Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Chavarria‐Reyes removed to Mexico after concluding that he lacked permission to be here and was ineligible for discretionary relief because he has committed a crime of moral turpitude. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The court held that, although the IJ failed in his duty, Chavarria-Reyes failed to exhaust remedies with respect to the IJ’s failure to alert him to the possibility of voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. 1229c(a). An alien who departs voluntarily has more opportunity to return in later years than an alien removed involuntarily. Voluntary departure usually depends on a showing of good moral character: Chavarria‐Reyes has at least three convictions, for domestic battery, retail theft, and home‐repair fraud. Voluntary departure under section 240B(a) is available without regard to the alien’s character, if the alien makes the request at the outset of proceedings and forswears all other arguments. The court noted that the checklist for use at hearings with aliens who have counsel, the category in which the IJ (wrongly) supposed Chavarria‐Reyes to be, does not call on the IJ to give advice about voluntary departure under section 240B(a), whether or not some other option is available. View "Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Urena, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted as an alien found in the U.S. after having been deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and was sentenced to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Urena was directed, at the end of his prison sentence, to surrender to the Homeland Security Department for a determination of deportability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s refusal to exclude evidence of Urena’s seven prior removals under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and denial of Urena’s Motion for a Mistrial after the prosecution published to the jury an exhibit that included the fact of Urena’s prior conviction for “Felony Class 4 Cocaine Possession.” The district court found a specific non‐propensity purpose for the evidence of prior removals and was in the best position to find that the jury’s attention had not been drawn to the prior conviction information on the exhibit because the court itself had not noticed it until it was brought to its attention. View "United States v. Urena" on Justia Law

Perez-Fuentes entered the U.S from Mexico without inspection; his date of entry is not clear. After he was arrested several times DHS charge Perez-Fuentes as removable for being present without inspection, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Perez-Fuentes proceeded pro se, but with the aid of an interpreter, and testified that he is a parent of a daughter, Esmeralda, who is a U.S. citizen, and that he first entered the U.S. in 1995 and returned after a departure sometime in 1998. Perez-Fuentes sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). At the conclusion of a hearing at which Perez-Fuentes presented testimony, the IJ denied relief, finding that Perez-Fuentes failed to present documentary evidence to support his claim that he worked continuously in the U.S.; that Perez-Fuentes did not establish the good moral character requirement, noting three domestic battery arrests and evidence that Perez-Fuentes may have underreported his income for tax purposes; and lack of proof that removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to Esmeralda. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that it generally lacks jurisdiction to review denials of discretionary relief and that Perez-Fuentes had not exhausted his remedies with respect to claimed procedural errors. View "Perez-Fuentes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Vidinski, a native of Bulgaria, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 1998 but overstayed his visa. He married a U.S. citizen, Literski, in 2002. In 2005 he and Literski filed petitions seeking legal permanent resident status for him. Before those petitions were resolved, Literski told an ICE investigator that the marriage had been a sham to obtain immigration benefits for Vidinski (and money for her). Following a final order to remove Vidinski, the BIA dismissed his appeal and denied his motion to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit lifted a stay on Vidinski’s removal and rejected a petition for judicial review, in which he argued that he was entitled to cross‐examine Literski, who had not appeared in response to a subpoena and whose affidavit was critical to the marriage fraud issue, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a) and 1182(a). Vidinski is removable for having overstayed his 1998 visa and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the denial of cancellation of removal based on “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to family members. The removal proceedings were fundamentally fair. View "Vidinski v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center submitted to the Department of Homeland Security a Freedom of Information Act request for information relating to Tier III terrorist organizations. Membership in any tier makes a person inadmissible to the United States, with narrow exceptions. Tier I and Tier II organizations are publicly identified terrorist groups such as ISIS and al‐Qaeda. Tier III organizations are defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) as any group that engages in terrorist activity (defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)), even if the activity is conducted exclusively against regimes that are enemies of the United States. The government typically does not have good intelligence about Tier III organizations. The Department provided only some of the requested information. The Center filed suit. The district judge granted, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, summary judgment for the government on the ground that the names of the Tier III organizations are protected from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E), for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” View "Heartland Alliance National Immigrant Justice Center v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1157(a)(2), the President authorized entry of 85,000 refugees for fiscal 2016; at least 10,000 were to come from Syria. Since 2001, all persons seeking to enter the U.S. as refugees are required to undergo screening by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, followed by multiple layers of screening by