Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Yashar signed an “I-864 Affidavit of Support,” in which he agreed to provide his wife Ayla with support. After the couple divorced, Ayla sought support pursuant to the affidavit. Yashar argued that the premarital agreement and divorce judgment terminated his obligations under the affidavit of support. The district court granted summary judgment to Yashar. The court held that, under federal law, neither a divorce judgment nor a premarital agreement may terminate an obligation of support. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Yashar has a continuing obligation to support Ayla. The court held that when a sponsored immigrant separates from the sponsor’s household, the sponsor’s obligation under the affidavit of support is to provide the immigrant with whatever support is necessary to maintain him or her at an annual income of at least 125% of the poverty guidelines for a one-person household. If the sponsor agreed to support more than one immigrant, and those immigrants separate from the sponsor’s household and continue to live together, then the sponsor must provide them with whatever support is necessary to maintain them at an annual income of at least 125% of the poverty guidelines for a household of a size that includes all the sponsored immigrants. In this case, Yashar has a continuing obligation to provide Ayla with whatever support is necessary to maintain her at an income that is at least 125% of the poverty guidelines for a one-person household. For purposes of determining whether Yashar has fulfilled this obligation, the court must not consider the income of Ayla's son. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Erler v. Erler" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican native and citizen, petitioned for review of the government's reinstatement of a removal order issued in 2000. Petitioner received notice of removal in 2009 and, since that time, the government revised its policies regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration proceedings. The court concluded that there is nothing in the facts of petitioner’s case justifying remand to ICE for it to reconsider its decision to reinstate her prior expedited removal order; intervening agency memoranda that do not change the law to be applied by an appellate court do not require remand to the agency; nor was ICE required to explain its reasoning when exercising its prosecutorial discretion to reinstate petitioner's removal order; and ICE was not required to wait until all of petitioner's administrative appeals had concluded before reinstating removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Morales de Soto v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of her motion to reopen. Petitioner's motion to reopen argued that exceptional circumstances prevented petitioner from attending the hearing. The court concluded that, while petitioner's explanation does not reveal great sophistication, planning, or resources, it is not inherently unbelievable or incredible, and therefore the IJ and the BIA erred in disregarding petitioner's explanation. The court held that a car’s mechanical failure does not alone compel granting a motion to reopen based on “exceptional circumstances.” In this case, petitioner's explanation, taken as true, does not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioner took an unnecessarily long route to court, giving her little margin for error; she did not use the $500 she had to reach the court on time but used it instead to tow her car to a mechanic and prepaid for the repair; and she failed to contact her lawyer or the court to inform them of the problem. The court held that mechanical failure coupled with decisions to leave insufficient time to account for routine delays and to pay for car repairs instead of transportation to court, does not constitute exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Garcia Arredondo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner sought review on May 3, 2013. After another panel of this Court denied petitioner's request for a stay, he was removed to El Salvador on November 19, 2013. The court concluded that, while granting petitioner's petition will not guarantee his return to the United States, it will at least increase his chances of being allowed to do so. Therefore, the court can provide effective relief and his removal to El Salvador does not render the petition moot. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that it is not more likely than not that petitioner will be tortured in El Salvador. Although gang membership is illegal under Salvadoran law, petitioner did not establish that the government tortures former gang members or those with gang-related tattoos. In addition, Salvadoran law prohibits extrajudicial killings and violence, and there is substantial evidence that the government enforces those laws. With respect to private violence, the court concluded that the BIA’s decision rests on a correct understanding of government “acquiescence” in torture. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen who became a legal permanent resident, seeks review of the BIA's finding of removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). Petitioner was charged as removeable along with his son and wife for allegedly participating in an attempt to smuggle his wife's family members into the United States in a van. The court granted the petition, concluding that the BIA failed to address the IJ's seemingly inconsistent credibility findings. Nor did the IJ make a finding that petitioner engaged in “an affirmative act of help, assistance, or encouragement” of smuggling as the court's case law requires for a violation of section 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). The court remanded on an open record for the IJ to reconsider his ruling, provide further explanation, and engage in further factfinding if necessary. View "Perez-Arceo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a naturalized citizen from Nigeria, appealed the district court's denial of his request to modify his birth date. There is no official record of petitioner's birth. Petitioner listed the birth date that his mother recalled when he was naturalized in 1987. Petitioner later discovered, upon finding a handwritten record of family birth dates in his father's Bible, that he had been born four years earlier. At issue is whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to modify naturalization certificates issued by the courts prior to October 1, 1991. The court concluded that Congress preserved federal subject matter jurisdiction over such certificates through the uncodified savings clause of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 408, 104 Stat. 4978, 5047, and that the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider motions to amend such certificates in accordance with former 8 U.S.C. 1451(i). The court emphasized the distinction between two categories of certificates: those issued by courts prior to 1991 and those issued by the Attorney General after the Immigration Act of 1990 went into effect on October 1,1991. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded. View "Collins v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a naturalized citizen, appealed the district court's dismissal of her petition to change the birthday listed on her certificate of naturalization. Because the date of birth on plaintiff's naturalization certificate does not match the date of birth on file with the Social Security Administration, California has not allowed plaintiff to renew her state driver’s license. The court held that, although it is sympathetic to plaintiff's situation, federal courts lack jurisdiction to amend agency-issued naturalization certificates. The court noted that, until 1991, courts had exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Yu-Ling Teng v. District Director" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of Egypt and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, challenged the district court’s denial of his naturalization application. The court concluded that the district court's failure to make specific findings with respect to the materiality of plaintiff's statements made to the Sacramento Superior Court regarding his marital status prevents the court from reviewing the district court's determination that he committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon his moral character. Furthermore, because a violation of 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii) is not a per se bar, the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider all relevant factors in making its ultimate determination that plaintiff failed to show he is of good moral character. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hussein v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the IJ's determination that he lacked a reasonable fear of torture and is therefore not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) from his reinstated removal order. The court concluded that the IJ's determination is not limited to the question whether it was “facially legitimate and bona fide.” The court reviewed the IJ's negative reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence. In this case, the court held that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate government acquiescence in torture sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture under CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and the ADAC, seek permanently to enjoin defendants from categorically denying drivers' licenses to DACA recipients. Defendants had instituted a policy that rejected the Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients under the DACA program as proof of authorized presence for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction. The court agreed with the district court that DACA recipients are similarly situated to other groups of noncitizens Arizona deems eligible for drivers’ licenses. Consequently, Arizona’s disparate treatment of DACA recipients may well violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the court's previous opinion in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer indicated is likely the case. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, however, the court need not and should not come to rest on the Equal Protection issue, even if it “is a plausible, and quite possibly meritorious” claim for plaintiffs, so long as there is a viable alternate, nonconstitutional ground to reach the same result. In this case, the court concluded that Arizona’s policy classifies noncitizens based on Arizona’s independent definition of “authorized presence,” classification authority denied the states under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.1101, et seq. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order that Arizona’s policy is preempted by the exclusive authority of the federal government to classify noncitizens. View "Arizona Dream Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law