Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Vidinski, a native of Bulgaria, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 1998 but overstayed his visa. He married a U.S. citizen, Literski, in 2002. In 2005 he and Literski filed petitions seeking legal permanent resident status for him. Before those petitions were resolved, Literski told an ICE investigator that the marriage had been a sham to obtain immigration benefits for Vidinski (and money for her). Following a final order to remove Vidinski, the BIA dismissed his appeal and denied his motion to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit lifted a stay on Vidinski’s removal and rejected a petition for judicial review, in which he argued that he was entitled to cross‐examine Literski, who had not appeared in response to a subpoena and whose affidavit was critical to the marriage fraud issue, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a) and 1182(a). Vidinski is removable for having overstayed his 1998 visa and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the denial of cancellation of removal based on “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to family members. The removal proceedings were fundamentally fair. View "Vidinski v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center submitted to the Department of Homeland Security a Freedom of Information Act request for information relating to Tier III terrorist organizations. Membership in any tier makes a person inadmissible to the United States, with narrow exceptions. Tier I and Tier II organizations are publicly identified terrorist groups such as ISIS and al‐Qaeda. Tier III organizations are defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) as any group that engages in terrorist activity (defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)), even if the activity is conducted exclusively against regimes that are enemies of the United States. The government typically does not have good intelligence about Tier III organizations. The Department provided only some of the requested information. The Center filed suit. The district judge granted, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, summary judgment for the government on the ground that the names of the Tier III organizations are protected from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E), for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” View "Heartland Alliance National Immigrant Justice Center v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1157(a)(2), the President authorized entry of 85,000 refugees for fiscal 2016; at least 10,000 were to come from Syria. Since 2001, all persons seeking to enter the U.S. as refugees are required to undergo screening by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, followed by multiple layers of screening by the federal government, which can take two years. Indiana has an approved refugee resettlement plan (8 U.S.C. 1522) and receives federal funds to contract with private agencies for the provision of services, “without regard to race, religion, nationality, sex, or political opinion.” Indiana’s governor refused to pay for services to any refugee whose “‘country of origin” is Syria. The Seventh Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction. Regulation of immigration is a federal function. The state’s brief provided no evidence that Syrian terrorists are posing as refugees or have ever committed acts of terrorism in the U.S. The court characterized the governor’s argument as “the equivalent of his saying . . . that he wants to forbid black people to settle in Indiana not because they’re black but because he’s afraid of them, and since race is therefore not his motive he isn’t discriminating.” Indiana is free to withdraw from the refugee assistance program, but withdrawal might not interrupt the flow of Syrian refugees; the Wilson/Fish program distributes federal aid to refugees without the involvement of the state government. View "Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence" on Justia Law

Turkhan, born in 1960 in Iraq, entered the U.S. in 1979, eventually becoming a legal permanent resident. He is an Assyrian Christian, has not left the U.S. since 1979, is married to a U.S. citizen, and is the father of children, ages 10 and 19. In 1990, he pleaded guilty to cocaine charges. In prison, he obtained his G.E.D., became a nursing assistant, worked as a mental-health companion, and received a letter of commendation. In 1994, an IJ found him deportable. Existing law allowed waiver of deportation for certain excludable legal permanent residents (Section 212(c)). At the hearing, Turkhan attempted to have relatives testify; although arrangements were to have been made, no interpreter was provided. The IJ found Turkhan statutorily eligible but denied relief. The BIA affirmed and, in 1997, declined to reconsider, citing the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts. The Seventh Circuit denied habeas relief. In 2001, the Justice Department issued regulations for reopening section 212 cases. The Supreme Court held that persons rendered removable by guilty pleas entered before AEDPA may obtain relief. The BIA denied Turkhan’s renewed motions twice. In 2006, he additionally sought withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA remanded for consideration of “changed country conditions in Iraq.” An IJ found Turkhan ineligible for section 212(c) relief but granted CAT deferral of removal. The BIA affirmed. The decision did not restore Turkhan’s lawful permanent resident status nor abrogate the deportation order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the scope of the BIA remand and that Turkhan’s right to procedural due process was violated. The court was “mystified by the government’s decision … [but] the decision is not ours to make.” View "Turkhan v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that Cadavedo, a native of the Philippines, had engaged in marriage fraud. During an interview, Cadavedo’s wife had admitted that Cadavedo had promised to pay her to marry him for immigration purposes. She gave a sworn statement to USCIS and withdrew her I-130 petition to adjust his status. That USCIS finding bars him from obtaining adjustment of his status to become a lawful permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1154(c). Cadavedo received a notice to appear, charging him as removable, in 2012. In 2014, an immigration judge denied Cadavedo’s request for a continuance to allow him to challenge the USCIS finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Cadavedo made his request during the hearing he sought to have continued, and his entitlement to the belated