Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Three nonprofit organizations brought suit challenging an executive order that denies U.S. citizenship to children born in the United States whose fathers are neither citizens nor lawful permanent residents, and whose mothers are present in the country either unlawfully or only temporarily. The organizations alleged that they have members who are expecting children affected by the order, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that the plaintiffs had standing and a cause of action for injunctive relief. The court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims, and that the equitable factors favored granting relief. It issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the executive order against the plaintiffs and their members, but not against nonparties. The government appealed the scope and propriety of the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, with de novo review of legal issues and clear error review of factual findings. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Citizenship Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1401. However, the First Circuit vacated the injunction to the extent that it ran directly against the President and the agencies themselves, holding that injunctive relief should be limited to agency officials. The court affirmed the injunction as applied to the organizations’ members who are likely to be harmed, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case concerns challenges to Executive Order No. 14160, issued in January 2025, which seeks to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States after its effective date if their fathers are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and their mothers are either unlawfully or temporarily present in the country. Plaintiffs include individual immigrants, nonprofit organizations, and a coalition of states and local governments. They allege that the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Order.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted preliminary injunctions to both sets of plaintiffs, finding they were “exceedingly likely” to succeed on their claims under the Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a). The injunctions barred federal agencies and officials from enforcing the Executive Order against the plaintiffs and, in the case brought by the states, issued a nationwide injunction to provide complete relief. The government appealed, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, the scope of the injunctions, and the merits of the constitutional and statutory claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s findings that the plaintiffs have Article III standing and are likely to succeed on the merits. The First Circuit held that the Executive Order’s denial of birthright citizenship to children born in the United States under the specified circumstances violates both the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), as interpreted by United States v. Wong Kim Ark and subsequent precedent. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part, vacated them in part as to agency defendants, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Doe v. Trump" on Justia Law

A Haitian national entered the United States on a temporary visa in 2010 and was later charged with removability for overstaying his visa. After initially obtaining temporary protected status, which was extended for several years, his status was not renewed in 2018. He was subsequently arrested multiple times in New Hampshire between 2018 and 2020 for incidents involving domestic violence and resisting arrest, though not all arrests resulted in convictions. Following his last arrest, he was detained and removal proceedings were initiated. He sought adjustment of status through his wife, as well as cancellation of removal and other forms of relief.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal. The IJ found the testimonies of the petitioner and his wife credible but inconsistent regarding the details of the arrests, and gave more weight to police reports, which were considered closer in time to the events. The IJ denied adjustment of status as a matter of discretion, citing the negative factors reflected in the police reports, and found the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal due to insufficient continuous physical presence, as his notice to appear was served less than two years after his arrival.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the police reports were reliable and their use was not fundamentally unfair, and that the IJ could consider evidence of criminal conduct not resulting in conviction. The BIA also found the notice to appear sufficient to stop the accrual of continuous presence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to determine whether the police reports were corroborated before giving them substantial weight in denying adjustment of status. The court vacated the BIA’s order as to adjustment of status and remanded for further proceedings, but affirmed the denial of cancellation of removal. View "Maurice v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case concerns a Guatemalan petitioner, López, who sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. After an immigration judge denied her applications, López appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), indicating her intent to file a supporting brief. On the deadline, her counsel attempted to file the brief electronically but mistakenly submitted it to the immigration court instead of the BIA. The immigration court rejected the filing weeks later, and counsel promptly refiled with the BIA and moved for acceptance of the late brief, explaining the technical error.The BIA, through an unsigned notice, denied the motion to accept the late-filed brief, stating only that the rationale was insufficient and that no further motions or reconsideration would be entertained. Subsequently, a single-member panel of the BIA dismissed López’s appeal, adopting the immigration judge’s decision and stating that the grounds for appeal were waived because they were not developed in a timely brief or statement. The BIA did not address the circumstances of the late filing or the explanation provided by López’s counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA’s actions. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate explanation for denying the motion to accept the late-filed brief, especially given the plausible and promptly explained reason for the delay. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further consideration consistent with its opinion, without addressing the merits of the underlying asylum claims. View "Lopez-Gomez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan citizen and her minor son entered the United States without legal status in August 2021. In November 2022, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her. Nearly a year later, she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), naming her son as a derivative applicant. She claimed that, for four years prior to her departure, unidentified hooded men in her home village threatened to kidnap her children if she did not support their side in a local land conflict. She did not report these threats to authorities, and neither she nor her family suffered physical harm or kidnapping attempts.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her asylum application untimely, rejecting her argument that ignorance of immigration law constituted an extraordinary circumstance excusing the late filing. The IJ also found that the threats did not amount to past persecution, nor did she establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, as the threats were unfulfilled and not linked to a protected ground. The IJ denied withholding of removal, citing her failure to meet the higher burden required, and denied CAT protection, finding no evidence she would likely be tortured or that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in such harm. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that her circumstances were not extraordinary and that the threats were insufficiently specific or severe to constitute persecution or torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of her untimely asylum application under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The court further held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT protection, as the record did not compel a finding of past persecution, future persecution, or likely torture. