Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A woman from Peru entered the United States in 2013 without valid documents and was later placed in removal proceedings. She conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, primarily based on years of physical and sexual abuse she experienced from her former partner, Mauro. She described a lengthy relationship characterized by escalating violence, failed police protection, and threats involving their child. De La Cruz claimed she was persecuted due to her membership in several proposed social groups, mostly linked to her status as a Peruvian woman in various familial or social configurations, and she submitted evidence about gender-based violence in Peru.The Immigration Judge found De La Cruz credible and her asylum application timely but denied all forms of relief. The judge concluded that the abuse she suffered was not on account of a statutorily protected ground, but rather arose from personal disputes within the relationship. As such, the judge found no sufficient nexus between the harm and the protected grounds necessary for asylum or withholding of removal, and determined her fear of future torture was speculative and unsupported for CAT relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the Immigration Judge applied the correct legal standards and did not clearly err in the factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, applying substantial evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that there was no nexus between the harm suffered and a protected ground, and agreed that the fear of future torture was too speculative to warrant CAT protection. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. View "De La Cruz-Quispe v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Haitian national, Jonalson Dor, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In August 2018, he pled guilty in Massachusetts state court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under Massachusetts law. At that time, both state and federal law included "hemp" in the definition of "marijuana." In December 2018, Congress amended the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to exclude "hemp" from its definition of "marijuana." The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Dor in 2019, originally based on earlier marijuana convictions. Those convictions were later vacated, and in 2023, DHS amended its charges, basing Dor’s removability on his 2018 conviction.An Immigration Judge in Boston denied Dor’s motion to terminate the proceedings, holding that the relevant version of the CSA was the one in effect at the time of the criminal conviction, not at the time of removal. The judge found Dor removable under the INA’s controlled substance provision. Dor appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ’s decision on March 18, 2025, agreeing that the time of conviction was the controlling point for determining if a state conviction matches the federal controlled substance definition.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether the definition of a “controlled substance” under the INA should reference the CSA as it existed at the time of conviction or at the time of removal proceedings. The court joined other circuits in holding that the relevant CSA definition is the one in effect at the time of conviction. Because Dor’s 2018 conviction categorically matched the federal definition then in force, the court denied his petition for review and upheld the removal order. View "Dor v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Colombian man and his family fled to the United States after a violent criminal gang, the Gulf Clan, repeatedly threatened their lives to coerce his support. The threats began after he opened a bakery and escalated to in-person confrontations. Upon receiving an armed threat at his business, he reported the incidents to local police, who responded by stationing a guard at his bakery and blocking threatening phone lines. While in-person threats ceased, the family continued to receive telephonic threats from different numbers. Fearing for their safety, they left Colombia and entered the United States, where they sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.An Immigration Judge found that while the man’s testimony was credible, he failed to establish that the Colombian government was unwilling or unable to protect him from the private gang’s threats. The judge determined that the police had taken meaningful action, including posting a guard and blocking calls, and that the government was both willing and able to provide protection. As a result, the requests for asylum and withholding of removal were denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, agreeing with the Immigration Judge’s assessment that the Colombian authorities had demonstrated willingness and ability to protect the family.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, applying the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s factual findings. The court held that the record supported the agency’s conclusion that the Colombian government was able to protect the family, even if it could not provide absolute security. The court denied the petition for review, finding no error in the agency’s determination or its procedural handling of the case. View "Restrepo Castano v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations brought suit challenging an executive order that denies U.S. citizenship to children born in the United States whose fathers are neither citizens nor lawful permanent residents, and whose mothers are present in the country either unlawfully or only temporarily. The organizations alleged that they have members who are expecting children affected by the order, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that the plaintiffs had standing and a cause of action for injunctive relief. The court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims, and that the equitable factors favored granting relief. It issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the executive order against the plaintiffs and their members, but not against nonparties. The government appealed the scope and propriety of the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, with de novo review of legal issues and clear error review of factual findings. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Citizenship Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1401. However, the First Circuit vacated the injunction to the extent that it ran directly against the President and the agencies themselves, holding that injunctive relief should be limited to agency officials. The court affirmed the injunction as applied to the organizations’ members who are likely to be harmed, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case concerns challenges to Executive Order No. 14160, issued in January 2025, which seeks to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States after its effective date if their fathers are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and their mothers are either unlawfully or temporarily present in the country. Plaintiffs include individual immigrants, nonprofit organizations, and a coalition of states and local governments. They allege that the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Order.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted preliminary injunctions to both sets of plaintiffs, finding they were “exceedingly likely” to succeed on their claims under the Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a). The injunctions barred federal agencies and officials from enforcing the Executive Order against the plaintiffs and, in the case brought by the states, issued a nationwide injunction to provide complete relief. The government appealed, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, the scope of the injunctions, and the merits of the constitutional and statutory claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s findings that the plaintiffs have Article III standing and are likely to succeed on the merits. The First Circuit held that the Executive Order’s denial of birthright citizenship to children born in the United States under the specified circumstances violates both the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), as interpreted by United States v. Wong Kim Ark and subsequent precedent. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part, vacated them in part as to agency defendants, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Doe v. Trump" on Justia Law