relief he wanted to seek from USCIS is speculative at best. View "Cadavedo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Cisneros came to the U.S. in 1988 at age 17 and stayed after the expiration of his visa. In 1995, he married U.S. citizen; his status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident. They divorced in 2002. Cisneros consistently supported his ex-wife and the couple’s children and now has grandchildren. He has a history of alcoholism. In 2012, Cisneros committed unarmed robbery, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), resulting in loss of his legal permanent resident status and making him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because robbery is a crime of moral turpitude. Cisneros applied for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B), which gives the Attorney General the discretionary power to waive inadmissibility for the spouse, parent, or child of a U.S. citizen who would suffer “extreme hardship” if removed. An immigration judge granted Cisneros’s application. DHS appealed; the BIA revoked the waiver. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that its authority extends only to legal or constitutional issues, not discretionary determinations. View "Cisneros v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2013, Santashbekov applied for asylum claiming that he faced persecution for his political activism as a member of the youth wing of the Ata Meken party in his native Kyrgyzstan, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A). After the 2010 revolution, according to the U.S. State Department, Kyrgyzstan continued to face instability and human rights problems, including arbitrary arrests and torture by law enforcement and security forces. The immigration judge characterized Santashbekov’s testimony about his own situation as “vague” and “extremely confusing.” Santashbekov testified that he had experienced persecution by Kurmanov, who Santashbekov believes is a member of an opposing political party and a police or government official; Kurmanov and his associates asked him to repudiate Ata Meken and detained and beat him several times in 2011. Santashbekov changed his address and his name, which was formerly Sultanhodzhaev. He submitted hospital paperwork that confirms that he received medical treatment in Kyrgyzstan corresponding to the beatings he described. He submitted criminal court documents showing that Kurmanov was prosecuted and that Santashbekov was named as a “plaintiff” in the proceeding. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s denial, also noting inconsistencies in Santashbekov’s testimony. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Daniiar Santashbekov v. Loretta Lynch" on Justia Law

Arias came to the U.S. without authorization in 2000. She has raised three children here and has consistently paid income tax. Her longtime employer calls her an “excellent employee.” Her sole criminal conviction, falsely using a social security number to work (42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B)), was classified as a “crime involving moral turpitude” by the BIA, which disqualified Arias from seeking discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The Seventh Circuit remanded for reconsideration. Many violations of the cited statute would amount to crimes involving moral turpitude, but for both legal and pragmatic reasons, it is unlikely that every violation of the statute necessarily qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA misapplied the framework for identifying crimes involving moral turpitude that it was bound to apply at the time of its decision; after the BIA’s decision, the Attorney General vacated that framework in its entirety. The court noted the current vacuum of authoritative guidance on how the Board should determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude. View "Arias v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Salgado unlawfully entered the U.S. in 1996 and stayed continuously for 20 years. He has children, born in 2001 and 2003, who are U.S. citizens. In 2005 Salgado was convicted in Wisconsin of possessing cocaine. In 2013, when Salgado was arrested for driving under the influence, DHS charged him with removability for having been convicted of a controlled-substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and for being present in the U.S. unlawfully, 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An IJ ordered removal but the BIA remanded for consideration of Salgado’s claim that his lawyer had provided ineffective assistance by neglecting to seek relief from removal. On remand, Salgado applied for statutory withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his membership in “Mexican nationals whose family members have suffered persecution at the hands of the Zetas and other drug cartels in Veracruz” and “Mexican nationals who have lived in the U.S. for many years and who, upon being removed to Mexico, are perceived as having money.” The IJ found his asylum application untimely because he did not file it within a year of entering the U.S. and no changed or extraordinary circumstances excused the late filing, The Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review, rejecting claims that the BIA improperly rejected the proposed social group and misapplied the CAT legal standard. View "Salgado-Gutierrez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Fuller, now 51 years old, came to the U.S. from Jamaica in 1999 with a fiancé visa sponsored by Wood, a U.S. citizen. They soon married and in 2001 had a daughter. Fuller received conditional permanent resident status, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a), but he and Wood failed to attend a required interview with USCIS. In 2004 his status was terminated. They divorced the next year. Also in 2004, Fuller had pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sexual assault and was sentenced to 30 months’ probation. He later violated the conditions of his probation and in 2012 was resentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Upon Fuller’s release from state custody in 2014, the DHS detained him and charged him as removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and for losing his conditional permanent resident status. Fuller unsuccessfully sought withholding of removal, arguing that he fears persecution and torture in Jamaica based upon his claimed bisexuality. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, upholding the IJ’s factual determination that Fuller is not bisexual and that he would be perceived in Jamaica as bisexual, the basis of his purported fear of torture. View "Fuller v. Lynch" on Justia Law