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Haitian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident at age 13 faced removal proceedings after being convicted in New Hampshire for the sale of a controlled drug, which was classified as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. During removal proceedings, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he would likely be tortured if returned to Haiti due to risks posed by Haitian authorities, gangs, and individuals seeking revenge, especially given his severe mental illness.An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the removal charge and denied his application for CAT relief after conducting hearings and considering evidence. The IJ found that, although conditions in Haitian detention facilities were deplorable and extrajudicial violence was a problem, the petitioner had not shown that the Haitian government maintained these conditions with the specific intent to torture detainees. The IJ also found insufficient likelihood that the petitioner would be targeted for torture by gangs, mobs, or private individuals with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and the petitioner timely sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to address the petitioner’s CAT claim regarding the risk of torture by low-level Haitian officials in detention facilities. The court vacated the BIA’s order and remanded for further consideration of this specific claim, instructing the BIA to properly distinguish between intent and purpose requirements for torture under CAT. The petition for review was otherwise denied, as the court found no error in the agency’s handling of other aspects of the CAT claim or in its evidentiary rulings. View "Fleurimond v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A naturalized U.S. citizen and his noncitizen son challenged the U.S. Secretary of State and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro over the reclassification of a visa petition. The father, after becoming a lawful permanent resident, filed a Form I-130 petition for his son, who was under 21 at the time. The son turned 21 during the process, and the petition was approved when a visa in the F2A category was available. After the father naturalized, the consulate reclassified the petition into the F1 category for adult children of U.S. citizens, resulting in a lengthy wait for visa availability. The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), the son should still be considered under 21 for visa purposes, and the reclassification was unlawful.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint, relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular decisions regarding visa denials. The court did not address the merits of whether the reclassification was lawful under the CSPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not bar judicial review in this instance because the plaintiffs were challenging the reclassification of the visa petition, not a visa denial. The court then addressed the merits and concluded that, under the CSPA, the son’s statutory age should be calculated using the formula provided for F2A beneficiaries, which accounts for bureaucratic delays. Therefore, the son remained a “child” for visa purposes at the time of the father’s naturalization, and the reclassification to the F1 category was unlawful. The First Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Teles De Menezes v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Several individuals who had received grants of parole under programs established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela challenged the government’s decision to terminate those grants. The parole programs, created during the Biden Administration, allowed eligible individuals from these countries to enter the United States temporarily for up to two years, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. When President Trump took office in January 2025, he issued executive orders directing DHS to end categorical parole programs, including the CHNV programs. DHS subsequently published a notice terminating the programs and revoking all existing grants of parole within thirty days, rather than allowing them to expire naturally.The plaintiffs, affected by the early termination, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court certified a class of affected individuals and granted a preliminary stay, preventing DHS from revoking their parole grants before the original expiration dates. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the categorical termination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in part because the agency’s rationale rested on a legal error and failed to adequately consider reliance and humanitarian interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that the relevant statute requires DHS to grant parole only on a case-by-case basis, but does not impose the same limitation on the termination of parole. The court also found that the agency’s explanation for terminating the parole programs was not so deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Concluding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Noem" on Justia Law

Mariano Ortiz Trejo, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 1999, briefly returned to Mexico in 2004, and reentered the U.S. without inspection in 2005. He resides in Rhode Island with his minor son, a U.S. citizen, and the child’s mother, who is not a legal permanent resident. Ortiz Trejo works in construction and contributes to the household income. In 2015, he was served a Notice to Appear, conceded removability, and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his son due to the child’s allergies and emotional health. He also sought voluntary departure as an alternative.The Immigration Judge of the Immigration Court found Ortiz Trejo credible but determined that he had not established the requisite hardship for cancellation of removal. The judge found that the child’s allergies were controllable, the likelihood of a severe reaction was low, and the child’s mother could provide for him, with continued access to medical care in Rhode Island. The judge admitted a psychological evaluation diagnosing the child with “Adjustment Disorder” but gave it limited weight. Cancellation of removal was denied, but voluntary departure was granted.Ortiz Trejo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the denial of cancellation and the grant of voluntary departure. The Board found that the Immigration Judge had considered all evidence, including the psychological evaluation, and concluded that the record did not establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Ortiz Trejo then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the Board did not err in its decision, finding no legal error or failure to consider key evidence. The court denied the petition for review, upholding the Board’s determination that Ortiz Trejo had not met the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal. View "Ortiz Trejo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national who had lived in the United States since 2000 applied for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). She testified that, before leaving Guatemala, she received frequent death threats from individuals seeking to extort her father's meat shop and experienced a separate violent incident unrelated to her family. She feared returning to Guatemala due to potential targeting by gangs, particularly as a deportee perceived to have money. In the United States, she had three U.S. citizen children, one of whom suffered from anxiety and was receiving therapy.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all three forms of relief. The IJ found that the petitioner was not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal due to insufficient continuous presence in the United States and, alternatively, that she failed to show her children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if she were removed. The IJ also determined that the threats and harm she experienced in Guatemala did not amount to persecution on account of a protected ground, but rather were motivated by general criminal activity. The IJ further found no evidence that she would be tortured with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government, denying her CAT claim.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision on all grounds. The BIA agreed that the hardship to her children did not meet the statutory threshold, that there was no nexus between the harm feared and a protected ground for withholding of removal, and that the CAT claim was waived due to lack of meaningful challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not err in its determinations regarding hardship, nexus to a protected ground, or waiver of the CAT claim. View "Lopez Cano v. Bondi" on Justia Law