Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen who became a legal permanent resident, seeks review of the BIA's finding of removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). Petitioner was charged as removeable along with his son and wife for allegedly participating in an attempt to smuggle his wife's family members into the United States in a van. The court granted the petition, concluding that the BIA failed to address the IJ's seemingly inconsistent credibility findings. Nor did the IJ make a finding that petitioner engaged in “an affirmative act of help, assistance, or encouragement” of smuggling as the court's case law requires for a violation of section 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). The court remanded on an open record for the IJ to reconsider his ruling, provide further explanation, and engage in further factfinding if necessary. View "Perez-Arceo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a naturalized citizen from Nigeria, appealed the district court's denial of his request to modify his birth date. There is no official record of petitioner's birth. Petitioner listed the birth date that his mother recalled when he was naturalized in 1987. Petitioner later discovered, upon finding a handwritten record of family birth dates in his father's Bible, that he had been born four years earlier. At issue is whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to modify naturalization certificates issued by the courts prior to October 1, 1991. The court concluded that Congress preserved federal subject matter jurisdiction over such certificates through the uncodified savings clause of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 408, 104 Stat. 4978, 5047, and that the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider motions to amend such certificates in accordance with former 8 U.S.C. 1451(i). The court emphasized the distinction between two categories of certificates: those issued by courts prior to 1991 and those issued by the Attorney General after the Immigration Act of 1990 went into effect on October 1,1991. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded. View "Collins v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a naturalized citizen, appealed the district court's dismissal of her petition to change the birthday listed on her certificate of naturalization. Because the date of birth on plaintiff's naturalization certificate does not match the date of birth on file with the Social Security Administration, California has not allowed plaintiff to renew her state driver’s license. The court held that, although it is sympathetic to plaintiff's situation, federal courts lack jurisdiction to amend agency-issued naturalization certificates. The court noted that, until 1991, courts had exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Yu-Ling Teng v. District Director" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of Egypt and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, challenged the district court’s denial of his naturalization application. The court concluded that the district court's failure to make specific findings with respect to the materiality of plaintiff's statements made to the Sacramento Superior Court regarding his marital status prevents the court from reviewing the district court's determination that he committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon his moral character. Furthermore, because a violation of 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii) is not a per se bar, the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider all relevant factors in making its ultimate determination that plaintiff failed to show he is of good moral character. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hussein v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of the IJ's determination that he lacked a reasonable fear of torture and is therefore not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) from his reinstated removal order. The court concluded that the IJ's determination is not limited to the question whether it was “facially legitimate and bona fide.” The court reviewed the IJ's negative reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence. In this case, the court held that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate government acquiescence in torture sufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture under CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and the ADAC, seek permanently to enjoin defendants from categorically denying drivers' licenses to DACA recipients. Defendants had instituted a policy that rejected the Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients under the DACA program as proof of authorized presence for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction. The court agreed with the district court that DACA recipients are similarly situated to other groups of noncitizens Arizona deems eligible for drivers’ licenses. Consequently, Arizona’s disparate treatment of DACA recipients may well violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the court's previous opinion in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer indicated is likely the case. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, however, the court need not and should not come to rest on the Equal Protection issue, even if it “is a plausible, and quite possibly meritorious” claim for plaintiffs, so long as there is a viable alternate, nonconstitutional ground to reach the same result. In this case, the court concluded that Arizona’s policy classifies noncitizens based on Arizona’s independent definition of “authorized presence,” classification authority denied the states under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.1101, et seq. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order that Arizona’s policy is preempted by the exclusive authority of the federal government to classify noncitizens. View "Arizona Dream Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law

After petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to violating California Penal Code 32, accessory to a felony, he was ordered removed. The IJ concluded that petitioner's conviction constituted an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” and therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 101(a)(43)(S). The BIA dismissed petitioner's appeal and announced a new interpretation of “obstruction of justice” that requires only “the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice.” Contrary to the prior construction, this interpretation of INA 101(a)(43)(S) requires no nexus to an ongoing investigation or proceeding. The court agreed with petitioner that the agency's revised interpretation of the statute raises serious constitutional concerns about whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The court remanded to the agency so that it can either offer a new construction of INA 101(a)(43)(S) or, in the alternative, apply In re Espinoza-Gonzalez's interpretation to the instant case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, appealed the BIA's determination that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure because he lacked good moral character pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(1), as a "habitual drunkard." Petitioner is a chronic alcoholic and has a ten-year history of alcohol abuse. The court held that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a person’s medical disability lacks any rational relation to his classification as a person with bad moral character, and that section 1101(f)(1) is therefore unconstitutional. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners Linares and Preciado challenged the denial of their applications for cancellation of removal based on the finding that they were ineligible for cancellation of removal because their convictions for identity theft under California Penal Code 530.5(a) and (d)(2) were categorical crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The court concluded that the BIA erred in finding that petitioners' convictions were CIMTs because sections 530.5(a) and (d)(2) are not categorical fraud crimes, nor do they necessarily involve vile, base, or depraved conduct. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review. The court did not address the parties' remaining arguments. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Linares-Gonzalez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners Ramirez-Munoz and Francia-Alvarez, a married couple and natives and citizens of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to deny the motion to reopen their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that petitioners have not established that they are part of a narrowly defined or cognizable particular social group, and the court held that the proposed group of “imputed wealthy Americans” is not a discrete class of persons recognized by society as a particular social group. Nor is the proposed group sufficiently particular that it can be described with passable distinction that the group would be recognized as a discrete class of persons. Further, petitioners' evidence of changed country conditions does not point to either actual or imputed wealthy Americans as the targeted class of victims of increased violence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch" on Justia Law