Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner initially entered the United States on a traveler’s visa, but he later became a permanent resident after marrying a United States citizen. Then, roughly a decade later, he and his accomplices robbed a delivery van belonging to “an ATM vendor.” Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and spent five years in prison. Once immigration officials found out about the conviction, they started removal proceedings. As relevant here, the government argued he was removable because Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. The immigration judge and the Board agreed and refused to waive inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery requires proof of an “unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person . . . of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.” Thus, Petitioner is removable for having committed a “crime of violence.” Moreover, the court wrote that the decision in Taylor “does not change our position” that a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. View "Garfield Green v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for having knowingly procured her naturalization contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1425(a). Defendant made several false statements in procuring her naturalization. The issues on appeal are whether the government met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements were material, as that element of the Section 1425(a) offense was defined in Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335 (2017), and whether they were made “under oath.”
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that the false statements were immaterial because they did not necessarily establish she lacked good moral character. The court disagreed, reasoning that 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(f) provides that “no person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who” gives false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit in violation of Section 1101(f)(6). Moreover, Defendant argued that “false testimony” is limited to false statements given verbally under oath. As the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements in her N-400 Application for Naturalization were given orally and under oath, the government failed to present sufficient evidence, and we “need not even address materiality.” The court explained that the district court t was free to find the testimony of a USCIS supervisory officer more credible than the contrary opinion of Defendant’s expert, who admitted she had never attended a naturalization interview in Des Moines. Accordingly, the court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find she acted to obtain immigration benefits for her spouse. View "United States v. Deanah Cheboss" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) June 17, 2022, decision denying their motion for reconsideration of the Board’s July 29, 2021 decision. In the July 29, 2021 decision, the Board granted the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) motion to reinstate Petitioners’ removal proceedings and reissued the Board’s prior October 15, 2013 decision, which dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of a decision denying their applications for asylum and related protection.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it discerned no abuse of discretion. The court explained that the Board offered a rational explanation for rejecting Petitioners’ request for clarification. The Board’s July 29, 2021 decision—by Petitioners’ own acknowledgment—reissued the October 15, 2013 decision. This decision, in turn, permitted voluntary departure consistent with the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision. Both the Board’s October 15, 2013 decision and the IJ’s February 9, 2012 decision warned Petitioners of the consequences of filing a motion for reconsideration: automatic termination of voluntary departure and immediate effect of the alternative order of removal. Here, Petitioners chose to move for reconsideration. Their action automatically terminated the voluntary departure that the October 15, 2013 decision authorized. View "Tsatsral Bekhbat v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sudan and citizen of South Sudan, petitions this Court for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering Petitioner removed and reversing the IJ’s decision granting Petitioner deferral of removal to South Sudan. Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by (1) limiting its review on remand to address only whether he had been convicted of a theft offense, (2) determining that the Nebraska shoplifting statute constitutes an aggravated felony as a theft offense, and (3) reversing the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal to South Sudan.   The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the matter to the BIA for further proceedings. The court explained that for Nebraska’s shoplifting statute to be a categorical match to the generic definition of theft, it must criminalize only those who act with the specific intent to “deprive the owner of the right and benefits of ownership.” The court wrote that contrary to the BIA’s order, that appropriation “necessarily deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership” does not mean that the offender acted with the specific intent for that deprivation to occur. Accordingly, the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner was removable for having committed a theft offense—and, thus, an aggravated felony—based upon his Nebraska shoplifting convictions. View "Ruachkuoth Thok v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review from two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and denying his request to reopen and reconsider the denial of his applications.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that although Petitioner argued the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his asylum application, Petitioner failed to challenge before the BIA the IJ’s alternative, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum because his application was untimely, and the BIA deemed that this argument was waived. Further, the court wrote that Petitioner similarly failed to offer any argument regarding the timeliness of his asylum application before this Court. And, in any event, the court wrote that it will not disturb the BIA’s conclusion that this issue has been waived and is dispositive of the asylum application. View "Alexander Arroyo-Sosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a rancher from Mexico who fears returning. He gives several reasons why. Twice, his uncles were kidnapped and held for ransom. The second time, the kidnapping was reported to the police. And though the police said they would “try to help,” they were ultimately unable to “do anything.” On another occasion, someone took pictures of Petitioner’s family home and then demanded money and threatened to kidnap a family member. And once, when he was driving from his family’s ranch to his home, two vans began chasing him. Shortly after Petitioner entered the United States, the Attorney General began removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his applications.  