Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A native and citizen of Mexico was placed in removal proceedings after being charged with a misdemeanor offense in 2014. He conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, listing one alias on his application. During his merits hearing, he disclosed additional aliases used for work and border crossing, but did not initially mention another alias, “Juan Sanchez Cabrera,” which the government later introduced through documentary evidence. He explained that he had used a false name during a border crossing but could not recall the specific alias. Throughout his testimony, he stated he did not remember all the aliases he had used.The Immigration Judge of the immigration court denied his application for cancellation of removal, finding him statutorily barred from establishing good moral character under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) due to providing false testimony. The judge relied on his failure to disclose the “Juan Sanchez Cabrera” alias on his application and during direct testimony. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial, finding no clear error in the judge’s determination that he provided false testimony with the intent to deceive for immigration benefits, as evidenced by his incomplete disclosure of aliases until confronted by the Department of Homeland Security.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the mixed question of law and fact regarding the application of the false testimony bar, but not over factual determinations of intent. The Fourth Circuit found that the Board applied the incorrect standard of review by reviewing the legal question for clear error rather than de novo. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for the Board to apply the correct standard. View "Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras, along with her daughter, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. She described a history of abuse by male relatives and partners in Honduras, culminating in severe stalking and threats from a man named Matute, who attempted to abduct her and threatened her and her daughter’s lives. After repeated failures by local police to respond to her pleas for help, she fled Honduras with her daughter, leaving her son with her grandparents. She later learned that Matute continued to harass her family after her departure.After entering the United States, an asylum officer found she had a credible fear of persecution or torture. The Department of Homeland Security charged her and her daughter with inadmissibility. At her merits hearing before an immigration judge, she presented testimony and country-conditions evidence about violence against women in Honduras. The immigration judge found her not credible, gave little weight to her expert evidence, and denied all relief, concluding that her proposed social groups were not cognizable and that there was no nexus between her persecution and a protected ground. The judge also found she had not established a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence and could have relocated within Honduras.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, focusing on the lack of nexus between her harm and a protected ground, and finding no clear error in the denial of CAT relief. The BIA concluded that the harm she suffered was due to a private dispute rather than persecution on account of a protected ground.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully consider the country-conditions evidence relevant to her claims, as required by precedent. View "Alfaro-Zelaya v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Black native and citizen of Guyana, entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in infancy and lived there since. He suffered from untreated mental illness, including schizophrenia, and physical disabilities requiring a wheelchair. After a psychotic episode, he was convicted of several felonies and served sixteen years in prison. Following his release, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as removable due to his aggravated felony conviction. Fearing torture if deported to Guyana because of his mental health, physical disabilities, criminal-deportee status, and race, he sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, presenting testimony and evidence of mistreatment faced by similar groups in Guyana.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner and his expert credible but denied relief, concluding that the likelihood of torture in Guyana was insufficient. The judge determined that Guyanese police do not actively seek to harm or torture mentally ill persons and that government acquiescence was not supported by the evidence. The judge also found that discrimination and poor conditions existed but did not rise to the level of torture or government acquiescence. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the judge failed to consider the cumulative risk of torture based on all asserted grounds and misapplied the definition of torture. The Board affirmed, focusing only on mental illness and finding no clear error in the judge’s conclusions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only the Board’s decision. The court held that the Board abused its discretion by ignoring relevant, unrebutted evidence regarding the petitioner’s risk of torture due to his race, physical disabilities, and criminal-deportee status. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the agency to consider all evidence and apply the definition of torture to each claim. View "McDougall v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen, after returning to his home country from Venezuela, was recruited under false pretenses to work as a cook at a rural camp. Upon arrival, he discovered the camp was operated by a group known as the Unknown Gunmen, which the Nigerian government considers a terrorist organization. He was not allowed to leave, was forced to cook for the group’s leaders, and was eventually held without pay. After several months, he managed to escape and, fearing for his life due to repeated threats and attacks by the group, fled Nigeria. He traveled to Venezuela and then to the United States, where he sought asylum and withholding of removal, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution.An Immigration Judge found him removable for entering the United States without valid documents. The judge denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal, concluding that by cooking for the Unknown Gunmen, he had provided “material support” to a terrorist organization, which barred him from relief. The judge also denied his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured with the acquiescence of a public official if returned to Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, agreeing that the material-support bar applied and that there was no de minimis or duress exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the petitioner’s forced cooking for the group did not constitute “material support” under the relevant statute, as his actions were not sufficiently substantial to help the organization accomplish its terrorist activities. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s order of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ozurumba v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, originally from Mexico, was convicted for purchasing firearms in the United States and reselling them in Mexico without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result of these unlicensed sales, he was sentenced to 78 months in prison. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”An immigration judge determined that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) matched the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as used in the INA. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s order, arguing that the statute of conviction criminalized a broader range of conduct than the generic aggravated felony and thus was not a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically constitutes “illicit trafficking in firearms.” The court held that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms,” and that the statute of conviction fits within this definition. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding overbreadth and found no ambiguity in the statutory language. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an aggravated felony for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under the INA. View "Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A mother and her three children, all citizens of El Salvador, entered the United States without admission or parole in 2015. The Department of Homeland Security charged them as removable. The mother conceded removability but sought asylum and statutory withholding of removal, claiming persecution based on her membership in two particular social groups: her immediate family and single Salvadoran women. She described two incidents in El Salvador: threats made to her son by a classmate allegedly joining a gang, and an incident where armed gang members forced entry into her home to hide from police, which she believed was due to her status as a single woman.An Immigration Judge denied her applications, finding that the threats to her son did not amount to persecution and that the home invasion, even if it constituted persecution, was not shown to be on account of a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the threats lacked specificity and immediacy and that the home invasion was motivated by the gang members’ need to hide rather than her membership in a particular social group. The BIA also found that the proposed group of single Salvadoran females was not a cognizable social group under asylum law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the petition, following recent Supreme Court guidance that the 30-day filing deadline for petitions for review is not jurisdictional. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s findings: the incidents described did not establish persecution on account of a protected ground, and the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the petitioner was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. View "Rivas De Nolasco v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from El Salvador, after her husband fled to the United States due to gang threats, was subjected to repeated extortion and threats of violence, including sexual extortion, by gang members who targeted her because she was a woman living alone with her children. Despite seeking help from local police, she was told to comply with the gang or flee. After enduring escalating threats and payments, she eventually fled to the United States with her children.Upon arrival, she retained an attorney to represent her in her asylum proceedings. She informed her attorney of both the financial and sexual extortion she faced, but he failed to include the sexual extortion in her application and proposed a legal theory for asylum based on a particular social group (PSG) that was foreclosed by existing precedent. The immigration judge, sitting in the Immigration Court, found the proposed PSG not cognizable and denied her claim, concluding the gang’s motivation was financial rather than based on group membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, adopting the immigration judge’s reasoning and denying her appeal.Represented by new counsel, she moved to reopen her case before the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and proposing alternative, plausible PSGs. The Board denied the motion, finding no IAC and concluding her harm was not due to a protected characteristic. She then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that noncitizens who retain counsel in removal proceedings have a Fifth Amendment right to a fundamentally fair hearing, which can be violated by ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found her original attorney’s performance objectively unreasonable and prejudicial, as alternative PSGs could have led to a different outcome. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the Board’s denial of her motion to reopen, vacated the denial of her asylum and withholding claims, and remanded for a new hearing. View "Guandique-De Romero v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from El Salvador entered the United States without valid documents in 2014 after fleeing an abusive relationship with a gang member who had threatened her and her family. She experienced repeated physical assaults and threats, including an incident where her hand was cut with a knife. After reporting the abuse to local police, who dismissed her concerns, she relocated within El Salvador but continued to receive threats from the gang. Fearing for her life, she fled to the United States, where she sought asylum, claiming past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her membership in a particular social group.An Immigration Judge denied her application for asylum, finding that her proposed social groups were not legally cognizable because they were defined by the harm suffered and lacked particularity and social distinction. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, also concluding that her social groups were impermissibly circular and that she had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA later denied her motion to reconsider, rejecting her argument that precedent supported recognition of her social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reconsider. The Fourth Circuit held that the BIA committed legal error by rejecting the petitioner’s proposed social group without conducting a substantive, fact-based analysis as required by law. The court vacated the BIA’s ruling on the social group issue and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to perform a proper analysis based on the facts and evidence of the case. The court also vacated the BIA’s analysis of future persecution, directing that it be reconsidered if the social group is found cognizable on remand. View "Guardado v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Jonathan Alexander Colorado Navarro, a former MS-13 gang member, came to the United States after killing three people in El Salvador. He initially omitted this information in his asylum applications, only fully confessing during his testimony before an Immigration Judge (IJ). Despite these omissions and other lies, the IJ found him credible and concluded that he qualified for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on the likelihood of being tortured in El Salvador.The Department of Homeland Security issued Colorado a Notice to Appear, charging him with being in the country illegally. At his initial immigration court hearing, he admitted his illegal status and sought asylum and CAT protection. Colorado went through three asylum applications, each progressively revealing more information about his past crimes. The IJ granted him deferral of removal under CAT, finding his testimony credible and determining that he was likely to be tortured if returned to El Salvador.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviewed the IJ's decision and reversed it, finding clear error in the IJ's credibility determination and the likelihood of torture analysis. The BIA noted inconsistencies and omissions in Colorado's applications and testimony, undermining his credibility. The BIA also found that the evidence did not support the IJ's conclusion that Colorado was likely to be tortured, either by Salvadoran officials or gangs, if returned.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusions. The court agreed that Colorado's omissions and inconsistent explanations undermined his credibility and that the evidence did not establish a sufficient likelihood of torture. The court also noted that Colorado's claim that the BIA should have remanded the case for further testimony was unreviewable because it was not raised before the BIA. Consequently, the court denied Colorado's petition for review. View "Colorado Navarro v. Bondi" on Justia Law