Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Ion Lapadat and his family, all of Roma ethnicity, sought asylum in the United States due to severe mistreatment in Romania. Ion testified that he was shot in the back while collecting firewood, and his family faced attempted kidnappings, threats, and violence. They also experienced pervasive discrimination, including denial of healthcare, employment, and access to public services. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found their testimony credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), concluding that their experiences did not rise to the level of persecution.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the mistreatment did not constitute persecution and that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania. The BIA also found that Ion failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Ion then petitioned for review of the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA erred in its analysis. The court held that Ion's past experiences, including being shot and the severe assaults and threats faced by his family, collectively rose to the level of persecution. The court also determined that the BIA erred in concluding that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania, noting the long history of anti-Roma abuse and the Romanian government's documented persecutory conduct.The Ninth Circuit granted Ion's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the BIA to address the remaining elements of Ion's asylum claim and to reconsider his fear of future persecution. View "Lapadat v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's final order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for removal. The en banc court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that petitioner was a habitual drunkard; the statutory "habitual drunkard" provision is not unconstitutionally vague under the criminal law standard or any lesser vagueness standard that might apply in a non-criminal context; the statutory "habitual drunkard" provision does not violate equal protection principles because the denial of cancellation of removal to habitual drunkards is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in public safety. View "Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions" on Justia Law

After the BIA determined that petitioner was an aggravated felon because of his conviction for attempted sexual abuse under Oregon law, Oregon Revised Statutes 163.427, the agency determined that he was deportable, terminated his asylee status, denied his request for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, and denied waiver of admissibility. The Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider any discretionary aspect of the BIA's decision to deny petitioner's application for adjustment of status and waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1159(b) and (c), as the Attorney General's discretion is specified in the statute. Applying the three-step process articulated from Descamps v. United States, the panel held that the Oregon statute does not categorically match the generic federal offense; the statute is divisible; and, under the categorical approach, a conviction under subparagraph 163.427(1)(a)(A) is sexual abuse of a minor within the generic federal definition and therefore an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Therefore, the BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The panel dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part. View "Diego de Diego v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded for further proceedings, holding that it had jurisdiction over petitions for review of reasonable fear determinations made in connection with the reinstatement of expedited removal orders; the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction was the final order of removal; and therefore, the petition for review was timely because it was filed less than 30 days after that order. The Ninth Circuit also held that the IJ abused his discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen and reconsider; contrary to the IJ's holding, the court's precedents make clear that economic extortion on the basis of a protected characteristic can constitute persecution; and the IJ failed to consider the question of petitioner's family ties. View "Ayala v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal based on 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), which makes an immigrant inadmissible if he lacks a valid entry document "at the time of application for admission." Petitioner, a native of Bangladesh, was in the CNMI without admission or parole on November 28, 2009, when the immigration laws of the United States took effect in the CNMI. The court concluded that petitioner was an immigrant who lacked a valid entry document and was deemed by law to have made a continuing application for admission by being present in the CNMI, an application that was considered and denied during his removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Minto v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 53-year-old garbage truck driver, filed suit against USA Waste, his employer of 32 years, alleging wrongful termination based on age discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for USA Waste. The court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of USA Waste because plaintiff established a prima facie case under both his age discrimination and retaliation theories, and USA Waste failed to introduce any evidence that it had a legitimate reason for firing him. In this case, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, did not require proof of employment eligibility from plaintiff, and USA Waste could not make plaintiff's reinstatement contingent on verification of his immigration status because doing so would violate California public policy. Furthermore, plaintiff's use of an attorney was activity protected by California public policy, USA Waste fired plaintiff because he was represented by his attorney at the Settlement Agreement negotiations, and the district court erred by holding that USA Waste provided a legitimate reason for firing plaintiff. Therefore, the court concluded that USA Waste failed to meet its burden as to plaintiff's claim based on retaliation discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff's oral request for leave to amend the complaint eight months after the filing deadline. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santillan v. USA Waste of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jesus Ramirez came to the United States from El Salvador in 1999 and was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 2001. In 2012, plaintiff married a United States citizen and the couple sought lawful permanent resident status for Ramirez. The court held that a TPS designee provides a pathway for Ramirez to obtain lawful permanent resident status under the adjustment statute; under 8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(4), an alien afforded TPS is deemed to be in lawful status as a nonimmigrant—and has thereby satisfied the requirements for becoming a nonimmigrant, including inspection and admission—for purposes of adjustment of status under section 1255; and thus the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ramirez. View "Ramirez v. Brown" on Justia Law