Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Chen entered the U.S. illegally. Luo followed in 2002, with a visitor's visa, which he overstayed. They married 2008. They became members of the China Democracy Party Foundation, a group committed to political reform in China. In removal proceedings, an IJ found Chen removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as present in the U.S. without having been lawfully admitted or paroled, and found Luo removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), for remaining in the U.S. longer than permitted. They unsuccessfully sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the U.N. Convention Against Torture, arguing that, if repatriated, they would be subject to persecution (or worse) because of their political activities in the U.S. The IJ did not find Chen credible and did not find that the petitioners had carried their burden of proving their claims. After the BIA upheld those denials, they moved to reopen, rather than seeking judicial review. After the motion was denied, three years passed before they filed a second motion to reopen, arguing changed country circumstances. The BIA denied the motion as time-and-number barred and found that the "changed country circumstances" exception did not apply. The First Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that motions to reopen are disfavored because of the compelling public interest in finality and the expeditious processing of immigration proceedings. View "Chen v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Pandits, citizens of India, have lived in the U.S. for 21 years. They reside in Massachusetts with their 19-year-old daughter, Pooja, who is a U.S. citizen. In 2009, DHS began removal proceedings on the grounds that they had arrived without a valid entry document and were present in the U.S. without being "admitted," 8 U.S.C. 1182(a). The Pandits sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), arguing that they had been physically present for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding; were of good moral character during such period; had not been convicted of a qualifying offense; and that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to their daughter. They argued that that Pooja could not live in the U.S. without her parents and would be forced to move to India if they were deported, where she "would face difficulties acclimating to the different educational and cultural system." In 2013, the IJ denied their application, finding they had not shown "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" and that, even if they met all of the statutory criteria, they would not "merit a favorable exercise of discretion" because they had "engaged in fraud repeatedly in order to gain immigration benefits." Each had entered into (separate) fraudulent marriages, and a friend had filed a fraudulent labor certification on their behalf. The First Circuit affirmed the BIA’s refusal to re-open proceedings for consideration of Pooja’s medical problems. View "Pandit v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, overstayed her visa and was subjected to removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for special rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses, a relief provision enacted pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). An immigration judge (IJ) denied the application on the ground that Petitioner’s testimony was unreliable and non-credible with respect to her abuse. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on the basis that a good faith marriage must be shown before an applicant may be eligible for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal. The First Circuit vacated the denial of Petitioner’s application for VAWA special-rule cancellation of removal, holding that the BIA’s failure to adequately explain its decision that the operative statute requires an alien to prove a good faith marriage as an eligibility requirement for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal precluded meaningful judicial review in this case. Remanded. View "Tillery v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, an Immigration Judge (IJ) entered an order of removal of Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. In 2012, Petitioner reentered the United States unlawfully. Thereafter, Petitioner was charged with criminal unlawful reentry. In 2013, Petitioner moved to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the 2009 removal proceedings. The IJ denied the motion to reopen, concluding (1) the motion was time and number barred, and (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not comply with the requirements enumerated in Matter of Lozada. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the BIA denied. Petitioner then petitioned for judicial review. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for judicial review in part for want of jurisdiction and otherwise denied it, holding (1) because Petitioner never filed a timely petition for judicial review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review that portion of Petitioner’s motion; and (2) the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. View "Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, sought to register permanent residence or adjust status. In support of his application, he submitted evidence, including a visa and Form I-94, that he was legally admitted to the United States when he was thirteen years old. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application on the basis that the documents were fraudulent. Petitioner was then placed in removal proceedings. Emphasizing his young age at the time of his alleged admission, Petitioner asserted that he did not know that his documents were fraudulent. An immigration judge (IJ) determined that Petitioner had failed to establish that he was lawfully present in the United States following a prior admission. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the courts below did not err in their determinations that Petitioner’s testimony before the IJ was not credible; and (2) the BIA did not err by summarily affirming the IJ’s decision to give no weight to Petitioner’s favorable polygraph test. View "Acosta v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States illegally, conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal. An immigration judge held that Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his Maine assault conviction was not a “crime of domestic violence.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit initially denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner then petitioned for rehearing, presenting a developed argument based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder. The First Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded, holding that Moncrieffe controls in this case and that, in accordance with Moncrieffe, Petitioner was not convicted of a “crime of violence.” View "Sauceda v. Lynch" on Justia Law

For aliens who have committed certain criminal or terrorist offenses, removal proceedings are mandatory under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, committed such offenses. After being released from criminal custody, Petitioner was detained under section 1226(c) pending immigration removal proceedings without bond and without an individualized showing that he posed a flight risk or danger to society. After eight months of detention, Petitioner filed a class action on behalf of himself and similarly situated noncitizens held for more than six months. The district court granted the habeas petition, concluding that section 1226(c) contains an implicit reasonableness requirement and that any detention under section 1226(c) is presumptively unreasonable after six months. The court found that Petitioner’s specific detention had become unreasonable and ordered bond hearings for all class members. The First Circuit (1) vacated the judgment as to the class members, holding that section 1226(c) does contain an implicit reasonableness requirement, but an individualized reasonableness inquiry adheres more closely to legal precedent than a bright-line six-month rule; and (2) affirmed the district court’s individualized holding with respect to Petitioner’s particular habeas petition. Remanded. View "Reid v. Donelan" on Justia Law

In 1994, Petitioner crossed the U.S.-Mexican border in violation of United States law. The day after he entered the country, Petitioner was served an Order to Show Cause charging him as being deportable. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Petitioner deportable. Petitioner later filed a second motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. The motion was granted. In 2014, Petitioner applied for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure, arguing that he was eligible for suspension of deportation because the law in effect in 1994 required a noncitizen to be continuously physically present in the United States for seven years before applying for suspension of deportation and that he easily met this requirement. An IJ concluded that the so-called “stop-time” rule applied retroactively to Petitioner because his deportation proceedings remained pending on the date the stop-time rule went into effect and that the stop-time rule cut off Petitioner’s physical presence after one day, rendering him ineligible for suspension of deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule was reasonable and that the BIA properly applied the stop-time rule to Petitioner. View "Santos-Quiroa v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, was ordered removed in 2002. After Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA rejected. More than a decade later, Petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider. The BIA denied that motion as well. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s second motion to reconsider, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that the circumstances of Petitioner’s case were not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant an equitable exception to the time and number bars applicable to Petitioner’s motion. View "Omar v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner was issued a notice to appear and conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, concluding (1) Petitioner failed to carry his burden to show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and (2) Petitioner had not established that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Chen v. Lynch" on Justia Law