Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A Guatemalan national entered the United States without authorization after fleeing gang violence in his home country. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but an immigration judge denied these requests and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the removal order. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, which clarified the requirements for a valid “notice to appear,” the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings to seek voluntary departure, a form of relief that would allow him to leave the United States without a formal removal order. To qualify, he needed to show, among other things, that he had the means to depart the country, typically by possessing a valid passport.The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion to reopen, finding that his affidavit—stating only that he was in the process of renewing his Guatemalan passport—was too conclusory and unsupported by documentary evidence. The Board concluded that he had not sufficiently demonstrated that he would be able to depart the United States if granted voluntary departure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board’s denial. The court held that the Board applied the correct legal standard, requiring only a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief at the motion-to-reopen stage, not conclusive proof. The court found that the Board did not err in determining that the petitioner’s unsupported and conclusory statement about his passport application failed to meet even this threshold. The Sixth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review, upholding the Board’s decision. View "Pastor-Hernandez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras entered the United States without inspection in 2005 and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings, which included the time, date, and location of her initial hearing, as well as instructions to update her address. She failed to appear at her first scheduled hearing, which was dismissed because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had not filed the NTA with the immigration court. After DHS filed the NTA and moved to recalendar, subsequent hearing notices sent to her listed address were returned as undeliverable. She did not appear at the rescheduled hearing in November 2009, and the immigration judge (IJ) ordered her removal in absentia.She later filed three motions to reopen her removal proceedings, arguing each time that she had not received notice of her hearing. The first motion was denied by the IJ, who found she had constructive notice and was at fault for not updating her address; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Her second motion was denied by the BIA as repetitive. In her third motion, she cited new Supreme Court decisions (Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland) and raised a new jurisdictional argument, but the BIA found the motion untimely and numerically barred, declined to exercise its sua sponte authority, and rejected her legal arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held that even if multiple motions to reopen based on lack of notice were permitted, the petitioner’s arguments lacked merit because she received an NTA that satisfied statutory notice requirements and failed to fulfill her obligation to update her address. The court also held that the immigration court had jurisdiction and that it lacked authority to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. The petition for review was denied. View "Vargas-Rodriguez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen entered the United States without authorization in 2005. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against him, initially serving him with a Notice to Appear (NTA) that did not specify the date and time of his hearing. He later received a subsequent notice with the specific date, time, and location of his hearing, which also warned of the consequences of failing to appear. Neither he nor his attorney appeared at the scheduled hearing, resulting in an in absentia removal order.He first moved to reopen the proceedings, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Immigration Judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit all denied relief. While his appeal was still pending, he filed a second motion to reopen, arguing that the initial NTA was deficient and that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, he was entitled to rescission of the removal order and eligibility for cancellation of removal. He also requested that the BIA reopen his case on its own motion (sua sponte). The BIA denied all requested relief, finding that he had received proper notice under the law, was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and declining to exercise its sua sponte authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to rescission of the in absentia removal order because, although the initial NTA was deficient, he received a subsequent notice that satisfied statutory requirements. The court also held that he forfeited his argument for cancellation of removal by failing to adequately develop it. Finally, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his claim regarding the BIA’s refusal to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman who entered the United States illegally as a child was later granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which rendered her prior removal order unenforceable. She frequently visited a local Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for detainees and was well known to the staff. During one such visit, ICE agents detained her without a warrant or probable cause, despite being aware of her DACA status. She was held for eight days and transferred between multiple locations before being released. While detained, she sought habeas relief, but her petition was denied as moot after her release.She subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the ICE agents, alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court initially dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that DACA status rendered the removal order non-executable and outside the jurisdiction-stripping provision. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed her First Amendment claim based on Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding they constituted new Bivens contexts and that alternative remedies existed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims arose in new Bivens contexts—specifically, immigration enforcement by ICE agents outside the home and outside the federal employment context. The court further found that alternative remedies, such as administrative complaint procedures under the Immigration and Nationality Act and habeas corpus, precluded the extension of Bivens. Thus, no implied damages remedy was available. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law

Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, illegally entered the United States in 1981 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, he applied for naturalization but failed to disclose a recent indictment for sexually abusing his niece. He became a naturalized citizen in October 2009 and pleaded guilty to the offense two months later. In 2019, the government sought to revoke his citizenship, and in 2022, a court ordered its cancellation due to his fraudulent procurement. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for a crime of child abuse.An immigration judge ordered Gonzalez's removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision. Gonzalez sought review in the Third Circuit, which transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit, determining that venue lay elsewhere.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Gonzalez was not deportable under the child-abuse provision because he was a naturalized citizen at the time of his conviction. The court relied on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Costello v. INS, which held that deportation provisions do not apply to individuals who were citizens at the time of their conviction. The court noted that the statutory language and the rule of lenity supported this interpretation. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit granted Gonzalez's petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Gonzalez Castillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Arsen Sarkisov, an alien unlawfully present in the United States, was issued a final deportation order by an immigration judge. Over six years later, Sarkisov moved to reopen his case, but the immigration judge denied the motion. Sarkisov then appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also rejected his claim. In 2023, Sarkisov appealed the Board’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and requested a stay of the deportation order during the appeal. The United States did not oppose the stay request, and the case was paused for almost a year while Sarkisov attempted to negotiate with the government. When negotiations failed, the litigation resumed, and Sarkisov's motion for a stay was considered.The immigration judge initially denied Sarkisov's motion to reopen his case, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision. Sarkisov then appealed to the Sixth Circuit, seeking a stay of removal during the appeal process. The United States did not oppose the stay request, but the case was paused for nearly a year due to ongoing negotiations, which ultimately failed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Sarkisov's motion for a stay of removal. The court applied the traditional test for a stay, as outlined in Nken v. Holder, which requires the applicant to show a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm without a stay. Sarkisov failed to address the merits of his appeal or provide reasons for irreparable harm, leading the court to deny his motion. The court emphasized that the burden of removal alone does not constitute irreparable injury and that the public interest favors prompt execution of removal orders. Consequently, the motion for a stay of removal was denied. View "Sarkisov v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Jin Yin Zhou, a Chinese citizen, married a U.S. citizen in 1996 and entered the United States as a conditional permanent resident in 1997. However, she never lived with her husband and instead lived with her boyfriend in Kentucky, with whom she had three children. Zhou concealed these facts during her immigration proceedings, including when she applied for naturalization. Eventually, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services discovered her marriage fraud, leading to her being placed in removal proceedings. The immigration judge sustained the charge of removability but granted her relief from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), considering her long residence, stable employment, and the hardship her children would face if she were removed.The Department of Homeland Security appealed the immigration judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Zhou's counsel failed to file a brief on her behalf, and the BIA reversed the immigration judge's decision, ordering Zhou's removal. Zhou filed an untimely motion to reopen her removal proceedings, requesting equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion, stating that Zhou failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice and due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination regarding the lack of prejudice, as this determination was dispositive of the appeal. Consequently, the court dismissed Zhou's petition for review. View "Zhou v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Joseph Ebu, a lawful permanent resident, was involved in concurrent naturalization and removal proceedings. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) delayed considering his naturalization application due to the pending removal proceedings. When the delay exceeded 120 days after his naturalization examination, Ebu sought judicial intervention to determine his naturalization application and declare him prima facie eligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). The district court dismissed his complaint, citing a provision that prohibits the determination of a naturalization application while removal proceedings are pending, relying on the unpublished opinion in Rahman v. Napolitano.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Ebu’s complaint, agreeing with USCIS that removal proceedings take priority over naturalization applications. The court followed the precedent set in Rahman, which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1429 precludes district courts from considering naturalization applications under § 1447(b) while removal proceedings are pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that § 1429’s prohibition on the Attorney General from considering naturalization applications during pending removal proceedings also applies to district courts. The court emphasized that Congress intended for removal proceedings to take priority over naturalization applications, regardless of the forum. The court also rejected Ebu’s request for a declaratory judgment on his prima facie eligibility for naturalization, stating that such a judgment would be an impermissible advisory opinion. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Ebu’s complaint based on § 1429 without considering the merits of his naturalization application. View "Ebu v. Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Nuzaira Rahman, a Bangladeshi national, entered the U.S. in 1992 on an H-4 visa and overstayed. She married Abrar Haque, a U.S. citizen, and had five children. Rahman faced removal proceedings after her visa expired and was ordered removed in absentia in 1998. Despite this, she obtained lawful permanent residence in 2000 through a petition by Haque. Rahman was later convicted of using a fraudulent social security number, leading to renewed removal proceedings. In 2019, an immigration judge ordered her removal, citing her inadmissibility due to prior unlawful presence and fraud.The immigration judge denied Rahman's requests for waivers of inadmissibility, finding she failed to prove her removal would cause extreme hardship to her spouse, Haque. The judge also questioned the legitimacy of their marriage and Rahman's credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the judge's decision, agreeing that Rahman did not demonstrate the required hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Rahman argued that the Board's hardship determination should be reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact. However, the court held that the statutory language "to the satisfaction of the Attorney General" in the waiver provisions made the hardship determination a discretionary decision, not subject to judicial review. The court dismissed Rahman's petition for review, concluding it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's discretionary hardship determination. View "Rahman v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Bhavanaben Patel, her husband Dinesh, and their two sons, natives of India, fled to the United States due to threats from loan sharks in Gujarat, India, after Dinesh accumulated significant debt. The family did not report these threats to local authorities due to a lack of "legal proof." Upon arrival in the U.S. without proper documentation, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Bhavanaben sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) for her family, arguing they would face harm from the loan sharks if returned to India.An immigration judge denied the family's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Patels appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed their appeal, leading them to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review.The Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. The court found that the BIA's conclusion of no nexus between the Patels' risk of future persecution and their membership in a particular social group was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the threats from the loan sharks were motivated by a desire for financial gain rather than animus toward a protected group. Additionally, the court found that the Patels' failure to report the threats to local authorities undermined their CAT claims, as there was no evidence that Indian officials would acquiesce to the loan sharks' conduct.The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to reject the Patels' applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Patel v. Bondi" on Justia Law