Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Gil‐Lopez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1987. He became a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2002, he pleaded guilty to violating Idaho Code 18‐1501(1), “Injury to Children,” after originally having been charged with two counts of forcible rape. He was removed. Gil‐Lopez did not appeal the removal order, file a motion to reopen the immigration proceedings, or file a habeas petition. Several years later, he returned to the U.S., was arrested, and was charged with being illegally present in the United States after having been convicted of a felony, U.S.C. 1326(a). The district court held that his 2004 removal could form the basis for a charge of unlawful reentry and that his prior conviction was for an aggravated felony. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gil‐Lopez cannot challenge the district court’s decision because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the immigration court’s 2004 removal order. View "United States v. Gil-Lopez" on Justia Law

After Aparicio-Brito’s fourth arrest for driving under the influence, the government commenced deportation proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).. Aparicio-Brito, a citizen of Mexico who entered the U.S. in 1998, did not challenge removability, but focused his efforts on suppressing the government’s evidence regarding his alienage and applying for cancellation of removal. An immigration judge (IJ) denied his suppression motions and application, finding that the government sufficiently demonstrated that Aparicio-Brito had entered the U.S. without inspection, and that cancellation of removal and voluntary departure would be improper because of Aparicio-Brito’s inability to demonstrate continuous presence in the U.S., good moral character, and extreme hardship on family members upon deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his arguments that the IJ and the government had violated his due process rights before and during the proceedings, and challenging the IJ’s conclusions regarding alienage, cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that the IJ and the government complied with their statutory responsibilities; adequately demonstrated his alienage; and correctly denied Aparicio-Brito’s application for cancellation of removal based on his inability to demonstrate 10 years of continuous physical presence. View "Aparicio-Brito v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Guzman-Rivadeneira came to the U.S. from Ecuador. In 1993 he was convicted in California of possession of counterfeit prescription blanks. After returning to Ecuador, he returned to the U.S. and became a lawful permanent resident because his mother is a U.S. citizen. On his application, he falsely responded that he had never been arrested or convicted of a crime. In 2012, Guzman-Rivadeneira pled guilty to a controlled substance misdemeanor. Guzman-Rivadeneira returned from another trip abroad in 2014 and was charged as removable for: conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (1993 conviction), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); conviction of a controlled substance offense; procurement of a visa by fraud; and lack of a valid entry document. He argued that a 1997 California court order reducing the 1993 conviction to a misdemeanor should be given retroactive effect; that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver of removability for his visa fraud, and that as a legal permanent resident he would be eligible for cancellation of other grounds of removal. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit declined a petition based on the “moral turpitude” issue. Guzman-Rivadeneira’s original lawyer conceded that the 1993 conviction involved moral turpitude, and in appealing to the BIA, his new lawyer did not seek relief from that concession, not did she take the steps needed to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Guzman-Rivadeneira v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Dominguez-Pulido unlawfully entered the U.S with his parents around 1993. Approximately 15 years later, Dominguez-Pulido was convicted of burglary, a felony offense under Illinois law. An Immigration Judge concluded that he was removable as an alien present without admission and denied various forms of relief from removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denials, citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), which limits judicial review of final orders for removal that involve a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. The court rejected claims that the “moral turpitude” clause was void for vagueness; that Dominguez-Pulido’s fear of persecution bears a nexus to his membership in a particular social group— individuals deported from the U.S. who have or who are perceived to have money, and who have family members in the U.S. who could pay ransom; and that his removal would violate the Eighth Amendment. View "Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Arrazabal , a Salvadoran, entered the U.S. in 1995 at age 19, and became a lawful permanent resident alien because his mother and sister were naturalized citizens. He became involved with the Los Angeles chapter of the MS-13 gang, which has members in El Salvador. He was imprisoned for illegal gun possession and, later, for possessing cocaine. In prison he obtained prominent MS-13 tattoos. In 2001 Arrazabal’s status was revoked. His application for asylum was denied; he was removed. Years later, Arrazabal attempted to reenter illegally and was charged under 8 U.S.C. 1326. He again sought asylum, claiming that he feared he would be killed if returned to El Salvador because he wanted to quit MS-13, but his tattoos made him a target. The officer found that Arrazabal had shown reasonable probability that he had been tortured in El Salvador and that these police beatings created a reasonable possibility that he would be tortured if returned. Because his 2001 removal order made him ineligible for asylum, Arrazabal applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection, which were denied for lack of credibility. The judge did not believe that Arrazabal had refrained from criminal activity while active in MS-13, that he had been framed by U.S. police officers twice, that the IJ who ordered him removed was racist, that he suffered abuse by Salvadoran police, or that he had received death threats from fellow gang members. