Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Fody Daniel Membreno-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought review of the denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Initially, Membreno-Rodriguez was deemed inadmissible to the United States due to lack of a valid entry document but was granted parole. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), all of which were denied. After marrying a U.S. citizen, Membreno-Rodriguez moved to reopen his immigration proceedings to pursue adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. However, the BIA denied the motion on grounds of his inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision that Membreno-Rodriguez was ineligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a) since he had conceded his inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The court also noted that his parole status had no effect on his status as an applicant for admission into the United States. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Membreno-Rodriguez's motion to reopen for failing to demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. View "Membreno-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Mario Alejos-Perez, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, sought a review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) final order of removal that found him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his Texas conviction for possessing a synthetic cannabinoid. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for review. The court agreed with the BIA's conclusion that Alejos-Perez failed to prove there was a "realistic probability" that Texas would use the state statute he was convicted under to prosecute the possession of drugs that are not criminalized under federal law, which would mean his conviction would not be a removable offense. Alejos-Perez argued that the "realistic probability" standard should not apply, but the court rejected his argument, citing the rule of orderliness and the law of the case doctrine. The court also found that Alejos-Perez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding several authorities he cited for the first time during his appeal. View "Alejos-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an appeal by Evaristo Contreras Silva, a Mexican citizen who was convicted of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). Silva entered the United States unlawfully and was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2018. He was informed of his illegal status and given an I-94 form. Silva argued that he believed he was lawfully in the U.S. based on the I-94 form and his interactions with immigration officials. In February 2022, Silva was found in possession of a firearm after a domestic violence call from his wife. He was subsequently charged and convicted for firearm possession as an illegal alien.On appeal, Silva argued that the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was unlawfully in the U.S. when he possessed the firearm. He based his belief on the I-94 form, advice from his immigration attorneys, adherence to his bond conditions, and various applications to change his status after his arrest.However, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Government provided sufficient evidence that Silva knew he was in the U.S. unlawfully when he possessed a firearm according to the standard set in Rehaif v. United States. The court considered Silva's unlawful entry, his detention by DHS, his admission of unlawful entry in an application for status adjustment, and the pending status of his immigration applications at the time he possessed the firearm. The court concluded that although there was evidence supporting Silva's belief of lawful presence, it did not justify a judgment of acquittal as the evidence was not definitive and the issue was appropriately presented to the jury. View "United States v. Silva" on Justia Law

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In this case, a native and citizen of Honduras, Kelmi Velasquez-Castillo, appealed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which denied his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Velasquez-Castillo, who had been categorized as an unaccompanied minor after his second entry to the U.S., argued that his removal would violate the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and that new evidence regarding his sexual orientation was relevant to his eligibility for asylum. The BIA had upheld the Immigration Judge's decision that Velasquez-Castillo failed to show that the new evidence was not available at the time of the previous hearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the BIA erred in denying the motion to reopen without resolving the issue of the statutory provisions relating to an unaccompanied minor, and that the BIA failed to consider whether there was new and previously unavailable evidence in support of asylum eligibility. The Court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for the BIA to interpret the TVPRA's relevant provisions in the first instance and to consider whether the new evidence met the requirements for reopening the case. View "Velasquez-Castillo v. Garland" on Justia Law

