Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by ignoring petitioner's equitable tolling argument and the court declined to determine whether the deadline should be equitably tolled in the instant case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions for the BIA to apply the same equitable tolling standard that this court uses in other contexts. Under this standard, “a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” View "Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the BIA's order dismissing his appeal of the IJ's order of removal. At issue is whether petitioner became a lawful permanent resident in 2000, when the INS officer signed the I-89 Form certifying that he was eligible for a permanent resident card, or in 2004, when USCIS formally approved his application and actually issued the card. The court agreed with the BIA that petitioner became a permanent resident in 2004, after his eighteenth birthday, when USCIS formally approved his application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1255(b). Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2009 (CCA), 8 U.S.C. 1431. In the alternative, the court concluded that, pursuant to Robertson-Dewar v. Holder, there is no evidence that the United States purposefully delayed ruling on petitioner's application with the intent of not acting therein until he had aged out of the statute, so there is no evidence of affirmative misconduct. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's equitable estoppel argument. The court denied the petition. View "Gutierrez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, seeks review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1158 and 1231(b)(3). Petitioner testified that he had been tortured by the Ethiopian government because it suspected he and his family members supported a terrorist organization called the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The court concluded that the IJ and the BIA failed to consider several factors essential to determining whether one central reason for the Ethiopian government’s maltreatment of petitioner was persecution on account of a protected ground. Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration. View "Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent" on Justia Law

Petitioner conceded removeability, but cancellation as a nonpermanent resident under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). At issue is whether petitioner's conviction for a prior Texas misdemeanor assault qualifies as a "crime of moral turpitude" that makes him ineligible for cancellation. The Supreme Court held in Mathis v. United States that, under the modified categorical approach, a court may look to certain documents, including the indictment and the judgment, to narrow an offense that otherwise would not be a categorical match with an enumerated offense. With Mathis holding that a statute like Texas’s assault offense that merely offers alternative means of committing an offense does not allow application of the modified categorical approach, the court is back to the general categorical inquiry about which the parties, the immigration judge, and the Board agree. Texas’s assault statute can be committed by mere reckless conduct and thus does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, which requires a more culpable mental state. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration. View "Gomez-Perez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After petitioner was ordered removed in abstentia, he filed a motion to reopen on the basis that he was unaware that a notice to appear had been issued years earlier and he never received a notice of hearing. The BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of the motion. The court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion because it concluded that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of notice without considering all relevant evidence. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the BIA so that it may consider all relevant evidence offered by defendant to rebut the presumption of notice. View "Torres Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged DHS's decision to reinstate an expedited order of removal. Although petitioner agrees that the court lacks jurisdiction, she formally opposes the motion and seeks a declaration of this circuit's rule of finality as it pertains to this circumstance. The court concluded that the Tenth Circuit has provided a compelling analysis of why reinstatement orders should be regarded as final only upon completion of reasonable fear and withholding-of-removal proceedings. The court agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s analysis and concluded that it applies even where, as here, withholding-of-removal proceedings remain ongoing only because the BIA has remanded to the IJ for background and security checks. The court agreed with Abdisalan v. Holder and adopt its bright-line rule that, when the BIA decides some issues but remands for background and security checks as to others, its decision is not final for purposes of judicial review. It follows that here, the removal proceedings are ongoing because the BIA remanded to the IJ for background and security checks. The reinstatement order is thus non-final, and the court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for review in this case. View "Ponce-Osorio v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of the BIA's order finding him statutorily ineligible for relief from removal under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The court concluded that the BIA did not err in finding petitioner ineligible for section 212(c) relief. In this case, the treatment of petitioner's prior offense (transporting an alien within the United States) as an aggravated felony - which is proper even if it is retroactive - means that under the pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Stat. 3009-546, law otherwise in effect at the time he pleaded guilty in December 1996, he would have been deportable whether he traveled abroad or not. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Limonteco Lucas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from an IJ's denial of her motion to reopen in abstentia removal proceedings and denial of her subsequent motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that petitioner failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in regard to her claims of femicide. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in regard to her assertions about the remilitarization of Guatemala after the election of Otto Perez Molina. Therefore, the court concluded that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in agreeing with the IJ that petitioner had not made the required showing. Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion, this court need not reach petitioner's claims regarding her eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Finally, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claim regarding the BIA’s denial of her motion for reconsideration because she filed an untimely petition for review of that decision. The court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Ramos-Lopez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was determined ineligible for cancellation of removal after an IJ concluded that his conviction for deadly conduct under Texas Penal Code 22.05(a) was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The BIA applied the “realistic probability” approach to hold that deadly conduct was categorically a CIMT and dismissed the appeal. The court held that, for the reasons explained in Mercado v. Lynch, the BIA applied the incorrect standard in analyzing whether petitioner’s conviction constitutes a CIMT. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the BIA to analyze petitioner’s convictions under the minimum reading approach. View "Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order of removal finding that his convictions for indecent exposure and making terroristic threats under Texas law are crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The court concluded that the BIA incorrectly applied the realistic probability approach in analyzing whether petitioner’s convictions are CIMTs. There has not been an intervening change of law that would permit this panel to overturn prior precedent and adopt the realistic probability approach as applied to CIMTs. The court has persistently applied the “minimum reading” approach in this context. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the BIA to analyze petitioner's convictions under the correct approach. View "Mercado v. Lynch" on Justia Law