Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America
Robert Lanoue, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to submitting false claims to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 287. He operated a scuba school that was part of a government program funded by the post-9/11 GI Bill, which reimbursed him for teaching veterans. Lanoue admitted to submitting false and fraudulent claims, resulting in a loss of over $3 million to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge found that Lanoue's crime met the criteria for an aggravated felony and denied his request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision, leading Lanoue to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Lanoue's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 categorically involved deceit, as the statute requires knowingly submitting false claims to the government. The court also found that the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the loss exceeded $10,000, based on Lanoue's stipulation and plea agreement indicating losses between $1.5 and $3.5 million.Lanoue's argument for a retroactive waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) was rejected. The court noted that to qualify for such a waiver, a lawful permanent resident must have been convicted or admitted to the crime at the time of reentry, which was not the case for Lanoue.The Third Circuit held that filing false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287 is an aggravated felony involving deceit, and the government sufficiently proved the loss amount. Consequently, Lanoue is removable and ineligible for a waiver. The court denied his petition for review. View "Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law
Lopez v. Attorney General United States of America
Hector David Tipan Lopez, a native of Ecuador, suffered persecution by a local gang, the Lobos, due to his efforts to encourage young drug addicts to stop using drugs after converting to Evangelical Christianity. The gang targeted him multiple times, robbing, beating, and threatening him, and he did not seek medical care or report these incidents to the police due to distrust. Fearing for his life, he entered the United States in February 2023 and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after his arrest for domestic violence. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied his applications, ruling that his religion, race, and political opinions were not central reasons for his persecution. The IJ also concluded that Ecuadorian authorities would not acquiesce to his torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by using a subordination-based test and an animus-based test for determining the nexus between Tipan Lopez's persecution and his religion. The court remanded the religious-nexus question to the BIA with instructions not to apply these tests. The court also remanded the CAT claim for the BIA to determine whether Ecuador can protect Tipan Lopez from torture, as the BIA did not make this determination. The court denied the petition for review regarding the BIA's findings on race and political opinion. View "Lopez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law
Thankarasa v. Attorney General
Jathursan Thankarasa, a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka, participated in a protest supporting Tamil rights and was subsequently arrested, beaten, and interrogated by the police. After his release, he faced continued harassment and threats, leading him to leave Sri Lanka with the help of a smuggler. He traveled through several European countries using a Sri Lankan passport provided by the smuggler but did not seek asylum in any of those countries. Before entering the United States, the smuggler gave him a genuine French passport belonging to another person, which he used to attempt entry. Upon arrival, he admitted the passport was not his and stated his intention to seek asylum.The Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Thankarasa’s application for withholding of removal but denied his asylum application, citing his fraudulent use of the French passport as an egregious factor outweighing his fear of persecution. The IJ reconsidered the asylum denial, as required by regulations, but again denied it, emphasizing the lack of family reunification concerns since Thankarasa had no immediate family eligible for derivative asylum benefits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the fraudulent entry was sufficiently egregious to outweigh his fear of persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court found that the IJ properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including the egregiousness of the immigration fraud and the lack of family reunification concerns. The court concluded that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the asylum application and denied Thankarasa’s petition for review. View "Thankarasa v. Attorney General" on Justia Law
Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration
Krishna Kishore Geda and Chaya Durga Sruthi Keerthi Nunna, married Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on employment-based nonimmigrant visas, filed I-485 applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents. After waiting nearly eight years, they were informed that their applications were on hold due to the unavailability of the required immigrant visa. Frustrated by the delay, they sued the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its Director, claiming unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed their claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary decision shielded from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that the decision to delay adjudication of the Gedas' applications under the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary action specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. Consequently, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that only the executive and legislative branches could provide the relief sought by the Gedas. View "Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration" on Justia Law
Flores v. Attorney General United States
Conviction for failing to report murder does not preclude eligibility for withholding of removal. Flores, a Guatemalan native, entered the U.S. illegally. In 2007, she began and ended a relationship Sibrian. Flores returned to South Carolina with a new boyfriend, Perez, in 2008; Sibrian killed Perez. Flores claims she did not report the murder because Sibrian threatened to kill her and her three-year-old daughter. Flores eventually pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact for failing to report the murder. There was no evidence that Flores covered up the homicide, lied to law enforcement, or assisted Sibrian. After serving her prison term, Flores was removed. She re-entered illegally, was arrested for prostitution, and was detained. She stated that she feared returning to Guatemala because: her father wanted to kill her; she had been raped by local gang member following her previous removal; and she feared persecution as a lesbian. The asylum officer determined that Flores had a reasonable fear of persecution. An IJ found that Flores’s accessory conviction rendered her ineligible for withholding of removal and that Flores failed to adequately establish that she would be subjected to torture in Guatemala, as required by the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit remanded. Flores’s accessory-after-the-fact conviction is not an offense “relating to obstruction of justice,” nor is it an “aggravated felony” or a “particularly serious crime” under the statute; Flores is eligible for withholding of removal. View "Flores v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law
