Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Bhavanaben Patel, her husband Dinesh, and their two sons, natives of India, fled to the United States due to threats from loan sharks in Gujarat, India, after Dinesh accumulated significant debt. The family did not report these threats to local authorities due to a lack of "legal proof." Upon arrival in the U.S. without proper documentation, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Bhavanaben sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) for her family, arguing they would face harm from the loan sharks if returned to India.An immigration judge denied the family's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The Patels appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed their appeal, leading them to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review.The Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. The court found that the BIA's conclusion of no nexus between the Patels' risk of future persecution and their membership in a particular social group was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the threats from the loan sharks were motivated by a desire for financial gain rather than animus toward a protected group. Additionally, the court found that the Patels' failure to report the threats to local authorities undermined their CAT claims, as there was no evidence that Indian officials would acquiesce to the loan sharks' conduct.The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to reject the Patels' applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Patel v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Javi Porter, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a native of Jamaica, was convicted under Virginia law for possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) classified this conviction as an aggravated felony and initiated removal proceedings against him. Porter sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and found him removable as an aggravated felon.The IJ denied Porter’s motion to terminate the removal proceedings, concluding that DHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Porter was convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ sustained the charge of removability and denied Porter’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The IJ later issued a final summary order finding Porter removable as charged. Porter appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred in denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Porter’s Virginia drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court found that the Virginia statute under which Porter was convicted is divisible by the identity of the controlled substance and applied the modified categorical approach. The court concluded that possession with intent to distribute any amount of methamphetamine is a federal felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Therefore, Porter’s conviction under Virginia law is a categorical match to a felony offense under the CSA, rendering him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court denied Porter’s petition for review. View "Porter v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Sixth Circuit upholds BIA interpretation of "previously filed" application for adjustment of status.In 2001, Sofokli, a citizen of Albania, entered the U.S. under a visitor visa. Four months after it expired, his employer sought labor certification, which was granted 11 months later. His employer then sought a work visa; Sofoklis applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. USCIS granted advance parole, which permits an alien who is otherwise inadmissible to leave the U.S. and reenter. USCIS approved the work-visa petition but denied the adjustment application, citing 8 U.S.C. 1255(k)(2), which bars aliens from adjusting their status if they have accrued more than 180 days in the U.S. without “lawful status.” Sofokli departed again and was paroled into the U.S. His second adjustment application was denied. An IJ ordered removal, rejecting Sofokli’s argument that he remained in lawful status because of his employer’s pending petitions. The BIA and Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding 8 C.F.R. 1245.2(a)(1)(ii), which provides that, for an application to be subject to the jurisdiction of the immigration courts, the arriving alien must have filed the application while in the U.S. and must have “’departed from and returned … pursuant to ... advance parole to pursue the previously filed application for adjustment of status.” The court upheld the BIA’s conclusion that Sofokli’s second application was not “previously filed,” having been filed after returning from advance parole. View "Gazeli v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In 2001, returning from visiting his ailing father, Lopez, a citizen of Guatemala, crossed the Rio Grande into Texas. The border patrol arrested Lopez. Lopez lied about his name and nationality. Thinking that Lopez was a citizen of Mexico, the border patrol let him voluntarily return to Mexico. Lopez later crossed back into the U.S. evading apprehension. DHS tried to deport Lopez in 2008. Lopez applied for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(e)(3). The IJ ruled that Lopez failed “to prove that he has not been apprehended at the time of entry after” 1990 or to establish that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives, including Lopez’s American daughter. The BIA affirmed, without making any finding concerning whether Lopez was under surveillance when he entered. The Sixth Circuit vacated, in part, noting that the Act's “special rule cancellation” of removal provisions favor an individual if he sneaks across the border without detection or restraint. The burden is on the applicant to make this showing. The court reasoned that an applicant cannot be expected to show that government agents were not tracking his movement as he entered. Once the applicant has established that no one physically stopped him at the border, the government may use surveillance evidence as an affirmative defense. View "Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Lovano, a citizen of Canada, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1973. In 1993 Lovano was convicted in Ohio for attempting to pass bad checks and theft. Although deportation proceedings were instituted, Lovano was granted a waiver under (now repealed) 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). Lovano was subsequently convicted in 2012 in Cleveland of aggravated assault. Removal proceedings were again instituted under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), which authorizes the deportation of “[a]ny alien . . . convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed a removal order. