Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A lawful permanent resident originally from the Philippines, Nemis, entered the United States on a temporary work visa and adjusted to permanent residency. In 2016, he was indicted in the Southern District of New York for conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, specifically by preparing and submitting fraudulent documents in support of H-1B visa applications. Nemis pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate paragraph four of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which criminalizes knowingly making or presenting false statements, or presenting required immigration documents lacking any reasonable basis in law or fact.After Nemis traveled abroad in 2018 and sought reentry, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings, alleging he was removable due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) or conspiracy to commit such a crime. An immigration judge ordered his removal, finding his conduct constituted a CIMT. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision. Nemis sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which initially remanded the case to the BIA for proper application of the categorical approach to determine whether Nemis’s conviction under paragraph four of § 1546(a) categorically constituted a CIMT. On remand, the BIA again dismissed Nemis’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether paragraph four of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) categorically describes a CIMT under the modified categorical approach. The court held that both knowingly making or presenting false statements and knowingly presenting required immigration documents lacking any reasonable basis in law or fact constitute CIMTs. Consequently, Nemis’s conviction rendered him removable. The Second Circuit denied Nemis’s petition for review, affirming the BIA’s determination. View "Nemis v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A citizen of Brazil entered the United States without inspection in 1995, lived there for several years, and later left the country. In 2004, he attempted to reenter the U.S. on a visitor visa but was denied entry and received an expedited removal order before being deported. In 2017, he reentered the U.S. without inspection and was apprehended at the Vermont border, where U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a reinstatement order based on the 2004 removal. Although he was not removed at that time, he was later detained in 2023 pursuant to the reinstatement order. He filed a motion with CBP to reopen, reconsider, and rescind the reinstatement order, claiming he had not been advised of his rights in a language he understood. CBP denied his motion.In the interim, after his 2017 apprehension, he was referred for withholding-only proceedings, where an immigration judge denied his claims for relief and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Separate immigration relief sought through his wife’s asylum status was also denied due to the outstanding reinstatement order. After various attempts to challenge his removal administratively, including a denied motion to the San Francisco ICE field office, he petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of both the 2017 reinstatement order and the 2023 denial of his motion to reopen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that reinstatement orders are final orders of removal subject to judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), but found the petition for review of the 2017 order untimely and that equitable tolling did not apply. However, the court held it had jurisdiction to review CBP’s 2023 denial, ruled that CBP has authority under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 to reopen and reconsider reinstatement orders, and found CBP’s contrary view was legal error and an abuse of discretion. The court denied the petition as to the 2017 order, but granted it as to the 2023 denial, vacated the denial, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santos v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Poland entered the United States without inspection in 1999 and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 2006. Between 2006 and 2008, he participated in a conspiracy to retaliate against employees who had sued his employer for wage violations, including hiring individuals to commit violent acts and intimidation. He pleaded guilty in 2012 to conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses and parties to an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) and (f), and was sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment.Removal proceedings were initiated by the Department of Homeland Security. Before an Immigration Judge, he argued that his conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and that the offense was not committed within five years of his admission. The Immigration Judge denied his motion to terminate removal, finding the conviction was categorically a CIMT and met the timing requirement. He sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and a hardship waiver, but was denied by a second Immigration Judge. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. On a previous petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for the BIA to reconsider the CIMT determination. The BIA again concluded the conviction was categorically a CIMT.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. It held that conspiracy to retaliate against witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the CIMT ground for removability is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The court also declined to reconsider arguments already rejected in the earlier petition. The petition for review was denied. View "Dziedziach v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A native of Hong Kong and citizen of China, the petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1979. He was later convicted in federal court of conspiracy to import heroin, but received a waiver of deportation. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty in New Jersey Superior Court to theft by deception, a disorderly persons offense, and was fined $200. He also pleaded guilty in New York Supreme Court to forgery in the second degree, receiving probation and a fine. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, asserting that he was removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising from a single scheme.An Immigration Judge denied his motion to terminate proceedings, finding both state offenses constituted crimes involving moral turpitude and that the New Jersey theft by deception offense qualified as a “conviction” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed, and after various remands to address specific issues—including whether the New York offense categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude—the BIA again dismissed his appeal. The petitioner sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which initially denied relief by deferring to the BIA’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The Supreme Court then vacated that judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which held courts must independently interpret statutes without deferring to agency interpretations.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a “conviction” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires a formal judgment of guilt resulting from a criminal proceeding with minimum constitutional protections and culminating in a criminal sentence. Applying this standard, the court found the petitioner’s New Jersey offense met these criteria and denied his petition for review. View "Wong v. Blanche" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Yemeni national, sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, arguing he would likely be tortured if returned to Yemen due to an ongoing feud with the Balwi family, who allegedly aligned with the Houthis. He claimed past persecution and continuing threats, including incidents both in Yemen and after arriving in the United States. However, he failed to provide testimony or affidavits from close family members—his wife, sister, and adoptive father—who were knowledgeable about the feud and available to testify.After being convicted of first-degree assault in New York, the petitioner was placed in removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application for relief under CAT on two independent grounds: first, the lack of reasonably available corroborating evidence from key relatives, and second, the failure to establish, on the merits, that it was more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Yemen. The IJ noted inconsistencies and vagueness in testimony but did not make an explicit adverse credibility finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, adopting the IJ's reasoning and determining that the petitioner forfeited any challenge to the corroboration requirement by failing to raise it in his administrative appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding the corroboration challenge forfeited and clarified that an IJ may require corroboration whenever it would be reasonably expected and helpful, regardless of an adverse credibility finding. The court further held that lack of corroboration was an independent and valid basis for denying CAT relief, and the agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The petition for review was denied. View "Al Saidi v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from the Democratic Republic of the Congo was detained in New York pending removal proceedings and was ordered released on bond, which he could not pay. He then brought a class action and habeas petition on behalf of similarly situated noncitizens, challenging government bond-hearing procedures as violating due process. Specifically, he argued that the procedures wrongly placed the burden of proof on detainees, failed to consider ability to pay, and did not require consideration of alternatives to detention.