Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Ashraf Abdulkarim-Ali Alkotof, a Yemeni citizen, entered the U.S. on a B1/B2 visa in 2006 and overstayed. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a notice to appear, alleging he was subject to removal. Alkotof admitted the allegations but sought adjustment of status based on an I-130 petition filed by his U.S. citizen spouse, Tiffany Alfano. After Alfano's petition was denied, Alkotof divorced her and married Hajer Ali Yehia, who filed another I-130 petition, which was initially approved but later revoked due to alleged marriage fraud. Alkotof appealed the revocation and also applied for a U-Visa as a crime victim.The Immigration Judge (IJ) continued Alkotof’s removal proceedings multiple times but ultimately ordered his removal in 2018, citing the lack of an approved I-130 petition and the speculative nature of his U-Visa application. Alkotof appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal and denied his motion to remand for cancellation of removal, citing insufficient evidence to rebut the marriage fraud finding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the BIA’s denial of Alkotof’s motion to remand for cancellation of removal, as it involved discretionary judgment. The court also found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alkotof’s request for administrative closure or a continuance. The court noted that Alkotof was ineligible for adjustment of status due to the revoked I-130 petition and that he could continue to pursue his U-Visa application even after removal. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part Alkotof’s petition for review. View "Ashraf Abdulkarim-Ali Alkotof v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves Martha Isabel Rosales-Mendez, a Honduran native who illegally entered the United States. After being apprehended by border patrol agents, she was served with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The agents recorded an address provided by her boyfriend over the phone, which turned out to be incorrect. Consequently, Rosales-Mendez did not receive the second notice setting the date and time of her removal hearing, leading to her being ordered removed in absentia when she failed to appear.Rosales-Mendez's case was initially reviewed by an immigration judge who ordered her removal in absentia after she failed to attend the hearing. She later discovered the removal order and moved to reopen the removal proceeding, arguing lack of notice. However, the immigration judge denied the motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that since Rosales-Mendez failed to provide a correct address, the officials were excused from providing her notice of her removal hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Rosales-Mendez's petition for review. The court held that immigration officials were not required to give notice of a removal hearing to an alien who provided them an inaccurate home address. The court reasoned that Rosales-Mendez, through her boyfriend, provided an incorrect address and failed to correct it, thereby forfeiting her right to actual notice of her removal hearing. The court concluded that Rosales-Mendez was properly ordered removed in absentia. View "Rosales-Mendez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A transgender woman from Mexico, identified as A.P.A., who unlawfully immigrated to the United States as a child, faced deportation proceedings after being convicted of driving under the influence. In response, A.P.A. petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), citing past abuse by a custodial uncle in Mexico and fear of future persecution and torture due to her transgender status. The immigration judge denied these requests, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the decision.The BIA determined that A.P.A.'s asylum claim was untimely and did not meet the exception to the one-year deadline based on "changed" or "extraordinary circumstances." The BIA also concluded that A.P.A. had not shown past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in Mexico as a transgender woman. The BIA denied A.P.A.'s request for CAT relief for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the asylum application based on its timeliness, as per the statute and previous court decisions. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s decision that A.P.A. was not likely to suffer future persecution or torture as a transgender woman in Mexico. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review in part and dismissed it in part. View "A.P.A. v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves Marken Leger, a Haitian citizen who has lived in the United States as an asylee since 2000. In 2009, Leger pleaded no contest to a charge of lewd and lascivious battery, in violation of Florida Statute § 800.04(4). In 2013 and 2018, Leger pleaded no contest to two other offenses, both for the possession of marijuana, in violation of Florida Statute § 893.13(6)(b). The government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2019, alleging that his convictions made him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The immigration judge concluded that Leger was removable, finding that his marijuana possession convictions constituted controlled substance offenses under the INA and that his conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) was an aggravated felony. Leger appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that Leger's marijuana possession convictions did not constitute controlled substance offenses as defined under federal law, and thus, the BIA erred in determining that Leger was subject to removal on these grounds. The court also held that Leger's conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04(4) did not constitute the sexual abuse of a minor and was not an aggravated felony under the INA. The court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Marken Leger v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves a Venezuelan couple, Carlos Cuenca Figueredo and Yauri Rojas, who had a son, C.R. After their separation and divorce, they shared custody of C.R. in Venezuela. However, Rojas took C.R. to the United States without Figueredo's knowledge or permission. Twenty months after Rojas left Venezuela with C.R., Figueredo filed a petition in the Middle District of Florida seeking his son’s return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The Middle District of Florida found that C.R. was settled in his new environment in the United States. The court considered factors such as C.R.'s stable residence, school attendance, community participation, and Rojas's employment and financial stability. The court also took into account C.R. and his mother's immigration status, noting that Rojas had been granted authorization to remain and work in the United States while her asylum application was pending. Consequently, the court denied Figueredo's petition for C.R.'s return.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that a child's immigration status is one relevant factor in determining whether a child is settled in a new environment. The court found that the district court did not err in finding that C.R. was settled in his new environment and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order his return to Venezuela. View "Alberto Cuenca Figueredo v. Del Carmen Rojas" on Justia Law

