Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the IJ's and BIA's decisions denying petitioner's request to defer his removal to Somalia under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner had entered the United States in 2001 under a false passport and was previously ordered removed. Petitioner then moved to reopen his case, which the BIA granted, remanding the case to the IJ where petitioner's request was denied.The court affirmed the IJ's and BIA's judgments, holding that substantial evidence supported the conclusions that petitioner was unlikely to be tortured for minority-clan membership. The court rejected petitioner's challenge to the IJ's and BIA's conclusions that any torture by Al-Shabaab does not qualify for CAT relief because the Somali government would not acquiesce in such torture. Rather, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the IJ's and BIA's conclusions that the Somali government was unlikely to acquiesce in any torture by Al-Shabaab. Finally, the court concluded that the IJ and BIA properly considered the risk of torture in the aggregate. View "Hassan v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Herrera's husband fraudulently used the identity of a lawful permanent U.S. resident (LPR) to become a citizen. Herrera obtained LPR status as the wife of a citizen and became a citizen. Herrera's four children are U.S. citizens. In 2011, Herrera was convicted of second-degree theft. The government discovered Herrera’s false statement. She pleaded guilty to naturalization fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). The district court revoked her citizenship and restored her to LPR status, 8 U.S.C. 1451(e).If an alien commits fraud or misrepresents a material fact to gain a benefit under the immigration laws, she may be deported, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); 1227(a)(1)(A). Herrera sought a waiver available to aliens who committed immigration fraud but are the parent of a citizen and separately sought cancellation of removal as an LPR. DHS added a charge of removability for convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude based on Herrera's theft conviction, then withdrew the charge of removability for immigration fraud. The BIA affirmed that she was ineligible for a fraud waiver because she was no longer charged under the fraud provision and was ineligible for cancellation of removal because she had obtained her LPR status by fraud.The Eighth Circuit denied relief, rejecting Herrera’s argument that DHS could not withdraw the fraud charge because it had already been sustained by the IJ. The government is permitted to adjust the charges against an alien during the immigration court case. View "Gonzalez v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Dat was born in a Kenyan refugee camp in 1993. Admitted to the U.S. around 1994, he became a lawful permanent resident. Dat pled guilty to robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment. Dat’s robbery conviction is a deportable offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Dat moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney, Allen, assured him that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea. Allen testified that she repeatedly told Dat the charges were “deportable offenses,” that she never told him, his mother, or his fiancée that he would not be deported. that she encouraged Dat to hire an immigration attorney, and that they reviewed the Plea Petition, which says that non-citizens would be permanently removed from the U.S. if found guilty of most felony offenses. The Plea Agreement refers to immigration consequences. Dat and Allen also reviewed the PSR, which stated that immigration proceedings would commence after his release from custody.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Dat was not denied effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively reasonable for Allen to tell Dat that he “could” face immigration ramifications that “could” result in deportation. An alien with a deportable conviction may still seek “relief from removal. These “immigration law complexities” should caution any defense attorney not to advise a defendant considering a guilty plea that the result of a post-conviction, contested removal proceeding is certain. View "Dat v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order upholding the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions. The court did not find that "any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude" that al-Shabaab's presence in Somalia is materially different than existed in 2011 based on petitioner's evidence. Furthermore, the IJ did account for the emergence and growth of ISIS-Somalia in its determination, but ultimately determined that the "isolated references" in the record were insufficient to establish petitioner's claims. Finally, the IJ did consider petitioner's personal circumstances when determining whether the alleged changed country conditions were material. In this case, the IJ concluded that Westernized Somalis face no greater threat of harm than existed at the time of petitioner's prior proceedings in 2011, and petitioner failed to sufficiently show how his presence on the 2017 repatriation flight thrust him into "particular notoriety" thereby creating a greater risk of persecution. View "Mohamed v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the IJ's and BIA's decisions denying relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner claimed that the Somali government will acquiesce in his torture by Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization.The court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's and BIA's findings that the Somali government would not acquiesce in any torture of petitioner by Al-Shabaab. In this case, the record does not show that the Somali government has willfully turned a blind eye to Al-Shabaab's activities. Rather, the Somali government and its allies have battled Al-Shabaab, retaken territory from it, and worked to maintain order. Furthermore, the Somali government is using its amnesty program as part of its fight against Al-Shabaab as a tool to encourage defections. Finally, petitioner's argument that the Somali government and Al-Shabaab act in concert to torture people is wholly without record support. The court stated that the fact that the Somali government has not successfully ended the threat posed by Al-Shabaab violence is insufficient to establish that the torture would be with the consent or acquiescence of a government official. View "Moallin v. Barr" on Justia Law

