Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Maria Fatima Mejia Ponce sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Ponce claimed she faced persecution in Honduras due to her membership in a particular social group, specifically Honduran business owners perceived as wealthy and targeted by criminal gangs.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Ponce's application, finding that her proposed social group was not sufficiently particular or socially distinct. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Ponce's proposed group did not meet the criteria for a particular social group under U.S. asylum law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that to qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate persecution based on membership in a particular social group, which must be defined by common, immutable characteristics, and be socially distinct within the society in question. The court referenced its prior decision in Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General, which held that a particular social group must be narrowly defined and not overly broad.The Eleventh Circuit found that Ponce's proposed social group of Honduran business owners perceived as wealthy was too broad and lacked the necessary immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness. The court concluded that Ponce's proposed group did not qualify as a particular social group for asylum purposes. Consequently, the court denied Ponce's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Ponce v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Nakia Courtney Hamilton, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States in 2017 following a conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Hamilton, who was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2009, has filed three motions to reopen his removal proceedings. His most recent motion sought to apply for a waiver of the immigration consequences of his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Hamilton’s third motion to reopen, finding it untimely and procedurally barred. Hamilton argued that the procedural limitations should be equitably tolled based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, which held that a notice to appear must be a single document containing all required information to trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. The BIA concluded that Niz-Chavez did not affect Hamilton’s eligibility for a § 1182(h) waiver and thus did not justify reopening the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court found that the stop-time rule in § 1182(h) is triggered by the initiation of removal proceedings, not by the issuance of a compliant notice to appear as required by § 1229(a). The court determined that Hamilton’s removal proceedings were validly initiated when the Department of Homeland Security filed the notice to appear with the immigration court, regardless of whether it included the date and time of the hearing. Consequently, the court held that Hamilton was not eligible for a § 1182(h) waiver and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. The petition for review was denied. View "Hamilton v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

John Doe, using multiple aliases, had a long history with U.S. immigration authorities dating back to 1985. He was twice caught trying to enter the U.S. with fraudulent documents and was deported. In 1988, he was found in Texas and deported again. In 2018, he was detained in Florida, and despite a final deportation order, he refused to cooperate with immigration officials, leading to his indictment on three counts of willfully failing to leave the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Doe's request for a jury instruction that would require the government to prove he had been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to convict him under § 1253(a)(1). The court also denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the same grounds. Doe was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 51 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 1253(a)(1) does not require a noncitizen to have been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to be subject to its penalties. The court found that the statutory text and context did not support Doe's interpretation that only admitted noncitizens could be penalized under § 1253(a)(1). The court affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Doe's convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Doe" on Justia Law

Jordan Pulido developed an online relationship with a 14-year-old Croatian girl, I.G., and, with the help of his father, Roberto Jimenez, traveled to Croatia to have sex with her. They later brought her to the United States, where Pulido continued to have sex with her. Pulido was indicted on multiple counts, including using the internet to entice a minor, traveling with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and transporting a minor for sexual activity. Jimenez was indicted for conspiring to transport a minor for sexual activity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Pulido's pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment, suppress evidence, and exclude testimony. Both defendants were convicted on all counts after a nine-day trial. Post-trial motions for acquittal, a new trial, and a mistrial were also denied. Jimenez received sentence enhancements for exercising undue influence and having custody or supervisory control over I.G.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions on most counts but vacated Pulido's conviction on the enticement count, finding the indictment duplicitous. The court held that the enticement count was not harmless and remanded for resentencing. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Pulido's motion to suppress evidence from his electronic devices, holding that the border search exception applied. Additionally, the court found no fundamental unfairness in the translation irregularities during I.G.'s mother's testimony.For Jimenez, the court affirmed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence of his intent to transport I.G. for sexual activity. The court also upheld the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on Agent Garcia's testimony about his immigration status, concluding that the curative instruction mitigated any potential prejudice. Finally, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancements for undue influence and custody or supervisory control. View "U.S. v. Pulido" on Justia Law

The appellants, Madhu Sudhan Kanapuram and Swathi Pillarisetty, are Indian citizens legally residing in the United States on temporary employment-based visas. They filed Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status to obtain EB-2 immigrant visas. Their applications were initially within the priority date cutoff, but due to a retrogression policy, the Final Action Date was pushed back, placing their applications outside the priority cutoff date. After waiting 19 months without a decision, they filed a lawsuit alleging that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of State violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying the adjudication of their applications.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the case, concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) barred judicial review of claims asserting delays in the adjudication of pending Form I-485 applications. The appellants then sought review of this dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of challenges to USCIS delays in adjudicating Form I-485 applications because the statute grants the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and USCIS broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. The court concluded that the decision to delay adjudication due to the retrogression policy falls within this discretionary authority. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order of dismissal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the appellants' APA claims. View "SudhanKanapuram v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Fu Jing Wu and Wai Lam set up investment funds for foreign investors, promising opportunities to immigrate to the United States through the EB-5 visa program. They fraudulently diverted millions of dollars from these funds. An investor, Chun Liu, sued them in a Florida court. Wu and Lam removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on a purchase agreement. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case. The court found that Wu was not a signatory to the purchase agreement containing the arbitration clause and thus could not enforce it. Consequently, the court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) barred appellate review of the district court's order that both denied the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the denial of the motion to compel arbitration was intrinsic to the jurisdictional decision and could not be reviewed separately. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Wu and Lam’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wu v. Liu" on Justia Law

