Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a noncitizen from El Salvador who lawfully entered the United States on a nonimmigrant temporary visa with work authorization. While residing in the United States, he was stopped by a Pennsylvania state trooper for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer observed a rifle cartridge in the vehicle, leading to a search warrant and the discovery of a loaded pistol without a serial number. The individual admitted to purchasing the pistol in Maryland.He was indicted by a grand jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B), a statute prohibiting nonimmigrant visa holders from possessing firearms. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied his motion, holding the statute constitutional. After entering a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue, he was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(B) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The Court, following the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, assumed without deciding that some noncitizens may be included among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The Court then considered whether the statute is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. It found that there is a longstanding historical practice of disarming individuals considered disloyal to the sovereign, including noncitizens with allegiance to another country. Concluding that § 922(g)(5)(B) is relevantly similar to these historical analogues, the Court held that the statute does not violate the Second Amendment and affirmed the conviction. View "USA v. Aleman-Lozano" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident admitted to the United States in 1993, was ordered removed in 2011 based on a 1997 New York conviction for attempted third-degree criminal sale of cocaine. He did not appeal the removal order at that time but has since attempted several legal challenges to the order, including collateral attacks on his underlying conviction and multiple motions for reopening and reconsideration of the removal order. None of these efforts were successful, though a gubernatorial pardon in 2017 removed the aggravated felony basis for removal, leaving the controlled substance offense as the remaining ground.Following a 2023 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (United States v. Minter) interpreting the New York statute at issue, the petitioner filed new motions with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in 2024 seeking statutory reopening, statutory reconsideration, and sua sponte reopening, arguing that the Second Circuit’s reasoning undermined the basis for his removal. The BIA denied all motions, finding the statutory motions time-barred without justification for equitable tolling, and declined to exercise its sua sponte authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. It held that a change in law is not a permissible basis for statutory reopening under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), and, while statutory reconsideration may in rare cases be justified by a change in law, the petitioner’s motion was untimely and did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling. The Third Circuit also concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening. Accordingly, the court denied the petition as to the statutory motions and dismissed the petition as to sua sponte reopening. View "Aristy-Rosa v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Two individuals, citizens of Ecuador and Brazil, respectively, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and 2014. In late 2025 and early 2026, each was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and detained, without the possibility of bond, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This marked a change in government practice, as similar noncitizens had previously been detained or released under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for discretionary bond if the person is not a danger or flight risk. In 2025, the government began applying § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens already present in the United States who entered without inspection, resulting in mandatory detention without bond.Both individuals filed habeas petitions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, arguing their detentions violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The district courts granted their petitions, finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) did not apply to them and that their continued detention without bond violated the INA. One district court also held that such detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Both petitioners were subsequently released, and the government appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the statutory language and structure of the INA and considered relevant precedent. The court held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are both “applicants for admission” and “seeking admission,” meaning those engaged in a present or ongoing attempt to gain lawful entry into the United States. The court concluded that noncitizens already present in the United States who are not actively seeking admission are not subject to mandatory detention under this provision and should be considered under § 1226(a), which allows for bond. The Third Circuit also held that detaining such individuals without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause. The court affirmed the district courts’ orders directing the release of the petitioners. View "Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC" on Justia Law