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the IJ overlooked key evidence. View "Arrazabal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Karroumeh, a citizen of Jordan then married to a Jordanian woman with whom he had two children, was admitted to the U.S. as a visitor in 1996. Within months, he obtained a proxy divorce and married Wright, a U.S. citizen who also had children. Wright filed a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative in conjunction with a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. Both were conditionally granted in 1998. In 2000, they successfully petitioned to remove the conditions from Karroumeh’s lawful permanent resident status, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(1)(A). In 2001, Karroumeh filed his first application for naturalization During an interview, Karroumeh revealed that he and Wright were divorcing. Karroumeh withdrew his application. His divorce was finalized. In 2003 and 2006, Karroumeh filed two more applications for naturalization. In 2008, USCIS began to investigate Karroumeh for immigration fraud and obtained a sworn statement from Wright, including multiple contradictions. USCIS denied Karroumeh’s application. DHS commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit remanded the order of removal, finding that Karroumeh was prejudiced by his inability to cross-examine Wright, a key government witness whose evidence was presented through a written statement. View "Karroumeh v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Hernandez and his mother entered the U.S. unlawfully when he was a small child. They adjusted their status to that of lawful permanent residents in 1989, when Hernandez was seven. His mother became a naturalized citizen when he was 16, but her naturalization did not confer citizenship on him automatically. Both of his parents would have had to naturalize before he turned 18, or they would have had to legally separate. Neither happened. Over the next 15 years, Hernandez was convicted for three controlled-substance violations, two retail thefts, and as a felon-in-possession of a firearm. In 2015 the government instituted removal proceedings based on his criminal history, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); (A)(iii); (C); and (A)(ii), At his hearing, the IJ informed Hernandez of his right to representation and asked whether he wanted a continuance. Hernandez did not respond, but explained that he thought he was a citizen. The IJ determined that Hernandez never obtained citizenship and asked Hernandez whether he feared being harmed if he were returned to Mexico, offering to continue the case to allow him to apply for asylum. Hernandez again declined. After the IJ entered an order of removal, Hernandez obtained counsel. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, rejecting an argument that Hernandez was denied representation by counsel. View "Estrada-Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Zyapkov, a Bulgarian citizen, entered the U.S. in 2002 with a visitor’s visa. His daughter had entered two years earlier and eventually obtained citizenship through the “diversity lottery,” 8 U.S.C. 1153(c). Three months after Zyapkov’s arrival, he married Gregory, a U.S. citizen. Gregory and, later, Zyapkov’s daughter filed Form I‐130 “immediate relative” petitions on his behalf. Gregory’s petition was pending in 2008 when DHS initiated removal proceedings accusing Zyapkov of overstaying his visa and working as a truck driver without authorization. USCIS denied Gregory’s petition based on a conclusion that the marriage to was a sham. Zyapkov unsuccessfully sought a continuance. The finding of marriage fraud would make Zyapkov inadmissible, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and ineligible for permanent residency regardless of his daughter’s pending petition. The Board dismissed his appeal of the removal order. The following month, with his daughter’s approved I‐130 petition approved, Zyapkov successfully asked the Board to reopen. He sought to adjust his status to permanent resident. On remand the IJ conducted hearings, denied Zyapkov’s application to adjust his status, and denied relief from removal, based on inconsistencies in testimony about the marriage. The Board and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Since Zyapkov is inadmissible, he is ineligible for adjustment of status; even assuming eligibility, there was no legal or constitutional error in the IJ’s exercise of discretion. View "Zyapkov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Mohit and Ankush Seghal filed an I-130 petition seeking lawful permanent resident status for Mohit, who is a citizen of India, as the husband of Ankush, who is a U.S. citizen. The petition was denied Mohit had tried years earlier to gain lawful residence in the U.S. by a fraudulent marriage to another woman, making him ineligible for relief even though his marriage to Ankush is legitimate, 8 U.S.C. 1154(c). The decision to grant or deny an I-130 petition is not a matter of agency discretion, and Mohit is not subject to a removal order, so he properly challenged the denial in the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding of marriage fraud and thus granted summary judgment against the Seghals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the agency’s handling of the case involved procedural errors, the decision was legally sound. Substantial evidence, including Mohit’s own written admission, supported the agency’s finding that Mohit’s earlier marriage was fraudulent. View "Sehgal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Musa, a citizen of Botswana, entered the U.S. in 2008 on a visitor’s visa. She met a U.S. citizen and they married. Musa’s husband filed an I‐130 “alien relative” petition on her behalf, and Musa applied at the same time to adjust her status to permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1255(a); The Department of Homeland Security denied both: Musa’s husband was discovered not to have ended a previous marriage. In 2009 Musa was placed in removal proceedings because her visa had expired. In 2010, Musa divorced and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture because she feared that if she returned to Botswana her family would force her to undergo female genital mutilation. The agency denied relief. The Seventh Circuit granted the petition requesting withholding of removal. Substantial evidence did not support the agency’s conclusion that Musa likely will not be subjected to FGM. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Musa’s asylum application was untimely and denied the petition with respect to the Convention Against Torture because the agency did not err by finding that the government in Botswana would not acquiesce to forced FGM. View "Musa v. Lynch" on Justia Law