Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Murugan, a member of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority, claims that he left Sri Lanka and entered the U.S. without authorization because of incidents involving the Sri Lankan Army. One incident involved overnight detention and questioning. Another incident, involving four days of detention and interrogation while tied to a chair included kicking and slapping. After his release, Murugan was hospitalized and attended mental health counseling. Murugan did not report his arrest to the police or any other government authority. Finally, soldiers came to Murugan’s home, arrested him, and threatened to take him to an army torture camp. After six hours of detention, Murugan was released. Murugan’s parents told him that his life was in danger and that people who had been previously arrested with him had been re-arrested and sent to the torture camp.In removal proceedings, Murugan applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief. He alleged past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution based on an imputed political opinion and membership in the particular social groups of Tamils and returned asylum seekers. He testified that he feared he would be arrested at the airport, tortured, and killed. The IJ and BIA rejected his claims. The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for relief, noting that Murugan had not exhausted some of his arguments before the BIA and that the agency applied the correct legal standards. The factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Murugan v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

Germain was admitted to the U.S. in 2007 as a lawful permanent resident. Roughly 10 years later, he was convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 371, and three counts of making a false statement in an immigration application, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). Charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony based on his section 1546(a) convictions, Germain argued that those convictions did not qualify as “aggravated felonies” under 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). He sought cancellation of removal. under section 1229b(a). Germain argued that the parenthetical “(related to document fraud)” in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(P) limited the qualifying 1546(a) convictions to those expressly involving document fraud.The IJ ordered Germain removed, reasoning that 1546(a) was divisible because it enumerated four distinct offenses in its four paragraphs. Applying the modified categorical approach, the IJ determined that Germain’s indictment showed that he had pleaded guilty to three counts of making a false statement of material fact on an immigration application, all of which qualified as aggravated felonies because they were offenses described in 1546(a). The BIA dismissed Germain’s appeal. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed his petition for review. All four paragraphs of section 1546(a) relate to document fraud and the plain text and structure of the Act demonstrate that the parenthetical “(relating to document fraud)” is merely descriptive of 1546(a), rather than limiting. View "Germain v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A conviction under Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a)—which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to "own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical weapon or device"—does not constitute a "firearm offense" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C), and its cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3).The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's final order of removal and vacated the BIA's decision deeming petitioner removable under section 1227(a)(2)(C) of the INA, based on his conviction for a violation of Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a). Applying the categorical approach, the court explained that the prohibited items for the possession and concealed carrying offenses in section 790.23(1)(a) are means of committing those crimes, and not elements of separate crimes. View "Simpson v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming an IJ's discretionary denial of petitioner's application for asylum and grant of withholding of removal. The court concluded that when an asylum applicant is denied asylum but granted withholding of removal, 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(e) requires reconsideration anew of the discretionary denial of asylum, including addressing reasonable alternatives available to the petitioner for family reunification. And where the IJ has failed to do so, the BIA must remand for the IJ to conduct the required reconsideration.In this case, the IJ failed to consider petitioner's asylum claim under section 1208.16(e). Therefore, the BIA's failure to remand on this issue was manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion. The court explained that it is clear that neither the IJ nor the BIA conducted the proper reconsideration because the record contained no information about petitioner's ability to reunite with his family, information that the agency must review under section 1208.16(e). Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for reconsideration of the discretionary denial of asylum. View "Thamotar v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the identity of her nuclear family and her asserted persecution. The court explained that petitioner is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because the gang that targeted her family did so only as a means to the end of obtaining funds, not because of any animus against her family. Furthermore, petitioner is ineligible for CAT relief because she has not established that any harm she will suffer if returned to her home country will come with at least the acquiescence of a government official. View "Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government in an action challenging USCIS's decision determining that plaintiff was ineligible for adjustment of status due to his membership in a Tier III terrorist organization—the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—and his personal engagement in terrorist activity.The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in determining that plaintiff's inadmissibility under the terrorism bar was not actually litigated during the asylum proceeding, and rejected the issue preclusion claim. The court held that an organization engages in terrorist activity for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) when its members perpetrate terrorist activity and its leadership authorizes such conduct expressly or tacitly. In this case, as applied to plaintiff and the BNP, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also concluded that plaintiff's vagueness challenge to 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) & (VI) fails at the outset, because he intentionally relinquished any challenge to the definition of "terrorist activity" in the district court. Finally, the court applied the "exceedingly deferential" standard of review under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and held that the USCIS's conclusion that the BNP authorized its members' terrorist activity—and thus qualified as a Tier III terrorist organization—is not arbitrary and capricious. View "Islam v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider a petition challenging the Board's decision on appeal that preconclusion voluntary departure was not warranted in petitioner's case. Petitioner contends that he would have applied for preconclusion voluntary departure had the IJ told him about it. The court concluded that the Board's decision was within its independent discretion; that is, no matter what the IJ would have decided about preconclusion voluntary departure had it been raised, the Board had the authority to enforce its own judgment on the question. Furthermore, once the Board exercised that judgment and ordered removal, it cut off any jurisdiction the court might have had to consider the petition. View "Blanc v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Cuban citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition in part because the IJ and the BIA failed to provide reasoned consideration of petitioner's evidence of his well-founded fear of future persecution based on a pattern or practice of persecution toward dissident journalists in Cuba. However, the court denied the petition for review of petitioner's asylum claim based on past persecution because substantial evidence supports the BIA's conclusion that petitioner did not demonstrate that he suffered past persecution. View "Cabrera Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order of removal of petitioner as an alien convicted of aggravated felonies after his admission to the United States. In this case, petitioner was a citizen when he was convicted. At issue is whether a denaturalized alien is removable as an aggravated felon based on convictions entered while he was an American citizen.The court explained that, by its plain terms, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to aliens who were citizens when convicted. Therefore, the court held that the plain meaning of section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) forecloses the BIA's interpretation. Furthermore, binding precedent, Costello v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 376 U.S. 120 (1964), forecloses treating petitioner's denaturalization as retroactive for removal purposes. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hylton v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs, two immigrants who admit that they are subject to valid removal orders, filed suit alleging that the government cannot remove them because that would interfere with their "regulatory rights" to remain in the United States while they apply for waivers.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' applications do not give the court subject matter jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of their removal orders. The court explained that plaintiffs' claims fall squarely within 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)'s jurisdictional bar where the action being challenged is the government's execution of plaintiffs' removal orders. In this case, section 1252(g) strips the court of jurisdiction to hear the claims brought by plaintiffs, and the statute does not offer any discretion-versus-authority distinction of the sort they claim. Because Congress stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over such claims, the court affirmed the district court's dismissals. View "Camarena v. Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law