Marvin Laguna Rivera, a Nicaraguan citizen, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Laguna Rivera claimed that his political activities against the Nicaraguan government put his life in danger if he returned. The IJ found his testimony about recent threats not credible and determined that past persecution of his family members was too remote to establish a future threat to him. The BIA upheld the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Laguna Rivera argued that the court had jurisdiction to review the denial of his asylum petition despite its untimeliness and that the BIA's adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the asylum petition's timeliness due to controlling precedent. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility finding and the denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief.The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that Laguna Rivera's asylum application was untimely. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that Laguna Rivera did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution, as his claims were based on dated incidents and unsubstantiated rumors. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for review of the asylum claim and denied the petition for review of the withholding of removal and CAT claims. View "Rivera v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

Sheldon Turner, born in Jamaica to Jamaican parents Desmond and Roslyn Turner, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1990. His parents divorced in 1987, and his mother remarried twice, including a remarriage to Desmond in 1994. Roslyn naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1999 while still married to Desmond. Turner was convicted of a felony in 2016, leading to removal proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Turner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings, finding that Turner did not derive U.S. citizenship from his mother’s naturalization because his parents were married at the time of her naturalization, thus not meeting the legal separation requirement under former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3). The IJ’s decision was based on the statute’s plain language and the rationale explained in Levy v. U.S. Attorney General. Turner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed, with the BIA agreeing that the statute requires a continuing legal separation at the time of naturalization.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the BIA’s interpretation. The court held that former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) imposes a continuing requirement of legal separation that must exist at the time all other conditions of derivative citizenship are satisfied. Since Turner’s mother was married to his father at the time of her naturalization, Turner did not derive automatic citizenship. The court denied Turner’s petition for review. View "Turner v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged CIS's denial of her petition, Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, seeking an immigrant visa for her alien father. The court concluded that CIS's decision denying plaintiff's 2012 petition was not arbitrary and capricious or otherwise contrary to law and that substantial evidence supported the decision. In this case, the evidence regarding her father's marriage was sufficient to support CIS's doubts about the marriage's validity and was also sufficient to support denial of the visa petition for failure to prove the father's ultimate eligibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mendoza v. Secretary, DHS" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a labor dispute involving the H-2A visa program. Defendant Consolidated Citrus Limited Partnership (“Consolidated Citrus”) appealed from the district court’s order granting judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and holding Consolidated Citrus liable as a joint employer. All original plaintiffs were Mexican nationals who came to the United States temporarily to work as harvesters on citrus groves in central Florida. These plaintiffs entered the United States legally under the federal H-2A visa program. During the 2005-06 harvest season, Consolidated Citrus struggled to find sufficient labor to meet its harvesting needs. Starting with the 2006-07 harvest season, Consolidated Citrus began working with labor contractors to hire temporary foreign workers. One such labor contractor was defendant Ruiz Harvesting, Inc. (“RHI”), owned by Basiliso Ruiz (“Ruiz”). Consolidated Citrus expected the temporary workers to be at their assigned groves at some time in the early morning, but RHI personnel ultimately decided what time the workers would arrive. Each day, RHI transported workers to and from the groves in RHI vehicles. Under the H-2A program regulations, agricultural workers compensated on a piece-rate basis must be paid at least the equivalent of the wages they would have received under the applicable “adverse effect wage rate” (“AEWR”), which was the hourly minimum set by the Department of Labor. Where a worker’s piece-rate wages did not add up to the wages the worker would have earned under the hourly rate, the employer had to supplement that worker’s earnings to meet that minimum wage. The supplemental amount was known as “build-up” pay. RHI perpetrated a kickback scheme to recoup this build-up pay: on payday, RHI employees drove the H-2A temporary workers to a bank where the workers cashed their paychecks. The workers then returned to the RHI vehicle, where an RHI employee collected cash from each worker in an amount equal to that worker’s build-up pay. H-2A workers were told to return money only to Ruiz and RHI and only when the workers’ paychecks included build-up pay. No one from Consolidated Citrus demanded that H-2A temporary workers return their build-up pay, and no H-2A temporary worker ever complained directly to Consolidated Citrus about RHI’s kickback scheme. After careful review of this matter, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. To the extent that the district court held Consolidated Citrus liable as a joint employer for purposes of the plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims, the Court affirmed. The Court reversed, however, the district court’s determination that the FLSA “suffer or permit to work” standard applied to the breach of contract claims for purposes of determining whether Consolidated Citrus qualified as a joint employer under the H-2A program. The case was remanded to the district court to apply, in the first instance, that governing standard of common law agency for purposes of the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. View "Garcia-Celestino, et al. v. Consolidated Citrus Ltd. Partnership" on Justia Law