Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

Diego Penaranda Arevalo, a citizen of Ecuador unlawfully present in the United States, sought cancellation of a removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Penaranda then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review. While this petition was pending, Penaranda filed a motion with the BIA to terminate or remand his removal proceedings, arguing that his removal order was invalid because his original notice to appear did not include the date and time of his initial hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that Penaranda had forfeited any objection based on the time-and-place requirement by failing to raise it in a timely manner.The Second Circuit reviewed both cases together. The court reaffirmed its decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr that the time-and-place requirement is a non-jurisdictional rule and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Penaranda forfeited his objection. Therefore, the court denied that petition.In his first petition, Penaranda challenged the immigration judge’s finding that he gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, which led to the conclusion that he failed to establish good moral character and was therefore ineligible for the requested relief. The Second Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Penaranda’s petition insofar as it contested whether and why he testified falsely, as these are unreviewable questions of fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Penaranda also argued that the immigration judge held him to a higher burden of proof than required. The court found that this argument, while a question of law, failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part Penaranda’s first petition. View "Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Shuqiang Tian, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. Tian claimed persecution by the Chinese government due to his opposition to the government's forcible demolition policy, which involved demolishing villagers' homes without just compensation. Tian testified that he protested against the demolition, was arrested, beaten, and threatened by the police, and ultimately forced to accept inadequate compensation under duress.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Tian's claims, concluding that his prosecution for blocking a road and agitating in a government office did not amount to persecution. The IJ found no sufficient nexus between Tian's political opinion and the harm he suffered. The IJ also summarily denied Tian's CAT claim, stating that he had not demonstrated a likelihood of torture upon return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Tian failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground, and that he did not meet the burden for CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the agency's analysis was legally deficient. The court noted that the IJ and BIA failed to consider material evidence and the context of Tian's protests, which indicated that his persecution was linked to his political opinion. The court also found that the agency did not adequately address the possibility that Tian's arrests were pretextual and failed to provide a reasoned basis for denying his CAT claim. Consequently, the Second Circuit granted Tian's petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "Tian v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether defendant should have been acquitted of transporting an alien within the United States for profit in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). The Second Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant transported an alien "in furtherance of" the alien's illegal stay in the United States, as required by section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and by the district court's jury instructions. Although the Government did present evidence that defendant drove the alien to Pennsylvania Station in order to facilitate the alien's entry into Canada using a fraudulent passport, such a showing alone cannot establish a direct and substantial relationship between the transportation and an act in furtherance of the alien's unlawful presence in the United States. The Second Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the count and for de novo sentencing. View "United States v. Khalil" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding of removeability based on his unlawful entry into the United States. Petitioner, an unaccompanied juvenile of 17, entered the country without inspection to live with his mother. At issue was whether either the Fifth Amendment's due process clause or the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment required consideration and weighing of the proportionality of removal against the grounds for removability. The court held that no such consideration was necessary because removal was not punitive and no fair considerations were present in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Marin-Marin v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner, born in the Dominican Republic to unwed parents and admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was ineligible for derivative citizenship and denial of petitioner's motion to terminate removal proceedings. Petitioner argued that he became a U.S. citizen derivatively when his father was naturalized in 1980, when petitioner was eleven years old. The court agreed with the IJ and BIA that petitioner was not a "child" eligible for derivative citizenship because he was not "legitimated" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1432(a). In this case, the elimination of legal distinctions between children born in and out of wedlock under Dominican law did not occur before petitioner's sixteenth birthday. Furthermore, petitioner failed to identify any legal authority suggesting that New York has eliminated all legal distinctions between children based on the marital status of their parents. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Gil v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In this case, petitioner, who was illegally present in the United States after multiple deportations, crossed into Canada by bridge, was detained four hours by the Canada Border Services Agency, and was then returned back over the bridge. At issue was whether petitioner's return counts as his "last arrival" into the United States, and therefore gave him an additional one year from that date to file an asylum application. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 208.4(a)(2)(ii), an asylum claim must be filed within one year of the alien's "last arrival" in the United States. The court concluded that the court's prior precedent foreclosed such a result. However, after the court decided Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, the BIA issued a decision explicitly rejecting the court's holding, and giving the term "its natural and literal meaning, i.e., the alien's most recent arrival in the United States from a trip abroad." Matter of F-P-R-. Because deference to this subsequent BIA opinion raised a doubt that the BIA was better suited to resolve, the court granted the petition in part and remanded it in part for the BIA to determine, in the first instance, how F-P-R- may apply to this case. View "Linares-Urrutia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Buffalo Transportation seeks review of a final order of the OCAHO finding that it had committed substantive violations of Section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b). The OCAHO also affirmed the imposition of fines by ICE. The court agreed with the ALJ's finding that Buffalo Transportation had not timely complied with the requirements of 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b) and related regulations that require employers to verify that an employee is legally authorized to work in the United States through executing a Form I‐9 for each employee within three business days of hire. The court also agreed with the adjustments of ICE's original fine amounts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Buffalo Transportation Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Portugal and native of Angola, seeks review of DHS's order of removal that was issued without a hearing on the ground that he waived the right to challenge removal by submitting an Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) application and subsequently entering the country pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The court held that an ESTA record is sufficient evidence of waiver. In this case, the court concluded that the administrative record supports the agency’s finding that petitioner waived his right to a hearing by submitting an ESTA application and entering the United States pursuant to the VWP. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Vasconcelos v. Lynch" on Justia Law