Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Victor Manuel Castro-Aleman, originally from El Salvador, was brought to the United States illegally in 1973 as a child. Over the years, he had multiple encounters with law enforcement, including four DUI convictions in Virginia between 2009 and 2014. In 2016, while serving a sentence for his fourth DUI, he was visited by ICE agents and subsequently issued a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings. He was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge (IJ) after failing to submit an asylum application and not appealing the removal order. Castro-Aleman reentered the United States illegally and was discovered in Virginia in 2023, leading to his indictment for illegal reentry.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Castro-Aleman's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that his 2016 removal order was invalid due to due process violations. The district court found that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Castro-Aleman failed to demonstrate that his removal order was "fundamentally unfair" under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). The court found that even if there were due process violations, such as the IJ's failure to inform him adequately of his right to appeal, Castro-Aleman could not show actual prejudice. His extensive criminal history and admissions during the removal hearing established multiple independent grounds for his removability, making any appeal futile. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss and upheld his conviction for illegal reentry. View "United States v. Castro-Aleman" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Honduras entered the United States without authorization in 2003. In 2019, an Immigration Judge (IJ) indicated intent to grant his application for cancellation of removal, but due to a legislative cap, the decision was reserved until a visa became available in January 2023. By then, the initial IJ had retired, and a new IJ was assigned. The new IJ scheduled a new merits hearing because the petitioner was charged with a felony during the interim period. The new IJ ultimately denied the application, citing a lack of good moral character.The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that a binding policy required the reserved grant of cancellation to be issued within five days of visa availability, which would have precluded consideration of the new felony charge. The BIA rejected this argument, stating that the policy was not binding and did not create a remedy for exceeding the time frame. The BIA affirmed the new IJ's decision, finding the petitioner lacked good moral character and did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the policy the petitioner relied upon was not binding and, even if it were, it would not have imposed a five-day deadline in this case. The court noted that the policy was an internal guideline not intended to confer individual rights or have the force of law. Additionally, the court found that the petitioner was not substantially prejudiced by the delay, as he was required to maintain good moral character throughout the proceedings. The petition for review was denied. View "Zalaya Orellana v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Fabian Grey, a Jamaican citizen and lawful permanent resident in the U.S., applied for naturalization in 2016. After delays in processing his application, Grey filed a lawsuit seeking a court order to declare him eligible for naturalization and to compel the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to naturalize him. He also sought documents from USCIS under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and amended his lawsuit to compel USCIS to produce those documents. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS on both claims, allowing the agency to withhold or redact certain documents under FOIA’s law enforcement exemption and concluding that Grey was ineligible for naturalization due to lying under oath during his deposition.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina found that Grey had lied under oath about a 2016 criminal charge for misprision of a felony during his deposition. The court also determined that USCIS had appropriately responded to Grey’s FOIA request, producing substantial documentation and justifiably withholding or redacting certain documents. Grey appealed the district court’s rulings on both the FOIA and naturalization claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that USCIS was entitled to withhold certain information under FOIA’s law enforcement exemption and that Grey’s false testimony during his deposition disqualified him from demonstrating the good moral character required for naturalization. The court concluded that Grey was ineligible for citizenship and upheld the district court’s summary judgment in favor of USCIS. View "Grey v. Alfonso-Royals" on Justia Law

Kevin Hsieh, a native and citizen of India, was convicted of inducing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Following his conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered his removal from the United States, citing his conviction as an aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and a crime of child abuse under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Hsieh appealed the removal order, arguing that the statute of conviction is broader than the generic offenses of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Hsieh's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's determination that Hsieh's conviction under § 2422(b) categorically matched both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse as defined in the INA. Hsieh then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that a conviction under § 2422(b) does indeed categorically constitute a match for both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse under the INA. The court noted that § 2422(b) targets conduct directed toward minors, involves a mental element focused on sexual gratification, and includes both physical and nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of minors. The court also determined that the statute's mens rea requirement and the harm caused by the offense align with the definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied Hsieh's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision that Hsieh's conviction warranted his removal from the United States. View "Hsieh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lalakshi Kale and Gurusaday Dey, both Indian nationals, have resided in the United States since 2009 and sought to obtain legal permanent residence based on Kale's employment. They applied for adjustment of status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in 2022. Their applications were initially accepted because their priority dates were current. However, due to higher-than-expected demand, the final action date retrogressed, causing their applications to be held in abeyance under USCIS's adjudication hold policy until visa numbers become available.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. The district court also noted an alternative basis for dismissal under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) pursuant to 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that USCIS's adjudication hold policy is a discretionary action under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of an alien and to prescribe regulations for such adjustments. The court found that this discretionary authority includes the implementation of the adjudication hold policy, thus falling under the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the challenge to USCIS's policy and affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Kale v. Alfonso-Royals" on Justia Law

