Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Fabian Rangel-Perez challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) characterization of his Utah misdemeanor conviction as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The BIA concluded that Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor fell within the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies that includes “sexual abuse of a minor” offenses. Rangel-Perez argued that his prior Utah conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under the INA because the INA’s generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense required proof of both mens rea and a four-year age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, yet neither was an element of the Utah statute under which he was convicted. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rangel-Perez that the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies for “sexual abuse of a minor” included only offenses that require proof of at least a “knowing” mens rea or scienter. Therefore, Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction was not a “sexual abuse of a minor” offense under the INA. Thus, the Court reversed the BIA’s decision to treat Rangel-Perez’s prior conviction as an “aggravated felony” and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rangel-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Octavio Gutierrez-Orozco (Gutierrez), a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States illegally. Gutierrez insisted he entered the United States in March 1996. He remembered that date because his wife, who remained in Mexico, was pregnant with the second of their four children, who was born in September 1996. He claimed to have lived in the United States continuously since then, except for a brief, two-month trip back to Mexico in mid-1999 when his wife was ill, after which border patrol twice hindered his reentry. His wife joined him here sometime in 2000. Gutierrez’s immigration troubles began in February 2008, when a domestic violence incident with his teenage son led to a simple assault conviction. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Gutierrez conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The IJ conducted a hearing and concluded Gutierrez was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he did not demonstrate a ten-year continuous physical presence in the United States from April 1, 1998, to April 1, 2008; good moral character for that time period; and an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also denied voluntary departure because Gutierrez failed to maintain good moral character during the relevant time frame and, alternatively, as an exercise of discretion. Gutierrez appealed to the BIA for relief from the IJ’s decision. The BIA denied relief, agreeing with the IJ. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cristian Eduardo Obregon de Leon (“Obregon”), native of Guatemala and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted under Oklahoma law of various offenses, including possession of stolen vehicles and receipt of stolen property. He was subsequently placed into removal proceedings and deemed removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that he was statutorily ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) because he had previously adjusted to lawful permanent residence status. Obregon challenged both of these determinations in his petition for review of the BIA’s decision. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination that Obregon was removable because his conviction for possession of stolen vehicles constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. However, Obregon was statutorily eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver under section 1182(h). The case was remanded back to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Obregon de Leon v. Holder" on Justia Law

Wilber Ernesto Castillo, a citizen of El Salvador, appeals his sentence for violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which prohibits reentry into the United States by a previously removed alien. In 2004, Castillo was convicted in California state court for second-degree robbery, a violation of California Penal Code section 211. He was removed from the United States in 2007. In July 2009, Castillo reentered the United States without inspection. Castillo was convicted in 2011 for shoplifting and in 2014 for disorderly conduct. After his 2014 arrest, agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement interviewed Castillo. Based on his admissions that he had been removed from the United States and then reentered without inspection, the government charged Castillo with a violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Castillo argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that his sentence was miscalculated because the district court incorrectly considered the California robbery conviction to be a “crime of violence” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under section 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court correctly considered Castillo’s California robbery conviction to be a crime of violence, it affirmed. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff German Wilmer Saenz Mencia (Saenz), a Peruvian citizen, came to Utah to work for Phillip, Chance, Dustin and Preston Allreds’ sheep ranch. His work was authorized by an H-2A sheepherding visa, and he was paid the minimum wage for H-2A sheepherders: $750 per month plus food and lodging. He filed suit against the Allreds because he claimed this pay was inadequate because the work he performed did not qualify as sheepherding. Instead he argued he was entitled to the hourly wage for H-2A ranch hands, which he sought to recover in contract and quantum meruit. Additionally, he argued the work he performed did not qualify for the “range production of livestock” exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) minimum wage, and therefore asserted a minimum wage claim against the Allreds. The district court rejected these claims, denied Saenz’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Allreds. As grounds for its decision, the district court concluded Saenz’s claims were estopped because he did not object to his non-sheepherding work while the Allreds could have done something about it. Further, the court found that more than half of Saenz’s work qualified as “range production of livestock,” and Saenz was accordingly exempt from the FLSA minimum wage and the H-2A wage for ranch hands. Saenz appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to Saenz and the grant of summary judgment to the Allreds. "[N]either the FLSA exemption nor the Special Procedures are satisfied simply because most of an employee’s duties fall within a sheepherder’s job description. To assume they are, and to rule Mr. Saenz a sheepherder on that basis, is to misapply the relevant provisions in at least three ways. […] under the undisputed facts, Mr. Saenz spent a large majority of his time working away from the range, supervised by superiors who could have recorded his hours, performing duties that were often incidental to sheepherding but were not sheepherding themselves. He was a ranch hand, not a sheepherder, and the FLSA exemption and H-2A Special Procedures do not apply." Further, the Court concluded the Allreds were both actually and on constructive notice of Saenz's work conditions, and as such, concluded their grounds for affirming their summary judgment motion failed. View "Saenz Mencia v. Allred" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Ramon Cespedes, a native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States as a nonimmigrant tourist in 2011. His status was adjusted to conditional lawful permanent resident in 2012. Later he was charged in Utah state court with domestic violence; and in 2013, that court issued a protective order against him under Utah’s Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. In late 2013, Cespedes pleaded guilty to attempted violation of a protective order. He did not dispute that he was convicted of violating a protective order entered under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act or that the provision of the order that he was convicted of violating was the provision stating that “the defendant shall not contact . . . the protected party.” A few months later, the Department of Homeland Security brought a charge to remove Cespedes under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). In a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Cespedes argued that his violation of the protection order did not come within the federal statute. The IJ rejected his argument and ordered him removed from the United States. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ. The issue presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review was whether violation of an order prohibiting contact with a potential victim satisfied the statute. The Tenth Circuit held that it did, and affirmed the BIA. View "Cespedes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Bulgarian native Vladimir Vladimirov petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order of removal based on marriage fraud. Much of the government’s evidence came from written reports prepared by immigration officers and other written materials contained in the agency’s files. Vladimirov claimed the BIA’s reliance on such materials denied him due process of law and without the disputed evidence the government failed to make its case. After consideration of the process due in immigration cases, particularly as it applied to the consideration of evidence that might be excluded in other contexts, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in this case and denied the petition for review. View "Vladimirov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alfonzo De Niz Robles filed an administrative application for an adjustment of status after and in reliance on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in “Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla-Caldera I, 426 F.3d 1294 (2005)). His petition languished so long that it still stood waiting for a decision four years later, after the BIA handed down “In re Briones, (24 I.&N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007). The Tenth Circuit decided “Padilla-Caldera II.” When the BIA finally did take up petitioner’s petition in 2013, it decided to apply its decision in Briones retroactively to his case, using it to hold him categorically ineligible for an adjustment of status and subject to removal. On appeal. Petitioner sought to overturn that decision. “[I]n the end, the BIA’s decision to apply Briones retroactively to Mr. De Niz Robles finds no support in our examination of the principles underlying the law of retroactivity, in Supreme Court or circuit precedent, or in relevant authority from other jurisdictions.” View "De Niz Robles v. Lynch" on Justia Law