A Haitian national entered the United States on a temporary visa in 2010 and was later charged with removability for overstaying his visa. After initially obtaining temporary protected status, which was extended for several years, his status was not renewed in 2018. He was subsequently arrested multiple times in New Hampshire between 2018 and 2020 for incidents involving domestic violence and resisting arrest, though not all arrests resulted in convictions. Following his last arrest, he was detained and removal proceedings were initiated. He sought adjustment of status through his wife, as well as cancellation of removal and other forms of relief.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal. The IJ found the testimonies of the petitioner and his wife credible but inconsistent regarding the details of the arrests, and gave more weight to police reports, which were considered closer in time to the events. The IJ denied adjustment of status as a matter of discretion, citing the negative factors reflected in the police reports, and found the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal due to insufficient continuous physical presence, as his notice to appear was served less than two years after his arrival.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the police reports were reliable and their use was not fundamentally unfair, and that the IJ could consider evidence of criminal conduct not resulting in conviction. The BIA also found the notice to appear sufficient to stop the accrual of continuous presence. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to determine whether the police reports were corroborated before giving them substantial weight in denying adjustment of status. The court vacated the BIA’s order as to adjustment of status and remanded for further proceedings, but affirmed the denial of cancellation of removal. View "Maurice v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case concerns a Guatemalan petitioner, López, who sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. After an immigration judge denied her applications, López appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), indicating her intent to file a supporting brief. On the deadline, her counsel attempted to file the brief electronically but mistakenly submitted it to the immigration court instead of the BIA. The immigration court rejected the filing weeks later, and counsel promptly refiled with the BIA and moved for acceptance of the late brief, explaining the technical error.The BIA, through an unsigned notice, denied the motion to accept the late-filed brief, stating only that the rationale was insufficient and that no further motions or reconsideration would be entertained. Subsequently, a single-member panel of the BIA dismissed López’s appeal, adopting the immigration judge’s decision and stating that the grounds for appeal were waived because they were not developed in a timely brief or statement. The BIA did not address the circumstances of the late filing or the explanation provided by López’s counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA’s actions. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate explanation for denying the motion to accept the late-filed brief, especially given the plausible and promptly explained reason for the delay. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further consideration consistent with its opinion, without addressing the merits of the underlying asylum claims. View "Lopez-Gomez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan citizen and her minor son entered the United States without legal status in August 2021. In November 2022, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her. Nearly a year later, she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), naming her son as a derivative applicant. She claimed that, for four years prior to her departure, unidentified hooded men in her home village threatened to kidnap her children if she did not support their side in a local land conflict. She did not report these threats to authorities, and neither she nor her family suffered physical harm or kidnapping attempts.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her asylum application untimely, rejecting her argument that ignorance of immigration law constituted an extraordinary circumstance excusing the late filing. The IJ also found that the threats did not amount to past persecution, nor did she establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, as the threats were unfulfilled and not linked to a protected ground. The IJ denied withholding of removal, citing her failure to meet the higher burden required, and denied CAT protection, finding no evidence she would likely be tortured or that the Guatemalan government would acquiesce in such harm. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that her circumstances were not extraordinary and that the threats were insufficiently specific or severe to constitute persecution or torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of her untimely asylum application under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The court further held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT protection, as the record did not compel a finding of past persecution, future persecution, or likely torture. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A naturalized U.S. citizen and his noncitizen son challenged the U.S. Secretary of State and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro over the reclassification of a visa petition. The father, after becoming a lawful permanent resident, filed a Form I-130 petition for his son, who was under 21 at the time. The son turned 21 during the process, and the petition was approved when a visa in the F2A category was available. After the father naturalized, the consulate reclassified the petition into the F1 category for adult children of U.S. citizens, resulting in a lengthy wait for visa availability. The plaintiffs alleged that, under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), the son should still be considered under 21 for visa purposes, and the reclassification was unlawful.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint, relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular decisions regarding visa denials. The court did not address the merits of whether the reclassification was lawful under the CSPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability did not bar judicial review in this instance because the plaintiffs were challenging the reclassification of the visa petition, not a visa denial. The court then addressed the merits and concluded that, under the CSPA, the son’s statutory age should be calculated using the formula provided for F2A beneficiaries, which accounts for bureaucratic delays. Therefore, the son remained a “child” for visa purposes at the time of the father’s naturalization, and the reclassification to the F1 category was unlawful. The First Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Teles De Menezes v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A Haitian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident at age 13 faced removal proceedings after being convicted in New Hampshire for the sale of a controlled drug, which was classified as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. During removal proceedings, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he would likely be tortured if returned to Haiti due to risks posed by Haitian authorities, gangs, and individuals seeking revenge, especially given his severe mental illness.An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the removal charge and denied his application for CAT relief after conducting hearings and considering evidence. The IJ found that, although conditions in Haitian detention facilities were deplorable and extrajudicial violence was a problem, the petitioner had not shown that the Haitian government maintained these conditions with the specific intent to torture detainees. The IJ also found insufficient likelihood that the petitioner would be targeted for torture by gangs, mobs, or private individuals with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and the petitioner timely sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit held that the BIA erred by failing to address the petitioner’s CAT claim regarding the risk of torture by low-level Haitian officials in detention facilities. The court vacated the BIA’s order and remanded for further consideration of this specific claim, instructing the BIA to properly distinguish between intent and purpose requirements for torture under CAT. The petition for review was otherwise denied, as the court found no error in the agency’s handling of other aspects of the CAT claim or in its evidentiary rulings. View "Fleurimond v. Bondi" on Justia Law