Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Miguel Armando Rivera Samayoa, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States in 1996 and has since resided in Massachusetts, where he fathered four U.S. citizen children. Rivera applied for cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children, who have various health issues.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Rivera met the first three statutory requirements for cancellation of removal but denied his application, concluding that Rivera failed to demonstrate that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children. The IJ considered the children's ages, health, family ties, and the economic and political conditions in Guatemala, determining that the hardship they would face was not substantially beyond the ordinary hardship expected when a close family member leaves the country. The IJ also noted the possibility of Rivera's voluntary departure and potential future lawful reentry.Rivera appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment of the cumulative factors and found that Rivera had not established that his children would be unable to receive necessary medical treatment whether they stayed in the U.S. or relocated to Guatemala.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied Rivera's petition. The court held that the BIA and IJ had properly considered the cumulative impact of Rivera's removal on his children and found no legal error in their decisions. The court concluded that Rivera did not meet the high burden of proving that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children. View "Rivera Samayoa v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan native, Eder Anibal Cano-Gutierrez, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Cano-Gutierrez's claims stemmed from a series of armed robberies he experienced as a teenager in Guatemala. He testified that he was robbed five times by individuals at gang-controlled checkpoints but did not suffer physical harm or receive death threats. He fled to the United States in January 2018, fearing future harm and recruitment by the robbers.The Department of Homeland Security charged Cano-Gutierrez with removability for being present in the U.S. without authorization. He conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ found his testimony credible but denied his applications, concluding that the harm he suffered did not rise to the level of persecution and that he failed to show a nexus between the harm and a protected ground. The IJ also found that he did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution or that he would be targeted by government actors or with government acquiescence.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Cano-Gutierrez did not experience persecution and failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also found that he did not demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution and deemed his CAT claim waived due to lack of specific challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found no error in the agency's determination that Cano-Gutierrez failed to show a nexus between the robberies and a protected ground, and thus, his asylum claim failed. The court also agreed with the BIA that the CAT claim was waived. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Cano-Gutierrez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Marcos Da Silva Borges, his wife Eliane Maria Silva Teixeira Borges, and their two children entered the United States in October 2021 and were charged with inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The family argued that the government needed to prove their noncitizen status by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, a higher standard than "clear and convincing" evidence. They also contended that the government failed to meet this burden with the evidence presented. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) both ruled against the family, applying the "clear and convincing" standard.The IJ initially denied the family's motion to terminate the removal proceedings, finding that the government met its burden of proof. The BIA remanded the case for a full decision, which the IJ provided, again using the "clear and convincing" standard. The BIA upheld this decision, rejecting the family's arguments about the standard of proof and the reliability of the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court referenced its recent decision in Rosa v. Bondi, which held that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard applies in removal proceedings for individuals charged with inadmissibility and that this standard is more demanding than "clear and convincing" evidence. The court found that the agency applied the incorrect legal standard in evaluating the Borges family's removability. Consequently, the First Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the correct standard of proof. View "Da Silva Borges v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lesbia Asucena Alay, a native and citizen of Guatemala. Alay conceded her removability but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that her removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her two U.S. citizen children. Alay also applied for asylum and withholding of removal but later withdrew those applications.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Alay's application for cancellation of removal in December 2019, concluding that she had not demonstrated that her removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her children. The IJ found that Alay's children, A.L. and F.L., would remain in the U.S. with their father, who could care for and support them. The IJ acknowledged the potential hardships, including loss of income and separation from their mother, but determined these were not substantially beyond what is normally expected from removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, recognizing the hardships Alay's children would face but agreeing that these did not meet the threshold of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." The BIA noted that A.L. and F.L. were healthy and doing well in school, and concluded that the hardships they would experience were consistent with those ordinarily resulting from the removal of a close family member.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied Alay's petition for review. The court held that the agency had properly considered the evidence and made an individualized assessment of the hardships. The court found no legal error in the agency's determination that the hardships faced by Alay's children did not meet the statutory standard for cancellation of removal. View "Alay v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, entered the United States without inspection in 2004 to be with his son, Gustavo, a U.S. citizen. Petitioner sought cancellation of removal, claiming his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Gustavo. The immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner credible but determined he failed to meet the high burden of proving such hardship. The IJ noted Gustavo's behavioral issues but found no evidence of medical or learning disabilities and concluded that Gustavo's mother, who was his primary caretaker, would continue to support him.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision on two grounds: first, Gustavo had turned 21 while the appeal was pending, disqualifying him as a qualifying relative; second, the BIA agreed with the IJ's hardship determination. Petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision, which had adopted the IJ's reasoning. The court noted that it could only review legal questions and not factual determinations. Petitioner argued that the BIA failed to state the standard of review, applied the wrong standard, ignored relevant factors, cherry-picked evidence, and improperly required expert reports. The court found no merit in these arguments, noting that the BIA's decision was consistent with its precedent and that the BIA had appropriately reviewed the IJ's findings for clear error and the hardship determination de novo.Ultimately, the First Circuit held that the agency did not err in its hardship determination, finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Gustavo's hardship would be substantially beyond the ordinary hardship expected when a close family member is removed. The petition for review was denied. View "Goncalves Leao v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Jacinto Xiquin Xirum and Bartola Romero Santos, who petitioned for review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. The