A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States illegally in 2015 and later applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He settled near Baltimore, worked in construction, started a family, but encountered legal trouble, including a conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The government initiated removal proceedings, and he conceded removability. He argued that, due to his tattoos, criminal history, and a Salvadoran indictment linking him to gang activity, he would face torture in El Salvador, either from the government or gangs, and thus sought CAT relief.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner not credible, denied all forms of relief, and ordered removal. The judge concluded that the poor prison conditions in El Salvador did not amount to torture and found insufficient evidence that the petitioner would be singled out for torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the petitioner challenged only the denial of CAT relief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. While his petition was pending, the Third Circuit lifted a stay of removal, resulting in his deportation to El Salvador, where he was detained.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the petition as moot. The court held that, because the petitioner had already been removed and was incarcerated abroad, there was no longer any removal to defer, and thus no effectual relief could be provided. The court further concluded that the collateral consequences of removal, such as a bar on reentry, were not redressable by granting CAT relief, since CAT relief does not disturb the underlying removal order. The court also found that the government’s policy of facilitating returns did not apply to the petitioner’s circumstances. View "Mejia-Henriquez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a noncitizen who has resided in the United States for nearly three decades, has faced a final order of removal for approximately 15 years, primarily due to a 1997 narcotics conviction in New York. He has made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge this removal order. In the present matter, he contests the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his first motion for statutory reconsideration, his second motion for statutory reopening, and his third motion for sua sponte reopening. His arguments are grounded in recent case law from another circuit, which he claims constitutes a change in the legal landscape affecting his removal.Previously, an Immigration Judge entered a final removal order on consent in 2011. The BIA subsequently denied his motions for reconsideration and reopening, citing procedural and substantive bars. The petitioner’s efforts to reopen his case in the administrative process have been repeatedly rejected, and the current petition represents his fourth attempt to avoid removal. Throughout these proceedings, he has also sought to stay his removal while his petition is pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the petitioner’s request to continue a stay of removal. Applying the four-factor test from Nken v. Holder, the Third Circuit found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or that the balance of equities favored a stay. The court also determined that the public interest and the government’s interests weighed against any further delay. Additionally, the court denied the petitioner’s motion to hold the case in abeyance pending a new collateral attack on his underlying conviction, finding it untimely and not material to the immigration proceedings. As a result, the Third Circuit vacated the stay of removal, allowing the government to proceed with enforcement of the removal order. View "Aristy-Rosa v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Dominican Republic entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. She suffered abuse from her partner, who later involved her in a drug-trafficking scheme without her consent. In 2007, she pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, served a prison sentence, and was ordered removed from the United States in 2008. She unlawfully reentered the country in 2009 and remained until her 2023 arrest. Following the reinstatement of her prior removal order, she applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing harm from her former partner if returned to the Dominican Republic.An Immigration Judge denied her applications, finding her conviction was a presumptive “particularly serious crime” (PSC) under the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Y-L-, and that she had not rebutted the presumption. The judge also rejected her CAT claim, concluding she failed to establish it was more likely than not she would face torture with government acquiescence upon return. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted the Immigration Judge’s decision, and dismissed her appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction over both the CAT and withholding claims, even though the petitioner did not challenge the underlying removal order and the government did not contest the timeliness of the petition. The court unanimously denied her petition for review of the CAT claim, holding that the BIA did not err in denying relief. However, the panel was evenly divided on the statutory withholding claim: one judge would have denied the petition, one would have granted and remanded, and one would have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. As a result, the denial of statutory withholding was left intact by an equally divided court. View "Laureano v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Dominican Republic entered the United States without authorization as a child and lived with his mother, brother, and stepfather. The stepfather, who was not an authorized resident at the time, severely abused both the petitioner and his mother. After enduring years of abuse, the petitioner left home as a teenager but continued to support his mother, who later developed significant mental health issues linked to her trauma. The stepfather eventually gained lawful permanent resident (LPR) status and later threatened the petitioner again.The petitioner was charged with removability for lacking valid entry documents. He conceded removability but sought relief through two forms of cancellation: one, a special rule for individuals abused by a parent who is or was an LPR or citizen; the other, cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents based on hardship to a qualifying relative. The Immigration Judge denied both applications, finding the petitioner ineligible for special rule cancellation because the stepfather was not an LPR at the time of the abuse, and finding insufficient evidence of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the mother to grant cancellation of removal.On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge, agreeing that the abuser had to be an LPR at the time of the abuse and that the hardship to the mother did not meet the statutory threshold. The petitioner then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit held that the special rule for cancellation does not require the abuser to have been an LPR at the time of the abuse; it is sufficient if the abuser is or was an LPR at any time before relief is adjudicated. The court thus granted the petition on this claim and remanded for further proceedings. However, it denied the petition regarding cancellation of removal, finding substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion on hardship. View "Cardenas v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Two individuals, one a Nigerian citizen and another a Jamaican citizen, were held in U.S. immigration detention for extended periods following the completion of criminal sentences or pending immigration proceedings. Both petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, challenging their prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings as violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. The District Court granted both petitions, ordered bond hearings, and both individuals were subsequently released on bond.Following their success, each petitioner sought attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The District Court found that the government’s position in opposing the habeas petitions was not "substantially justified" and awarded fees: $18,224.58 to the Nigerian petitioner and $15,841.60 to the Jamaican petitioner. The government appealed these fee awards to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed whether a habeas corpus petition challenging immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 qualifies as a “civil action” under the EAJA, thus entitling prevailing parties to attorneys’ fees and costs. The Third Circuit held that such habeas actions are indeed “civil actions” within the meaning of the EAJA, relying on longstanding legal tradition and statutory interpretation. The court further affirmed that the government’s position in the Nigerian petitioner’s case was not substantially justified, due to the lengthy detention without a bond hearing. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s awards of attorneys’ fees and costs to both petitioners. View "Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correctional Center" on Justia Law

Mahmoud Khalil, an Algerian citizen and lawful permanent resident, was arrested in March 2025 by Homeland Security agents at his New York City apartment and charged as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s foreign-policy provision. Khalil, a Columbia University student and vocal advocate for Palestinian rights, was accused of having activities with potentially adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States. After his arrest, he was quickly transferred from New York to New Jersey, and then to Louisiana. His attorney initially filed a habeas petition in the Southern District of New York, seeking to enjoin his detention and removal, arguing retaliation against protected speech, and due process violations.The Southern District of New York, finding Khalil was already detained in New Jersey when the petition was filed, transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The New Jersey District Court asserted jurisdiction, denied the government’s motion to dismiss, and determined that the INA did not strip it of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court granted Khalil’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the foreign-policy removal charge, ordered that he not be removed, and later ordered his release from custody. Meanwhile, an immigration judge in Louisiana found Khalil removable on both foreign-policy and fraud charges and ordered his removal, resulting in conflicting mandates.Reviewing the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court had habeas jurisdiction, as the petition was properly transferred and related back to Khalil’s district of confinement. However, the Third Circuit found that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) of the INA strips the District Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising from removal actions, channeling such claims into a petition for review of a final order of removal in the court of appeals. As a result, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss Khalil’s habeas petition. View "Khalil v. President United States of America" on Justia Law

Ousmane Savane, a citizen of Côte d’Ivoire, entered the United States in 2012 through the Diversity Visa Program. During his initial application (the eDV), and in his subsequent Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration (DS-230), Savane did not disclose that he had two children, despite both forms requiring such information. He later explained that he omitted his children on the advice of a “coach” who helped him complete the forms, believing that doing so would facilitate his entry for financial reasons. The consular officer who interviewed Savane did not ask about his children, and Savane was admitted as a lawful permanent resident.In 2020, Savane applied for naturalization and disclosed all four of his children. He initially denied, but later admitted, that he had previously lied to U.S. officials to gain immigration benefits. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his naturalization application, finding that his earlier omissions rendered him not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Savane appealed administratively, arguing that the omissions were immaterial, but USCIS affirmed its denial. He then petitioned for review in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted summary judgment for the government, holding that Savane’s omission was material because it shut off a line of inquiry relevant to his eligibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, under 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2), an omission from an immigration application is material if it prevents investigation into a relevant aspect of eligibility, regardless of whether the omitted information would have led to denial. The court concluded that Savane’s failure to disclose his children precluded the consular officer from properly evaluating his eligibility, particularly regarding whether he was likely to become a public charge. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment for the government. View "Savane v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Sec" on Justia Law