Samir Fernandes Baptista, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted in Massachusetts of unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal. During his removal proceedings, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that this state crime is categorically an aggravated felony attempted theft offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, the immigration judge ordered Baptista removed for committing an aggravated felony after admission, and the BIA upheld this order.Baptista appealed the BIA's decision, arguing that his conviction does not qualify as an attempted theft offense under the INA. He contended that under Massachusetts law, a defendant could be convicted of unarmed assault by stealing property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent, which would make the state offense broader than the generic federal theft offense that requires the taking to be against the victim’s will. Baptista also argued that his conviction cannot qualify as an attempt because it does not require a defendant to commit an overt act toward a taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal conclusion de novo. The court concluded that the Massachusetts unarmed assault statute requires the taking to be against the victim’s will and involves force and violence, making it a categorical match to a generic federal theft offense. Additionally, the court found that the statute requires an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the theft, thus qualifying as an attempted theft offense under the INA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit denied Baptista’s petition for review. View "Baptista v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Adolfo Acevedo Ibarra, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally and used the identity of a U.S. citizen, Raul Cabrera, to obtain various documents and benefits fraudulently. He was detained in 2014 for using a fraudulent Social Security number and later pleaded guilty to illegal entry. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, and Ibarra admitted to the allegations and agreed he was removable. He sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause hardship to his four U.S.-citizen children. However, the immigration judge denied his application, citing his lack of good moral character due to his fraudulent activities.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision, agreeing that Ibarra's significant negative criminal history, including fraud, outweighed any evidence of good character. Ibarra then petitioned for review, claiming that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated during the removal hearing when his attorney's attempts to assert the privilege against self-incrimination were overruled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's finding that Ibarra lacked good moral character. The court noted that Ibarra's fraudulent activities, even without a conviction, justified the finding under the catchall provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). The court also rejected Ibarra's Fifth Amendment claim, stating that the privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted by the individual, not their attorney, and that Ibarra continued to testify without asserting the privilege himself.The Fourth Circuit denied Ibarra's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny cancellation of removal based on the substantial evidence of his lack of good moral character and rejecting his Fifth Amendment claims. View "Ibarra v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Ansar Hassen Hussen, an Ethiopian citizen, entered the U.S. on a B-2 visitor visa in January 2014 and overstayed. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution in Ethiopia due to his political opinion and ethnicity. An immigration judge (IJ) found his account implausible and denied his application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that material aspects of Hussen's story did not add up. Hussen filed a petition for review, No. 23-1047.While the first petition was pending, Hussen married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 application for an immigrant visa on his behalf. Hussen then filed a motion with the BIA to reopen his proceedings to seek an adjustment of status based on his marriage. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Hussen's evidence was insufficient to prove the bona fides of his marriage. Hussen filed a second petition for review, No. 23-2197.While the second petition was pending, Hussen filed another motion with the BIA to reopen the proceedings and reconsider its denial of his earlier motion. He provided additional evidence, but the BIA denied the motion, and Hussen filed a third petition for review, No. 24-1257.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Hussen's first petition, No. 23-1047, upholding the BIA's adverse credibility determination. The court granted Hussen's second petition, No. 23-2197, vacated the BIA's order denying the motion to reopen, and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard. The court denied Hussen's third petition, No. 24-1257, as moot in light of the relief granted on the second petition. View "Hussen v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Eugenia Bautista Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order of removal based on her 2011 conviction for petit larceny under section 18.2-96 of the Virginia Code. The Board held that petit larceny categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, rendering Chavez ineligible for cancellation of removal. Chavez argued that a defendant in Virginia could be convicted of larceny for taking property that he or she sincerely but unreasonably believed was abandoned, which falls short of the requisite mental state for a crime involving moral turpitude. She also contended that petit larceny for taking property of de minimis value does not constitute sufficiently reprehensible conduct to make out a crime involving moral turpitude.The Immigration Judge ruled for the government, reasoning that he was required to find that petit larceny was a crime involving moral turpitude under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez v. Holder. Chavez appealed to the Board, arguing that Virginia petit larceny did not require a culpable mental state and did not involve reprehensible conduct. The Board dismissed Chavez’s appeal, concluding that the offense required a culpable mental state and involved reprehensible conduct. Chavez then moved the Board to reconsider its decision, but a temporary Board member denied her motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Chavez’s petition. The court held that Virginia petit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, which satisfies the culpable mental state requirement. The court also found that the offense involves reprehensible conduct, regardless of the value of the property taken. Additionally, the court rejected Chavez’s challenge to the authority of the temporary Board member who decided her reconsideration motion, citing its previous decision in Salomon-Guillen v. Garland. View "Chavez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Bryan Alexis Molina-Diaz and his wife Cony Vanessa Pasqual de Molina fled El Salvador after witnessing the murder of Cony's cousin, Jose. Bryan applied for asylum and withholding of removal, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed. Bryan then moved for reconsideration and to reopen based on his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance, but the Board denied both motions.The IJ found Bryan and Cony's testimony credible but concluded that Bryan failed to show that the threats he received were on account of his family relationship rather than because he witnessed the murder. The IJ also found that Bryan did not demonstrate that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to control the non-state actors (MS-13 gang members) who threatened him. The Board affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Bryan did not establish the necessary nexus for asylum and that the government control requirement was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Bryan argued that the requirement to show the home government’s inability or unwillingness to control non-state persecutors should be abandoned following the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. Alternatively, he argued that the IJ and Board conflated inability with unwillingness and ignored evidence about conditions in El Salvador. The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that binding precedent requires showing the home government’s inability or unwillingness to control non-state persecutors. The court found that the IJ and Board did not conflate inability with unwillingness and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of government control. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review. View "Molina-Diaz v. Bondi" on Justia Law