the federal government, which can take two years. Indiana has an approved refugee resettlement plan (8 U.S.C. 1522) and receives federal funds to contract with private agencies for the provision of services, “without regard to race, religion, nationality, sex, or political opinion.” Indiana’s governor refused to pay for services to any refugee whose “‘country of origin” is Syria. The Seventh Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction. Regulation of immigration is a federal function. The state’s brief provided no evidence that Syrian terrorists are posing as refugees or have ever committed acts of terrorism in the U.S. The court characterized the governor’s argument as “the equivalent of his saying . . . that he wants to forbid black people to settle in Indiana not because they’re black but because he’s afraid of them, and since race is therefore not his motive he isn’t discriminating.” Indiana is free to withdraw from the refugee assistance program, but withdrawal might not interrupt the flow of Syrian refugees; the Wilson/Fish program distributes federal aid to refugees without the involvement of the state government. View "Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence" on Justia Law

Turkhan, born in 1960 in Iraq, entered the U.S. in 1979, eventually becoming a legal permanent resident. He is an Assyrian Christian, has not left the U.S. since 1979, is married to a U.S. citizen, and is the father of children, ages 10 and 19. In 1990, he pleaded guilty to cocaine charges. In prison, he obtained his G.E.D., became a nursing assistant, worked as a mental-health companion, and received a letter of commendation. In 1994, an IJ found him deportable. Existing law allowed waiver of deportation for certain excludable legal permanent residents (Section 212(c)). At the hearing, Turkhan attempted to have relatives testify; although arrangements were to have been made, no interpreter was provided. The IJ found Turkhan statutorily eligible but denied relief. The BIA affirmed and, in 1997, declined to reconsider, citing the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts. The Seventh Circuit denied habeas relief. In 2001, the Justice Department issued regulations for reopening section 212 cases. The Supreme Court held that persons rendered removable by guilty pleas entered before AEDPA may obtain relief. The BIA denied Turkhan’s renewed motions twice. In 2006, he additionally sought withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA remanded for consideration of “changed country conditions in Iraq.” An IJ found Turkhan ineligible for section 212(c) relief but granted CAT deferral of removal. The BIA affirmed. The decision did not restore Turkhan’s lawful permanent resident status nor abrogate the deportation order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the scope of the BIA remand and that Turkhan’s right to procedural due process was violated. The court was “mystified by the government’s decision … [but] the decision is not ours to make.” View "Turkhan v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that Cadavedo, a native of the Philippines, had engaged in marriage fraud. During an interview, Cadavedo’s wife had admitted that Cadavedo had promised to pay her to marry him for immigration purposes. She gave a sworn statement to USCIS and withdrew her I-130 petition to adjust his status. That USCIS finding bars him from obtaining adjustment of his status to become a lawful permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1154(c). Cadavedo received a notice to appear, charging him as removable, in 2012. In 2014, an immigration judge denied Cadavedo’s request for a continuance to allow him to challenge the USCIS finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Cadavedo made his request during the hearing he sought to have continued, and his entitlement to the belated relief he wanted to seek from USCIS is speculative at best. View "Cadavedo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Cisneros came to the U.S. in 1988 at age 17 and stayed after the expiration of his visa. In 1995, he married U.S. citizen; his status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident. They divorced in 2002. Cisneros consistently supported his ex-wife and the couple’s children and now has grandchildren. He has a history of alcoholism. In 2012, Cisneros committed unarmed robbery, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), resulting in loss of his legal permanent resident status and making him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because robbery is a crime of moral turpitude. Cisneros applied for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B), which gives the Attorney General the discretionary power to waive inadmissibility for the spouse, parent, or child of a U.S. citizen who would suffer “extreme hardship” if removed. An immigration judge granted Cisneros’s application. DHS appealed; the BIA revoked the waiver. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that its authority extends only to legal or constitutional issues, not discretionary determinations. View "Cisneros v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2013, Santashbekov applied for asylum claiming that he faced persecution for his political activism as a member of the youth wing of the Ata Meken party in his native Kyrgyzstan, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A). After the 2010 revolution, according to the U.S. State Department, Kyrgyzstan continued to face instability and human rights problems, including arbitrary arrests and torture by law enforcement and security forces. The immigration judge characterized Santashbekov’s testimony about his own situation as “vague” and “extremely confusing.” Santashbekov testified that he had experienced persecution by Kurmanov, who Santashbekov believes is a member of an opposing political party and a police or government official; Kurmanov and his associates asked him to repudiate Ata Meken and detained and beat him several times in 2011. Santashbekov changed his address and his name, which was formerly Sultanhodzhaev. He submitted hospital paperwork that confirms that he received medical treatment in Kyrgyzstan corresponding to the beatings he described. He submitted criminal court documents showing that Kurmanov was prosecuted and that Santashbekov was named as a “plaintiff” in the proceeding. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s denial, also noting inconsistencies in Santashbekov’s testimony. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Daniiar Santashbekov v. Loretta Lynch" on Justia Law