A noncitizen who enters this country without inspection or admission, but who later receives Temporary Protected Status (TPS), may adjust her status to Lawful Permanent Resident because a TPS recipient is deemed inspected and admitted for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1255(a).The Eighth Circuit held that section 1254a(f)(4) provides that TPS recipients "shall be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant" for purposes of adjusting their status under section 1255. The court explained that those in nonimmigrant status are necessarily inspected and admitted. By operation of section 1254a(f)(4), then, TPS recipients are considered "inspected and admitted" under section 1255(a), regardless of whether they entered the United States without inspection. Therefore, USCIS's contrary interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the INA and is therefore unlawful. View "Velasquez v. Barr" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal is what effect, if any, a guilty plea has on later denaturalization proceedings. In this case, defendant had pleaded guilty to violating and conspiring to violate Iraqi sanctions and to misusing his organization's tax exempt status and omitting relevant, material information from tax forms. Eight years after pleading guilty and eighteen years after first becoming a citizen, the government commenced proceedings to denaturalize defendant. The district court agreed with the government that defendant's failure to disclose his criminal activities called for denaturalization.The Eighth Circuit held that all three judicial estoppel factors favored applying the doctrine: first, the court stated that defendant's current position is clearly inconsistent with the one from his criminal proceeding; second, the district court had to accept the plea's factual basis, including defendant's statements during the plea colloquy; and third, defendant would derive an unfair advantage if he were allowed to change his position now. Therefore, the court cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider defendant's lack-of-knowledge defense. Finally, the court rejecting defendant's defense of laches because the doctrine of laches does not apply to the United States when it is acting in its sovereign capacity. View "United States v. Hamed" on Justia Law

Avitso, a citizen of Togo, entered the U.S. as a student in 2004 and married a U.S. citizen. In 2011, USCIS denied a Petition for Alien Relative filed by Avitso’s wife and an application for adjustment of status filed by Avitso, concluding they had entered into a fraudulent marriage to procure immigration benefits, which made Avitso removable, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A). Notice of removal proceedings was mailed to Avitso at the address where USCIS investigators had been told he resided. In 2012, DHS mailed notice to a different address. The immigration court also mailed notice; it was returned, marked “moved left no address.” Avitso failed to appear. The IJ entered a removal order.In 2019, remarried and represented by new counsel, Avitso moved to reopen, alleging that he “did not personally receive" notice but a copy was forwarded to him by his then-attorney. The motion cited ineffective assistance of counsel. The IJ denied the motion, concluding Avitso failed to meet case law requirements to establish ineffective assistance and even if those requirements were satisfied, the outcome would not have been different. The BIA dismissed Avitso’s appeal. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. Avitso’s motion to reopen included no evidence that he notified former counsel of his ineffective assistance claims, provided her an opportunity to respond, or filed a complaint with disciplinary authorities. The BIA enforces those requirements to discourage baseless allegations and deter meritless claims. View "Avitso v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's request for deferral and the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen his immigration case. The court rejected petitioner's due process claim that the agency failed to consider all relevant evidence. The court also held that the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner had failed to show he was more likely than not to be tortured based on his Christian faith if removed to Bangladesh. In this case, substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that petitioner failed to show that the Bangladeshi government acquiesces in torture, and substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that petitioner's evidence of forcible land evictions does not demonstrate the government's acquiescence in torture.The court also held that the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen where plaintiff offers nothing, beyond conclusory statements, to support his claim that the newly-offered evidence was not available at the time of his hearing in 2018. Furthermore, the new evidence was unlikely to alter the IJ's decision. View "Ahmed v. Barr" on Justia Law

In Al-Saadoon I, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioners' (husband and wife) petitions for naturalization because husband engaged in unlawful employment and thus the couple never lawfully adjusted to permanent resident status. Petitioners then filed a Supplement A to Form I-485 with USCIS to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents nunc pro tunc.The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioners' requests for nunc pro tunc adjustment to lawful permanent resident status, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to review a discretionary denial of an adjustment of status application. The court explained that, because petitioners failed to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents, they cannot meet the requirements for naturalization. To the extent that petitioners attempt to relitigate the determination that they were unlawfully admitted to permanent resident status in 2002, they are barred by res judicata. The court also held that the district court correctly dismissed petitioner's Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program claim. Finally, petitioners' Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) claim fails because they did not assert a claim for relief under RFRA in their petition. View "Al-Saadoon v. Barr" on Justia Law