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In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Marta Alicia Mejia-Alvarenga, a citizen of El Salvador, sought to challenge the denial of her application for asylum by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Mejia-Alvarenga was detained when trying to cross the Rio Grande into the United States and was subsequently charged with removability due to her lack of valid documentation. She filed an application for statutory withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, later amending her application to seek asylum, based on threats she received from a man named Rigoberto Nelson and others associated with him.The immigration judge denied Mejia-Alvarenga’s application and ordered her removal to El Salvador. Despite finding Mejia-Alvarenga a credible witness and acknowledging she had suffered previous harm amounting to persecution, the immigration judge ruled she had not been harmed due to political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The judge also concluded that Mejia-Alvarenga did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution because she did not show that the government would be unable or unwilling to control a future persecutor.The Court of Appeals denied Mejia-Alvarenga's petition in part and dismissed it in part due to lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the BIA did not err in concluding that Mejia-Alvarenga failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from private persecutors. The court also rejected Mejia-Alvarenga’s claim that the BIA violated its regulatory obligation to be impartial and her argument that the BIA violated her due process rights by allowing a single BIA member to render its decision. Lastly, the court dismissed Mejia-Alvarenga's claim that the BIA committed an abuse of discretion by not referring her case to a three-member BIA panel, ruling it lacked jurisdiction over this claim. View "Mejia-Alvarenga v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Defendant a citizen of Mexico, has been deported from the United States repeatedly over the past three decades. The list of crimes he has committed in the United States is extensive. Most recently, Defendant pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after a prior deportation. At the time of this offense, Defendant was 51 years old, but had only spent one year of his adult life in Mexico, his country of citizenship. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Defendant’s recommended range spanned from 3 years and 10 months (46 months) to 4 years and 9 months (57 months). The district court sentenced Defendant to 6 years (72 months). Defendant challenged his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Government concedes that the district court mistakenly counted six prior theft convictions when there were only four and mistakenly suggested that Defendant had served 7 years for a 1991 vehicle burglary conviction when he actually served 10 months of the 7-year sentence. These, the Government admits, were obvious errors. Yet the Government argues, and we agree, that these misstatements did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. Nor did they impugn the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the proceedings. Further, the court wrote it has previously affirmed the substantive reasonableness of a 72-month sentence for illegal re-entry. Thus, the court concluded that this sentence was substantively reasonable, as well. View "USA v. Recio-Rosas" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the country after a previous deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326(a) & (b)(2). He claimed that the district court wrongly denied his request for a jury instruction about duress and inappropriately applied an enhancement to his sentence for obstruction of justice. Mora argues that the district court’s finding did not address all the elements of perjury. The district court stated that “this Defendant lied under oath to that jury” and that “he obstructed justice.” Defendant posits that this does not address whether the lie was willful or material.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the defendant must present proof of each element to receive a jury instruction on duress. The court wrote that even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, he has not presented proof that he was in danger at the moment of his offense. The court reasoned that there is no reason to believe that he was detained, followed, or surveilled in the interim between his abduction and the commission of the offense.   Further, the court explained that the obstruction of justice enhancement applies if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct.” The court wrote that it found that the district court’s finding “encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.” View "USA v. Mora-Carrillo" on Justia Law

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Petitioners in this immigration case are a husband and wife who applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on their membership in the proposed particular social group of “Salvadoran business owners.” The immigration judge (IJ) denied the family asylum and withheld removal, concluding that “extorted business owners” do not constitute a particular social group (PSG), that no showing of nexus is possible without a PSG, and that extortion is not persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s ruling that the family had not asserted a cognizable PSG.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for review. The court held that regardless of geography, “business owners” are not a protected social group. The court explained that to be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show, among other things, that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” The court wrote that “business owner” is not an immutable trait. The court reasoned that because a PSG is an essential element of claims for asylum and withholding of removal, Petitioners cannot succeed on either claim. View "Munoz-De Zalaya v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Petitioner E a native and citizen of El Salvador, attempted to enter the United States near Hidalgo, Texas, with her daughter Katherine. An asylum officer interviewed Petitioner and determined that she had a credible fear of persecution based on her membership in a particular social group. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then personally served Petitioner and Katherine each with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging them with removability under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as aliens who sought admission without a valid entry document. In December 2018, Petitioner appeared before the IJ again and set forth her claims for immigration relief. She asserted that her claim for asylum and withholding of removal was based on her membership in several particular social groups. The IJ issued an oral decision denying Petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection and ordered her and her daughters removed to El Salvador. The BIA also rejected Petitioner’s argument.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner is ineligible for immigration relief in the form of asylum because has failed to show the requisite nexus between the harm she claims she suffered and feared in El Salvador and a protected statutory ground. Further, the court held that the BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner’s argument on this issue, given its reasoning that the IJ considered “the entirety of the evidence of record,” which included the relevant testimony. View "Martinez-De Umana v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed the terms of his supervised release arguing that there is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement and written judgment. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended various mandatory and standard conditions of supervision. The probation officer also recommended a special condition, as Defendant was a legal alien permanent resident, but his arrest would have rendered him subject to deportation proceedings. The district court imposed a guidelines sentence of imprisonment for 95 months with three years of supervised release. The court orally adopted the special conditions recommended in the presentence report and orally informed Defendant that he must be legally authorized to reenter the country, as is reflected in the written judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the work-authorization condition in the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement of his sentence and that the written judgment should be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Defendant’s sentence and its written judgment. The work-authorization condition does not broaden the restrictions in Defendant’s supervised release already in place under the oral pronouncement. The court wrote that the purported “conflict” is then best described as an ambiguity— one that can be resolved by looking to entire record to determine the sentencing court’s intent in imposing the condition. The court explained that the record makes sufficient reference to Defendant’s immigration history to discern the district court’s efforts to ensure that Defendant complied with the relevant immigration laws. View "USA v. Pelayo-Zamarripa" on Justia Law