Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, pled no contest to a charge under California Penal Code section 118, a general perjury statute. Petitioner was charged with perjury - application for driver's license. The IJ and the BIA concluded that petitioner's conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and disqualified petitioner from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court held that section 118 is not categorically a CIMT; section 118 is divisible because it criminalizes two distinct offenses: written and oral perjury; and, applying the modified approach, petitioner's offense of conviction for written perjury is not a CIMT. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted that it took no position on California’s other, context-specific perjury statutes. View "Rivera v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant emigrated from China in 1985, and applied for naturalization in 1993. In 1994, defendant was found guilty of Robbery of the First Degree and False Imprisonment with Violence or Menace. On March 31, 1994, defendant took his oath of allegiance and became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Nearly 20 years later, the government filed a complaint to revoke defendant's naturalization. The district court granted the government's motion on the pleadings based on 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(3) (for having committed crimes involving moral turpitude during the statutory period); and (2) the “catch-all” provision of 8 U.S.C. 1101(f), as promulgated in 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii) (for having committed unlawful acts that adversely reflect on one’s moral character during the statutory period). The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that defendant could not establish good moral character under section 1101(f) and 8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii). Therefore, the district court was required to enter a judgment of denaturalization. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Teng Jiao Zhou" on Justia Law

This court has held that an immigration judge may use the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—“false in one thing, false in everything”—to find that a witness who testified falsely in one respect at a removal hearing is also not credible in other respects. The court concluded that the BIA may not do the same thing when considering a motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court explained that, in contrast to an immigration judge, the BIA is not a finder of fact, so it cannot make the kind of credibility determination inherent in a decision to apply the falsus maxim. The court granted the petition for review in this case because the BIA applied the falsus maximu in denying petitioner's motion to reopen. The falsus maxim cannot render petitioner’s affidavit “inherently unbelievable,” because the falsus maxim is discretionary rather than mandatory. View "Shouchen Yang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's finding of removability based on his two prior drug convictions. The court concluded that the IJ erred in concluding that petitioner’s two counts of drug possession would bar him from first-offender treatment under the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA), 18 U.S.C. 3607(a). The court held that the two counts amount to a single “offense” under the FFOA because they arose out of a single event, composed a single criminal case, and triggered a single, undivided sentence. While petitioner was charged with possession of two different drugs, that alone does not change petitioner’s status as a first-time drug offender under the FFOA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Villavicencio-Rojas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, seeks adjustment of his immigration status under the “grandfathering” exception for beneficiaries of labor certification applications filed before April 30, 2001. Applying the Chevron framework, the court concluded that the statute at issue in this case, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), is ambiguous because Congress did not speak to the question of whether that section applies to substitute beneficiaries of labor certifications. The court concluded that it was permissible for the Attorney General, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1245.10(j), to interpret the statute to preclude beneficiaries substituted after the sunset date from obtaining grandfathered status. Therefore, the court concluded that 8 C.F.R. 1245.10(j) is entitled to deference. Because the BIA properly denied petitioner's application for adjustment, the court denied the petition for review. View "Valencia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that his California conviction for felony child abuse, under California Penal Code section 273a(a), constitutes a crime of violence and qualifies as an aggravated felony. The court concluded that section 273a(a) is not a divisible statute because the alternative mens rea requirements are not “elements." Rather, they are alternative means for accomplishing a single indivisible crime. Under the categorical approach, section 273a(a) is broader than 18 U.S.C. 16, and therefore not a “crime of violence,” nor does it qualify on that basis as an aggravated felony. Therefore, the BIA erred when it determined that petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded. View "Ramirez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his application for asylum and denial of his due process claim with regard to his removal proceedings before the IJ. The court clarified its holding in Abdisalan v. Holder and held that Pinto v. Holder remains the law of the Circuit. Pinto held that a BIA remand for further proceedings as to voluntary departure does not affect the finality of an otherwise-final order of removal. In this case, the court concluded that petitioner is subject to a final order of removal reviewable by this court because the BIA remanded his case to the IJ solely for proceedings related to voluntary departure. The court also concluded that, because petitioner’s asylum claim was not meaningfully exhausted before the BIA, this court lacks jurisdiction to review it. The court further concluded that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the manner in which the IJ conducted the removal proceedings violated his due process rights. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Rizo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioners David and Miguel Correo-Ruiz, citizens of Mexico and brothers, challenged the BIA's holding that individuals like petitioners, who entered the United States unlawfully and then applied for adjustment of status under a provision of the immigration laws permitting non-citizens to become lawful permanent residents, are categorically ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). In Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, the court upheld the BIA’s interpretation of the law and adopted a five-factor test for determining whether In re Briones may be applied retroactively in a given case. Petitioners assert that they incurred legal expenses pursuing section 1255(i) relief during the 21-month period between Acosta v. Gonzales and Briones. In Garfias-Rodriguez, the court suggested that incurring such expenses could potentially tilt the second and third factors in the petitioner’s favor. Because the record does not reflect the amount of the expenses petitioners incurred during the relevant 21-month window, the court remanded to the BIA with instructions to grant the brothers an opportunity to supplement the record. The BIA can then assess in the first instance, under the five-factor test, whether Briones may be applied retroactively in this case. The court granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Correo-Ruiz v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of North Korea, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of asylum under the firm resettlement doctrine. The court held that section 302 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, 22 U.S.C. 7842, does not preclude a finding that a North Korean has “firmly resettled” in South Korea, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 C.F.R. § 208.15, even though he otherwise meets the requirements of firm resettlement. Consequently, section 7842 does not affect the BIA's conclusion that petitioner has resettled in South Korea and therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sung Kil Jang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an adopted son of a natural-born U.S. citizen father and naturalized U.S. citizen mother, petitioned for review of his citizenship claim. The IJ agreed with petitioner that he was not removable because he obtained automatic derivative citizenship from his parents upon his adoption. The BIA concluded, however, that petitioner has not met his burden to establish citizenship. The BIA vacated the IJ's termination order and remanded. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's citizenship claim where petitioner has not been ordered removed, and rejected petitioner's claim that the statutory provision for review of nationality claims under 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5) creates an exception to the court's limitation to review of final orders. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Viloria v. Lynch" on Justia Law