Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Rajanbir Singh-Kar, a citizen of India, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. He claimed that members of a rival political party attacked him twice due to his political activities and that a police officer slapped him, threatened to jail him, and threw him out of the police station when he tried to report the attacks.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Singh-Kar’s application, finding that his testimony regarding a single incident of police misconduct was insufficient to establish that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The IJ also found inconsistencies between Singh-Kar’s application and his testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Singh-Kar’s evidence was insufficient. The BIA also noted that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of Singh-Kar’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that Singh-Kar’s testimony about a single incident of police misconduct and general country conditions evidence did not compel a different result. The court also found that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, the Second Circuit denied Singh-Kar’s petition for review. View "Singh-Kar v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Suqin Xia, a citizen of China, has lived unlawfully in the United States for over thirty years. She applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application, citing discretionary reasons. Xia then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.The district court dismissed Xia's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding an application made under § 1255. The court concluded that the denial of Xia's application was a "judgment" under this statute, thus precluding judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the denial of an application for adjustment of status under § 1255 is a "judgment" for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS. Consequently, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to review Xia's claims, affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. View "Xia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Mohsen Mahdawi, a Lawful Permanent Resident and undergraduate student at Columbia University, was arrested during his naturalization interview in Vermont. He was detained and served with a Notice to Appear, indicating that the U.S. Secretary of State had determined he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mahdawi filed a habeas petition, claiming his arrest and detention were in retaliation for his advocacy on the war in Gaza, violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing his removal from Vermont and later granted his release on bail, finding he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont initially granted Mahdawi’s emergency motion for a TRO and later extended it. The court also granted his motion for release on bail pending the resolution of his habeas petition. The government sought an emergency stay of these orders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and denied the government’s motion for a stay. The court found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release. The court also concluded that the government had not demonstrated irreparable injury and that the balance of equities tipped in favor of denying the stay. Consequently, the government’s motion for a stay and request for a writ of mandamus were both denied. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

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A Turkish graduate student, Rümeysa Öztürk, was lawfully residing in Massachusetts on a student visa when she was arrested by plainclothes officers without warning on March 25, 2025. She was transported across state lines and eventually detained in Louisiana. Her counsel, unaware of her location, filed a habeas petition in the District of Massachusetts, alleging her arrest was based on an op-ed she co-authored. The petition was transferred to the District of Vermont after it was revealed she had been in Vermont during transit.The District of Vermont set a schedule for a bail hearing and to resolve the constitutional claims in the habeas petition. The court ordered the government to transfer Öztürk from Louisiana to Vermont to aid in these proceedings. The government appealed this order, seeking an emergency stay of the transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the government failed to justify a stay. It determined that the District of Vermont was the proper venue for the habeas petition since Öztürk was in Vermont when the petition was filed. The court also found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction over Öztürk’s detention challenge. Additionally, the court held that the government did not demonstrate irreparable injury absent a stay and that the balance of equities favored Öztürk.The Second Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay, denied the request for a writ of mandamus, and vacated the administrative stay. The court ordered the government to comply with the district court’s transfer order within one week. View "Öztürk v. Hyde" on Justia Law

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Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

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Diego Penaranda Arevalo, a citizen of Ecuador unlawfully present in the United States, sought cancellation of a removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Penaranda then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review. While this petition was pending, Penaranda filed a motion with the BIA to terminate or remand his removal proceedings, arguing that his removal order was invalid because his original notice to appear did not include the date and time of his initial hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that Penaranda had forfeited any objection based on the time-and-place requirement by failing to raise it in a timely manner.The Second Circuit reviewed both cases together. The court reaffirmed its decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr that the time-and-place requirement is a non-jurisdictional rule and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Penaranda forfeited his objection. Therefore, the court denied that petition.In his first petition, Penaranda challenged the immigration judge’s finding that he gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, which led to the conclusion that he failed to establish good moral character and was therefore ineligible for the requested relief. The Second Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Penaranda’s petition insofar as it contested whether and why he testified falsely, as these are unreviewable questions of fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Penaranda also argued that the immigration judge held him to a higher burden of proof than required. The court found that this argument, while a question of law, failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part Penaranda’s first petition. View "Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Shuqiang Tian, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. Tian claimed persecution by the Chinese government due to his opposition to the government's forcible demolition policy, which involved demolishing villagers' homes without just compensation. Tian testified that he protested against the demolition, was arrested, beaten, and threatened by the police, and ultimately forced to accept inadequate compensation under duress.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Tian's claims, concluding that his prosecution for blocking a road and agitating in a government office did not amount to persecution. The IJ found no sufficient nexus between Tian's political opinion and the harm he suffered. The IJ also summarily denied Tian's CAT claim, stating that he had not demonstrated a likelihood of torture upon return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Tian failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground, and that he did not meet the burden for CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the agency's analysis was legally deficient. The court noted that the IJ and BIA failed to consider material evidence and the context of Tian's protests, which indicated that his persecution was linked to his political opinion. The court also found that the agency did not adequately address the possibility that Tian's arrests were pretextual and failed to provide a reasoned basis for denying his CAT claim. Consequently, the Second Circuit granted Tian's petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "Tian v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal was whether defendant should have been acquitted of transporting an alien within the United States for profit in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). The Second Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant transported an alien "in furtherance of" the alien's illegal stay in the United States, as required by section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and by the district court's jury instructions. Although the Government did present evidence that defendant drove the alien to Pennsylvania Station in order to facilitate the alien's entry into Canada using a fraudulent passport, such a showing alone cannot establish a direct and substantial relationship between the transportation and an act in furtherance of the alien's unlawful presence in the United States. The Second Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the count and for de novo sentencing. View "United States v. Khalil" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding of removeability based on his unlawful entry into the United States. Petitioner, an unaccompanied juvenile of 17, entered the country without inspection to live with his mother. At issue was whether either the Fifth Amendment's due process clause or the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment required consideration and weighing of the proportionality of removal against the grounds for removability. The court held that no such consideration was necessary because removal was not punitive and no fair considerations were present in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Marin-Marin v. Sessions" on Justia Law