The BIA explained that it agreed with the IJ’s social-group-recognizability and nexus rulings, as well as the IJ’s determination regarding CAT relief.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that here, the record does not support Petitioner’s contention that the Mexican government has turned a blind eye to criminal-gang-inflicted torture. When one of Petitioner’s uncles was kidnapped, the police offered to help. The fact that they were unable to “do anything” does not evidence acquiescence. And when Petitioner sought help from the police after the car chase, they provided it. Petitioner counters that country conditions reports show that criminal organizations have infiltrated the Mexican police and government. Yet he does not explain how this “general infiltration” makes the Mexican government “likely to acquiesce in his torture.” View "Efren Uriostegui-Teran v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her children, natives and citizens of Honduras, petitioned the Eighth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering them removed and denying their claims for relief. In her petition for review, Petitioner claimed that the BIA erred (1) by finding that her due process rights were not violated when the IJ continued her case instead of terminating it and (2) by denying her application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.   The Eighth Circuit denied their petition. The court explained that while Petitioner contends that by continuing the proceedings, the IJ “was engineering a preferred outcome,” the record demonstrates that the IJ “had not researched the issue before” and simply wanted “to give [DHS] a chance to address the issue.” Second, the court agreed with the BIA that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced. By continuing the removal proceedings, the IJ provided Petitioner with exactly what she was promised: presence in the United States until November 10, 2018.   Further, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the gangsters’ threats did not rise to the level of past persecution. Here, the threats were telephonic, sporadic, and over a period of four years. Given that the record does not indicate that the gangsters ever acted, or attempted to act, upon these threats during this long period, the threats lack immediacy and appear exaggerated. View "Rosaura Brizuela v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Côte d’Ivoire and citizen of Burkina Faso was admitted to the United States in 2016 with an F-1 student visa. Petitioner soon withdrew from the university, terminating his student visa. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief based on his fears of harm from his political opinions and affiliation with the Congress for Democracy and Progress. Three years later, he updated his affidavit with two additional bases for fear of future persecution: his Christian faith and Fulani ethnicity. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protections. Petitioner argued that the BIA abused its discretion by finding no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that because the IJ identified specific, cogent reasons to disbelieve Petitioner’s testimony, sufficient evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of asylum or withholding of removal. Petitioner argued that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination for his asylum and withholding-of-removal applications should not foreclose his application for CAT protections. Because Petitioner did not raise these arguments before the BIA, they are unexhausted, and the Eighth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to consider them. View "Wendkouni Zongo v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioner with removability for two counts of being an aggravated felon and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of being admitted to the United States. Petitioner conceded her removability, making her inadmissible to the United States and subject to deportation. Seeking relief from removal, Petitioner applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. To qualify for the waiver, Petitioner needed to demonstrate statutory eligibility and that the equities warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her waiver of inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part. The court explained that although the BIA did not include hardship to Petitioner’s relatives when it listed Petitioner’s positive equities, it still considered hardship in its decision. The BIA recognized that Petitioner’s removal would “likely result in a considerable level of hardship to herself, her spouse, and her children.” Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner’s petition on this ground. Further, Petitioner challenged the BIA’s weighing of equities, specifically how it weighed her crimes. The court wrote that this is not a reviewable question of law. It is a challenge to “the discretionary conclusion of not meriting a favorable exercise of discretion,” which the court does not have jurisdiction to review. View "Aisha King v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board concluded that Petitioner’s prior conviction in Kansas for possession of methamphetamine made him removable from the United States.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner is removable and therefore denied the petition for review. Petitioner contends that the approved instruction allows a prosecutor to charge a defendant with possession of multiple drugs in the alternative. But the instruction calls for insertion of a “controlled substance” in the singular, and recommends that “an alternative charge instruction not be given” because “the defendant cannot be convicted of multiplicitous crimes.”   Petitioner further asserted that drug type must be a “means” of committing the offense because Section 21-5706(c)(1) imposes the same punishment for possession of each substance. But while different punishments would conclusively establish that drug type is an element, equivalent punishments do not show that drug type is a means. The legislature may simply have concluded that each separate drug possession offense deserves the same punishment, regardless of whether the offender possessed cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court held that the Board correctly concluded Petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance offense. View "Humberto Barbosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law