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the 2012 conviction for aggravated assault in Ohio was not a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Lovano v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Turfah, a citizen of Lebanon, entered the U.S. in September 1995, when he was 19 years old, on a visa that allowed him to enter as an unmarried child under the age of 21 who was “accompanying or following to join” his father, the principal visa holder. Despite arriving on his own, rather than accompanying or following his father, the immigration authorities mistakenly admitted Turfah. Turfah’s father arrived in the United States less than a month later, and ultimately became a naturalized citizen. When Turfah applied for naturalization in 2012, USCIS denied his application, finding that Turfah was “not lawfully admitted” and lack of good moral character based on Turfah’s failure to accurately report and pay federal income taxes in 2010. USCIS later dismissed the moral character ground for denial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding Turfah ineligible for naturalization because “the word ‘accompanying’ means what it says in plain English.” A court cannot invoke its equitable powers to circumvent the requirements of the immigration laws. View "Turfah v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Marikasi, a citizen of Zimbabwe, legally entered the U.S. in 2002 on a non-immigrant visitor’s visa with an expiration date of July 18, 2002. On November 25, 2002, Marikasi sought asylum and withholding of removal. She referred to an abusive husband and did not check the box provided for “political opinion” as a reason for seeking asylum, but instead checked “nationality” and “membership in a particular group.” The only organization she mentioned was the Musasa Project for battered women. A 2005 amended application stated that her husband was a government agent and that she had been abused by members of the leading (ZANU PF) party “because I belonged to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) [the opposition]. My brother was brutalized and killed in 2002 by ZANU PF members because of my political activities.” The BIA affirmed denial of her petition and ordered removal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Important factual inconsistencies between Marikasi’s asylum application and her testimony supported an adverse credibility determination. Marikasi did not present sufficient corroborative evidence to rehabilitate her discredited testimony or independently satisfy her burden of proof. Marikasi failed to prove that she could not leave the relationship or that she could not relocate to another part of Zimbabwe. View "Marikasi v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Sakhawati, a citizen of Bangladesh, was apparently admitted to the U.S. in 1998, using a passport issued to Nessa. She travelled to Canada and was denied refugee status there in 2003. She was granted asylum and withholding of removal in the U.S. under the name Sakhawati in 2006 after testifying to being kidnapped, forced to marry, and targeted for promoting feminist political views inside Bangladesh. In 2007, DHS appealed and moved to reopen, based on new information showing that that Sakhawati had actually been residing in Canada during the time that she was allegedly being held captive in Bangladesh. On remand, the IJ denied Sakhawati relief, and ordered her removed to Bangladesh. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded; a DHS official exercising due diligence could have readily discovered the existence of the Nessa alien file and presented it at Sakhawati’s original hearing. Sakhawati then sought Attorney Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). Sakhawati’s counsel, billing at an hourly rate of $190.28, sought $21,248.37 in attorney fees, legal-assistance fees, and expenses for 104.85 hours claimed to have been spent on the matter prior to the Application for Attorney Fees, plus an additional $1,908.20 for 10.00 hours spent preparing the Application and responding to the opposition. The Sixth Circuit awarded a total of $15,653.76 in attorney fees, legal-assistance fees, and expenses. View "Sakhawati v.Lynch" on Justia Law

Amezola-Garcia unsuccessfully attempted to enter the U.S. in 1996 by presenting the resident alien card of another. He agreed to return to Mexico in lieu of exclusion proceedings. In 1997, Amezola-Garcia successfully entered without being admitted or paroled. Since that entry, Amezola-Garcia has traveled to Mexico and reentered the U.S. without being admitted or paroled at least four different times. In 2011, DHS commenced removal proceedings (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)). He sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, stating that he fears he will be harmed if he returns to Mexico, as a member of a “family which has been targeted by persons the government of Mexico cannot or will not control.” He cited the unsolved murder of his brother-in-law, a member of a “government organization of defense for Mexico” in 2009. The IJ concluded that Amezola-Garcia lacked good moral character because he “prevaricated intentionally” with regard to his application; that his testimony was often inconsistent; and that “he has made up his story out of absolutely nothing.” A single-member panel of the BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit found his appeal without merit, but remanded for reconsideration of voluntary removal. View "Amezola-Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law