Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Riley sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be killed by a drug kingpin if returned to Jamaica. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal under the CAT. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the IJ’s order, allowing the removal order to be enforced.Riley filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit within 30 days of the BIA’s decision but long after the DHS issued the final administrative review order (FARO). The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a final order of removal is jurisdictional and that the final order of removal was the FARO, not the BIA’s decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in withholding-only proceedings are not final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1). The Court also held that the 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Consequently, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Riley v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The President invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals identified as members of the Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Two detainees, along with a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas, sought injunctive relief against their summary removal under the AEA. The detainees were being held in U.S. detention facilities and were notified of their imminent removal.The District Court denied the detainees' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against their removal. The detainees then moved for an emergency TRO, which was not promptly addressed by the District Court. Consequently, they appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for an injunction pending appeal, citing insufficient time given to the district court to act. The detainees also applied to the Supreme Court for a temporary injunction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and found that the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the District Court's inaction had the practical effect of refusing an injunction, given the extreme urgency and high risk of irreparable harm faced by the detainees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that due process requires adequate notice and time for detainees to seek habeas relief before removal. The Government was enjoined from removing the detainees under the AEA pending further proceedings and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari. View "A.A.R.P. v. Trump" on Justia Law

Monsalvo Velázquez, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. unlawfully and has lived in Colorado for about 20 years. The federal government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2011. He requested either suspension of removal due to potential persecution in Mexico or permission to leave voluntarily. An immigration judge found him removable but granted him 60 days to depart voluntarily. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal order and granted a new 60-day voluntary departure period, which ended on a Saturday. Monsalvo filed a motion to reopen on the following Monday, but the BIA rejected it as untimely, stating the deadline expired on Saturday.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the BIA, holding that the 60-day voluntary departure period in 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(2) refers to calendar days, with no extension for weekends or holidays. Monsalvo then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that it has jurisdiction to review Monsalvo’s petition under §1252, which allows for judicial review of final orders of removal and all questions of law arising from them. The Court determined that the term “60 days” in §1229c(b)(2) should be interpreted to extend deadlines falling on weekends or legal holidays to the next business day, aligning with longstanding administrative practices and other similar statutory deadlines.The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Velazquez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. The President issued a proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal under the Proclamation, initially seeking relief in habeas but later dismissing those claims.The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing the removal of the named plaintiffs and a provisionally certified class of noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. The court extended the TROs for an additional 14 days. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government’s emergency motion to stay the orders, leading the Government to seek vacatur from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and granted the Government's application to vacate the orders. The Court held that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought in habeas corpus, as the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the detainees' confinement and removal. The Court also determined that venue for such habeas petitions lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, making the District of Columbia an improper venue. The detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief in the proper venue before removal. The application to vacate the District Court's orders was granted, and the TROs were vacated. View "Trump v. J. G. G." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the U.S., pleaded no contest in a California court under a statute criminalizing “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator,” defining “minor” as “a person under the age of 18.” He was ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(3), as an “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony,” including “sexual abuse of a minor.” The Supreme Court reversed. Under the categorical approach employed to determine whether an alien’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony, the court asks whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the "generic" federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. Petitioner’s state conviction would be an “aggravated felony” only if the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor, regardless of the actual facts of the case. The least of the acts criminalized by the California law would be consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 18 and a perpetrator who just turned 21. The generic federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires that the victim be younger than 16 and a significant majority of state criminal codes set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses predicated exclusively on the age of the participants. View "Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions" on Justia Law

An equally divided Court affirmed, by per curiam opinion, the judgment of the appeals court below. That court had temporarily halted implementation of the federal government's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program ("DAPA") on the grounds that the policy likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The case will go back to the federal district court to determine whether DAPA should be permanently enjoined. View "United States v. Texas" on Justia Law