petitioners argued that their removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their two U.S. citizen children.The U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the petitioners on July 10, 2018. They applied for cancellation of removal, which allows a noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully if they meet certain criteria, including proving that their removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child. On October 10, 2019, the immigration judge (IJ) denied their applications, finding that the petitioners did not meet the burden of proving that their children would suffer such hardship if the petitioners were removed. The IJ noted that the petitioners were healthy, employed, and owned a home in Mexico, and that there was no evidence the children could not continue their education in Mexico or Guatemala.The petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision on March 27, 2024. The BIA highlighted the IJ's findings, including the petitioners' health, employment status, and home ownership in Mexico, as well as the children's fluency in Spanish and lack of learning disabilities. The BIA concluded that the petitioners had not demonstrated the required level of hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition in part, finding it lacked jurisdiction to review challenges to the agency's factual findings. The court denied the petition in part, concluding that the agency's determination that the petitioners had not shown exceptional and extremely unusual hardship was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found that the agency had considered the evidence in the aggregate and had not ignored relevant facts. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Xirum v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Russian citizen, Diana Avdeeva, married a U.S. citizen and applied for lawful permanent-resident status, which was granted on a conditional basis. She and her husband later filed a petition to remove the conditional status, but USCIS did not act on it within the required timeframe. After their divorce, Avdeeva requested the petition be converted to a waiver petition. She then applied for naturalization, but USCIS denied her petition, terminated her permanent-resident status, and placed her in removal proceedings. Avdeeva sued USCIS for failing to adjudicate her naturalization application within the statutory period.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts remanded the case to USCIS based on a settlement agreement, which required USCIS to terminate removal proceedings, approve her petition, and conduct a new naturalization interview. Avdeeva was naturalized, and she dismissed her other lawsuit. She then sought attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), but the district court denied her motion, suggesting she was not a "prevailing party" and that awarding fees would be unjust due to the settlement terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Avdeeva was not a "prevailing party" under EAJA because the change in her legal status was not "court-ordered" but rather a result of the settlement agreement. The court noted that the district court's remand order did not resolve the merits of the case or retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, thus lacking the necessary judicial imprimatur. Consequently, Avdeeva was not entitled to attorney's fees. View "Avdeeva v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Igor Quinn-Goncalves, an undocumented native and citizen of Brazil, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that upheld an immigration judge's order for his removal from the United States. Quinn-Goncalves, who has been detained throughout the relevant period, acknowledged that his petition was filed late, arriving at the clerk's office three days after the deadline. His wife sent the petition via UPS on the last permissible day, following incorrect advice from the clerk's office that mailing by the deadline was sufficient.The BIA had previously denied Quinn-Goncalves's appeal of the immigration judge's removal order. The immigration judge had ordered his removal based on his undocumented status. Quinn-Goncalves then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, but his petition was not filed within the required 30-day period after the BIA's final order of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed the petition due to its untimeliness. The court emphasized that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(A)(i), a petition for review must be received by the clerk within the statutory deadline to be considered timely. The court rejected Quinn-Goncalves's argument that mailing the petition within the deadline should suffice, distinguishing his case from the precedent set in Houston v. Lack, which applied a mailbox rule for pro se prisoners. The court concluded that it could not extend the filing deadline under Rule 26(b)(2) and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Goncalves v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2015, two Ecuadorian citizens, Mayancela and Santander, along with Mayancela's minor children, entered the United States without admission or parole. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged them with removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). They did not contest their removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge (IJ) in the Boston Immigration Court denied their applications, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denials.The IJ found that while both petitioners testified credibly, they did not meet the burden of proof for their claims. The IJ concluded that Mayancela did not establish that her persecution was on account of her membership in the particular social groups "Ecuadorian women" and "Ecuadorian females," attributing the harm to her cousin's violent behavior and substance abuse. The IJ also found that Santander's asylum application was untimely and that the government had shown a fundamental change in Ecuador's conditions, rebutting any presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the evidence did not establish the requisite nexus for Mayancela's claims and that the government had sufficiently demonstrated changed conditions in Ecuador for Santander.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency failed to conduct the required mixed-motivation nexus analysis for Mayancela's asylum claim and vacated the agency's decision regarding her asylum and withholding of removal claims, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the agency's decision denying Santander's asylum and withholding of removal claims, as well as the denial of CAT protection for both petitioners, finding that the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. View "Mayancela Guaman v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a married couple from Guatemala, have resided in Massachusetts for over twenty years and have four U.S. citizen children. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued Notices to Appear, charging them with removability. They applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, citing their son L.C.'s medical and educational needs. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, finding they did not meet the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requirement due to insufficient corroborating evidence about L.C.'s situation in Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and later denied their first motion to reopen based on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.Petitioners filed a second motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel by their previous attorney, who failed to submit crucial evidence about L.C.'s educational needs. They provided new evidence, including country conditions in Guatemala and additional information about their children's medical and educational challenges. The BIA denied this motion, stating that Petitioners had not shown that their counsel's performance was so deficient that they suffered prejudice and that they had not established a prima facie case for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA provided insufficient explanation for its ruling, making it impossible to review the legal bases for its conclusions. The court noted that the BIA did not adequately address whether the failure to submit corroborating evidence about L.C.'s educational needs constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or whether Petitioners had established a prima facie case for relief. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chanchavac Garcia v. Bondi" on Justia Law