Jesus Gabriel Navarro Guadarrama, a Mexican citizen, pursued a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision dismissing his appeal for adjustment of status and the subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider. Navarro Guadarrama contended that the Board used an incorrect legal standard in considering his application.Navarro Guadarrama entered the U.S. in 1995 and was later convicted of several crimes. His criminal record led to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Navarro Guadarrama applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), which enables an alien illegally in the U.S. to seek relief from removal if they meet certain requirements. His application was denied by an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board due to his criminal record and evidence of bad character.Navarro Guadarrama petitioned the court to review the Board's decision. He argued that the Board used the legal standard from a previous case, Matter of Mendez-Moralez, which applies to aliens requiring waivers, instead of Matter of Arai, which applies to those who don't require waivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider Navarro Guadarrama’s petitions for review and that the Board did not apply the wrong legal standard. The court found that even if the Board cited the "wrong" case, there was no indication that, in substance, it applied the wrong standard. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Guadarrama v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Robert Franklyn Lodge, a native and citizen of Jamaica, challenged the constitutionality of a federal law regarding derivative citizenship. Lodge, born out of wedlock and abandoned by his mother, was brought to the United States by his naturalized father. After being convicted of aggravated felonies, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove Lodge, who argued that he had derived citizenship from his father under a since-repealed statute. The immigration judge ordered Lodge removed to Jamaica, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Lodge’s appeal.Lodge argued that the former statute discriminated against unmarried fathers based on sex and against black children based on race. He asked the court to declare him a citizen, arguing that the statute, if cured of its constitutional defects, would have permitted his father to transmit citizenship to him. However, the court found that Lodge would not have derived citizenship from his father even under a version of the statute cured of its alleged constitutional defects. Consequently, the court denied Lodge's petition for review and deemed his motion to transfer as moot. View "Lodge v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

Robert Franklyn Lodge, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was brought to the United States by his father, who became a naturalized U.S. citizen. After Lodge was convicted of aggravated felonies, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him. Lodge argued that he had derived citizenship from his father under a statute that has been repealed. The immigration judge ordered Lodge removed to Jamaica, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Lodge argued that the former statute discriminated against unmarried fathers based on sex and against black children based on race, and that he should have been granted citizenship if the statute were free of these constitutional defects. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Lodge's petition for review, concluding that he lacked standing to raise these constitutional challenges. The court found that Lodge's injury (removal from the U.S. due to non-citizenship) was not traceable to the sex classification in the statute, because even under a sex-neutral version of the statute, Lodge would not have derived citizenship from his father, because his mother's maternity was established. The court did not address the merits of Lodge's arguments about race and sex discrimination or whether he had third-party standing to assert his father's right to equal protection. Lodge's motion to transfer was denied as moot. View "Lodge v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Petitioner is removable as an aggravated felon and denied his requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner petitions for review, arguing that his Massachusetts conviction for armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G) and therefore is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and granted in part. The court rejected Petitioner’s argument that armed robbery does not constitute a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). However, the court agreed with the parties that a remand to the BIA is nevertheless required. The Attorney General has issued an intervening decision that might impact Petitioner’s request for withholding of removal, and the BIA should have the opportunity to consider the effect of that decision. The court wrote that Petitioner was sentenced to less than five years in prison. His aggravated felony conviction, therefore, does not per se constitute a particularly serious crime with respect to withholding of removal. View "Mucktaru Kemokai v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an Application for Naturalization (Form N-400), on which she certified under penalty of perjury that she had never “committed a crime or offense for which she was NOT arrested.” Defendant was charged in 2012 with healthcare fraud and conspiracy crimes. In 2012, Lopez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. In 2021, the United States filed a complaint in the district court to revoke Defendant’s naturalization. The complaint alleged   had illegally procured her naturalization on the ground that she had failed to meet the requirement of “good moral character.” The government moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Defendant had illegally procured her naturalization because she had committed a crime of moral turpitude during the statutory period. The district court granted that motion. It concluded that the conspiracy crime to which Defendant pleaded guilty overlapped with the statutory “good moral character.”   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that structuring a transaction to avoid a reporting requirement, as defined by 18 U.S.C. section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), is also not a crime categorically involving moral turpitude. The offense does not necessarily involve fraud. And, although the crime arguably involves deceit, it does not necessarily involve an activity that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Thus, the court held that a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. View "USA v. Lisette Lopez" on Justia Law