Cazun v. Attorney General, United States
Aliens subject to reinstated removal orders are ineligible to apply for asylum. Cazun was detained at the border and expressed fear of returning to Guatemala. An asylum officer made a negative credible fear determination. An IJ affirmed. An expedited order of removal was issued. Upon Cazun’s return to Guatemala, a drug trafficking gang threatened, tortured, and sexually assaulted her. Cazun fled with her two-year-old son. On her attempted re-entry, Cazun was detained. DHS reinstated her previously-entered removal order rather than initiating a new removal process. An IJ again affirmed a negative credible fear determination. Cazun consulted counsel and, claiming psychological trauma, obtained a new interview, Cazun described sexual assault, torture, and threats against her life and her son's life. The officer concluded that Cazun’s testimony was credible and established a reasonable fear of persecution. An IJ granted Cazun withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but would not consider Cazun’s asylum request. The BIA agreed that she was ineligible under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), which states that aliens who are subject to a reinstated removal order are “may not apply for any relief under [8 U.S.C. Ch. 12].” The Third Circuit upheld the decision, deferring to the BIA’s “reasonable” interpretation of a statute in which Congress did not speak clearly. View "Cazun v. Attorney General, United States" on Justia Law
Dutton-Myrie v. Attorney General United States
The Third Circuit remanded a determination that Dutton-Myrie, a citizen of Panama, was ineligible for deferral of removal under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Board of Immigration Appeals must determine, de novo, whether factual findings that the Panamanian government actively engages against criminal gangs and that Dutton-Myrie did not provide the police notice that the gang attacked him in the past, were sufficient to establish acquiescence. Dutton-Myrie arrived in the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 1991 and later pled guilty to cocaine-related charges. He escaped during an initial attempt to deport him, but was apprehended in 2005 and deported to Panama. A few days after he returned, a group of men stabbed him in the neck. He fled the country and re-entered the U.S. The government apprehended Dutton-Myrie a second time in 2007; he claimed that the government of Panama was unwilling or unable to protect him from gang attacks. View "Dutton-Myrie v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law
Chavez-Alvarez v. Attorney General , United States
Chavez-Alvarez, a citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1989, then served in the U.S. Army. In 2000, Chavez-Alvarez penetrated the vagina of an intoxicated platoon member with his fingers and performed oral sex without consent. He initially denied the allegations, but later admitted the assault and was convicted under the Code of Military Justice: 10 U.S.C. 907, 925, and 934 for making false official statements; sodomy; and adultery and indecent assault. He was discharged and confined for 18 months. Chavez-Alvarez was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227, having been convicted of an aggravated felony with a term of imprisonment of at least one year and of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme. An IJ determined he was ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Following a remand, the BIA concluded that Chavez-Alvarez was removable under the moral-turpitude provision, rejecting his argument that he was only convicted of sodomy, a constitutionally protected activity under Supreme Court precedent. The BIA disagreed, reasoning that Chavez-Alvarez’s crime was subject to a sentence enhancement, having been committed forcibly, which was the “functional equivalent” of a conviction for forcible sodomy, a crime involving moral turpitude, and that his two false-statements convictions were separate crimes of moral turpitude. The Third Circuit reversed, rejecting the BIA’s reasoning that “for immigration purposes a sentence enhancement can serve as the functional equivalent of an ‘element’ of an offense.” View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Attorney General , United States" on Justia Law
Issa v. Lancaster School District
Plaintiffs, immigrants, ages 18 to 21, fled war, violence, and persecution in their native countries to come to the U.S., arriving here since 2014. International refugee agencies resettled them in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. None are native English speakers. All fall within a subgroup of English language learners: “students with limited or interrupted formal education.” The School District administers numerous schools, including McCaskey High School, a traditional school that includes an International School program for English Language Learners, and Phoenix Academy, operated by Camelot Schools, a private, for-profit company under contract with the District. Phoenix is an accelerated program. Plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction, compelling the District to allow them to attend McCaskey rather than Phoenix, to which they had been assigned. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding likely violations of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. 1703(f), which prohibits denial of equal educational opportunity on account of race, color, sex, or national origin. Plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability that Phoenix’s accelerated, non-sheltered program is not informed by an educational theory recognized as sound by some experts in the field; plaintiffs’ language barriers and resulting lost educational opportunities stem from their national origins. View "Issa v. Lancaster School District" on Justia Law
Park v. Attorney General United States
Park, a citizen of South Korea, was ordered removed in 2009, in part for submitting fraudulent documents in support of his visa application. He claims that he subsequently became eligible for a “section 212(i)” waiver of inadmissibility. Because of the passage of time, the Board of Immigration Appeals could only reopen his removal proceedings through 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a), the “sua sponte” reopening provision. The BIA employs that provision only in extraordinary circumstances; its discretion is broad. Park argued that the BIA has consistently reopened sua sponte for aliens who have become eligible for relief from removal after their cases have ended, thus establishing a “settled course of adjudication” that it is now bound to follow. The Third Circuit dismissed Park’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Park neither showed nor established a reasonable inference that the BIA has constrained its discretion in a way that would allow judicial review of its decision denying sua sponte reopening. View "Park v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law