Any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the U.S. is deportable, ineligible for several forms of discretionary relief, and subject to expedited removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (3). An “aggravated felony” is defined as any of numerous offenses listed in Section 1101(a)(43), each of which is typically identified either as an offense “described in” a specific federal statute or by a generic label (e.g., murder); the penultimate sentence states that each enumerated crime is an aggravated felony irrespective of whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law. Luna, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in New York to attempted third-degree arson. An Immigration Judge determined that Luna’s arson conviction was for an “aggravated felony” and that Luna was ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Second Circuit denied review. The Supreme Court affirmed. A state offense counts as a Section 1101(a)(43) “aggravated felony” when it has every element of a listed federal crime except one requiring a connection to interstate or foreign commerce.; state crimes do not need a “jurisdictional hook.” Congress meant the term “aggravated felony” to capture serious crimes regardless of whether they are made illegal by the federal government, a state, or a foreign country. It is implausible that Congress viewed the presence of an interstate commerce element as separating serious from nonserious conduct. View "Luna Torres v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Qualifying U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) may petition for family members to obtain immigrant visas. A sponsored individual (principal beneficiary) is placed into a “family preference” category based on relationship to the petitioner, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(1)–(4). The principal beneficiary’s spouse and minor children qualify as derivative beneficiaries, entitled to the same status and order of consideration as the principal. Beneficiaries become eligible to apply for visas in order of priority date, the date a petition was filed. Because the process often takes years, a child may age out and lose status before she obtains a visa. The Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) provides that if the age of an alien is determined to be 21 years or older, notwithstanding allowances for bureaucratic delay, the petition “shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.” In this case, principal beneficiaries who became LPRs, filed petitions for their aged-out children (who did not have a qualifying relationship with the original sponsor), asserting that the newly filed petitions should receive the same priority date as their original petitions. U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) disagreed. The district court granted the government summary judgment, deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) determination under section 1153(h)(3). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the provision entitled all aged-out derivative beneficiaries to automatic conversion and priority date retention. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that each immigrant must have a qualified and willing sponsor. If an original sponsor does not have a legally recognized relationship with the aged-out children, another sponsor must be identified for the alien to qualify for a new family preference category. Immigration officials do not know whether a valid sponsor exists unless the aged-out beneficiary files and USCIS approves a new petition. Section 1153(h)(3) does not require a new petition for derivative beneficiaries who had a qualifying relationship with an LPR both before and after they aged out. In contrast, the nieces, nephews, and grandchildren of the initial sponsors cannot qualify for “automatic conversion.” The BIA’s interpretation benefits from administrative simplicity and fits with immigration law’s basic first-come, first-served rule. View "Scialabba v. de Osorio" on Justia Law

Moncrieffe, a Jamaican citizen legally in the U.S., was found with 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. He pleaded guilty under Georgia law to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a noncitizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is deportable, 8 U.S.C. 227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for discretionary relief. The INA lists as an “aggravated felony” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” including conviction of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes punishable as a felony (by more than one year’s imprisonment). A state conviction is a felony punishable under the CSA only if it involves conduct punishable as a felony under federal law. Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a CSA offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. An Immigration Judge ordered Moncrieffe removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting reliance on section 841(b)(4), which makes marijuana distribution punishable as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small amount for no remuneration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. If a noncitizen’s conviction for marijuana distribution fails to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it is not an aggravated felony under the INA. The Court employed the “categorical approach,” examining what the state conviction necessarily involved and not the facts underlying the case, and presuming that the conviction involved the least of the acts criminalized. Conviction under Georgia’s statute, alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount was involved, so Moncrieffe’s conviction could correspond to either the CSA felony or the CSA misdemeanor. The Court rejected an argument that section 841(b)(4) was merely a mitigating sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. The government’s proposal that noncitizens be allowed, during immigration proceedings, to demonstrate that their convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and no remuneration is inconsistent with the INA’s text and the categorical approach and would burden immigration courts and the noncitizens involved. Escaping aggravated felony treatment does not necessarily mean escaping deportation, because any marijuana distribution offense renders a noncitizen deportable as a controlled substances offender, but with an opportunity seek relief from removal. View "Moncrieffe v. Holder" on Justia Law

Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Chaidez in 2009 upon learning that she had pleaded guilty to mail fraud in 2004. To avoid removal, she sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis, contending that her former attorney’s failure to advise her of the guilty plea’s immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. While her petition was pending, the Supreme Court held, in Padilla v. Kentucky, that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty pleas. The district court vacated Chaidez’s conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had declared a new rule and should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed. Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. A case does not announce a new rule if it merely applies a principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts. Padilla’s ruling answered an open question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions, breaking new ground and imposing a new obligation. View "Chaidez v. United States" on Justia Law