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially certified the class and issued a preliminary injunction requiring changes to bond-hearing procedures, with the government complying for nearly two years. After the Supreme Court decided Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which held that lower courts lack jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief under certain immigration statutes, the district court vacated the injunction. It then decertified the class entirely, concluding that neither class-wide injunctive nor declaratory relief was appropriate, and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for injunctive relief, as lower courts lack authority for such relief post-Aleman Gonzalez. However, it found that the district court erred by decertifying the class for declaratory relief based on factors irrelevant to the Rule 23(b)(2) class-certification analysis. The Second Circuit clarified that while injunctive relief is unavailable, district courts retain authority to grant class-wide declaratory relief in these cases. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Onosamba-Ohindo v. Ball" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident originally from the West Bank, lived in Vermont and was pursuing graduate studies at Columbia University. Following his vocal participation in student demonstrations protesting military actions in Gaza, he was arrested at a USCIS facility in April 2025 by Homeland Security agents, who commenced removal proceedings against him. The Notice to Appear cited a determination by the Secretary of State that his presence or activities posed potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences, referencing his alleged rhetoric and conduct at protests. The government also presented prior allegations related to firearm purchases and drug possession, which the petitioner denied or had resolved.After his arrest, the petitioner’s attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, alleging that the government targeted him for removal based on constitutionally protected speech. The petition sought to invalidate the Secretary of State’s determination, bar removal based on advocacy for Palestinian rights, and obtain his release. The district court granted his release pending review of the petition, finding a likelihood of success on the First Amendment claim and determining it had jurisdiction despite statutory provisions that restrict judicial review in immigration matters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying a de novo standard for subject matter jurisdiction, the court concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) channels judicial review of questions arising from removal actions to the administrative process and ultimately to a petition for review of a final order of removal in the circuit courts. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the habeas petition because the petitioner’s claims were intertwined with the removal proceedings. The court vacated the district court’s release order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

A noncitizen defendant, a member of the MS-13 gang, pleaded guilty to assault in aid of racketeering after providing advice and supplies to junior gang members involved in a shooting. He was charged as part of a multi-defendant racketeering indictment covering violent crimes from 2016 to 2018. The defendant was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. One special condition of his supervised release required him to “cooperate with and abide by all instructions of immigration authorities.” The defendant did not object to this special condition during sentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York imposed the sentence and adopted the presentence report’s recommendations, including the special conditions of supervised release. The defendant filed an appeal challenging only the “Immigration Authorities Condition,” arguing that it was procedurally unreasonable, unconstitutionally vague, and impermissibly delegated judicial authority to non-judicial officers. The government argued the appeal was barred by a waiver in the plea agreement, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the waiver did not cover conditions of supervised release and denied the motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case for plain error. The court held that the challenge was ripe, was not waived but forfeited, and that the district court’s reasons for imposing the condition were self-evident in the record. The court further held that the condition was not unconstitutionally vague and did not unlawfully delegate sentencing authority. The judgment of the district court, including the challenged special condition, was affirmed. View "United States v. Salvador" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Sri Lanka sought protection in the United States, claiming that he would face persecution and torture if returned to his home country. He described being forcibly detained by members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a designated terrorist organization, compelled to serve as a translator during their interrogation of another captive, and subsequently detained and beaten by the Sri Lankan army under suspicion of LTTE affiliation. After living in Sri Lanka without incident for several years, he traveled to and from the United States, ultimately seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, ruling that the applicant was barred from asylum and withholding due to his provision of material support to the LTTE, and finding his asylum application untimely. The IJ also determined that the applicant had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that his CAT claims failed for lack of corroboration and insufficient likelihood of torture upon return. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, relying exclusively on the material support bar for asylum and withholding claims, and upholding the denial of CAT deferral on the merits, without assessing whether the applicant would otherwise qualify for asylum or withholding but for the bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA erred by not determining whether the applicant would be entitled to asylum or statutory withholding of removal if the material support bar did not apply, as such findings are necessary for the applicant to pursue a discretionary waiver from the Department of Homeland Security. The court granted the petition in part and remanded for this determination. The petition for review of the denial of CAT relief was denied. View "Sufiyan v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Brazil who entered the United States without inspection around 2005 and has lived in the country since then was arrested in 2025 by immigration authorities while driving to work. He had a pending asylum application since 2016, had been granted work authorization, owned a home, operated a small business, and had no criminal history. Following his arrest, the government initiated removal proceedings against him and detained him, asserting that he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) while his removal proceedings were pending.The United States Department of Homeland Security placed him in removal proceedings in immigration court, where an immigration judge concluded that he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus ineligible for release on bond under § 1226(a). The petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, arguing that his detention should be governed by § 1226(a), which allows for release on bond. The district court agreed, ordered the government to provide a bond hearing or release him, and, after a bond hearing was held, he was released because the immigration judge found he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the petitioner’s detention was governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) (mandatory detention) or § 1226(a) (discretionary detention with bond eligibility). The Second Circuit held that § 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens like the petitioner—those present in the United States after entering without inspection and not apprehended at or near the border. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas corpus, concluding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply in these circumstances, and that the petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. View "Cunha v. Freden" on Justia Law