos - predated the March 2012 hearing. Further, petitioner conceded that he was never able to retrieve these documents from his attorney but was able to submit different supporting documents to the BIA. Because, the court believed that the BIA's explanation for its decision was rational and in accordance with the record, the court denied the petition for review. View "Makundi v. Lynch" on Justia Law