Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a legal permanent resident, was twice charged as removable by the federal government, once in 2012 and once in 2016. Petitioner challenged the second removability charge as barred by res judicata. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the BIA's determination that res judicata did not bar the second removability charge because it was based on a different statutory provision and was unavailable to the Government when the first charge was brought. Petitioner also argued that the Government failed to meet 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)'s statutory requirements and that the BIA denied him due process of law. The court concluded that these two issues have not been addressed by the BIA in the first instance and thus they are not ripe for disposition. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied the petition in part. View "Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner primarily argues that the Board did not adequately consider two declarations indicating that his counsel did not receive certain documents related to the proceedings. The court concluded that these declarations do not sufficiently rebut the presumption that his counsel received the documents the Board sent. Therefore, petitioner's argument that the Board should have reconsidered its decision in light of the declarations fails. Furthermore, petitioner's remaining arguments, which all stem from the alleged nonreceipt of documents and his alleged inability to file a responsive brief, also fail. View "Njilefac v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's conclusion that one of petitioner's three convictions rendered petitioner removeable. At issue is petitioner's 2018 conviction for knowingly possessing a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 2-A, in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code 481.1161(a). In this case petitioner possessed MMB-Fubinaca, which, he agrees, is a federally controlled substance. However, Penalty Group 2-A also includes at least one substance that is not federally controlled.The court concluded that petitioner's 2018 conviction did not render him removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The court explained that the government failed to show that Penalty Group 2-A is divisible. Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that Penalty Group 2-A is broader than the federal statute, and "there is no categorical match" between Penalty Group 2-A and its federal counterpart. Here, the parties agree that Penalty Group 2-A criminalizes possession of at least one substance—naphthoylindane—that the federal statute does not mention. The panel declined to terminate petitioner's removal proceedings. Instead, the court remanded for consideration of whether petitioner has shown a realistic probability that Texas would prosecute conduct that falls outside the relevant federal statute. The panel also remanded for consideration of whether petitioner's 2009 and 2013 convictions render him removable, in the event that petitioner succeeds on the realistic-probability inquiry. View "Alejos-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

There is no conflict between the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Bail Reform Act (BRA) that prevents DHS from civilly detaining a criminal defendant after she has been granted pretrial release pursuant to the BRA.As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's December order is appealable under the BRA, 18 U.S.C. 3145 and 3731. The court explained that the September release order released defendant from criminal detention under the BRA and, considered by itself, the court would lack jurisdiction over the September release order because it was issued by a magistrate judge and not a district court. However, the December order was the district court's affirmation of the September release order in response to defendant's motion to clarify her release status.On the merits, the court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the applicability of 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) and 1252(g) in its December order, explaining it was "not attempting to review or set aside any decision or action to commence removal proceedings" but was instead "attempting to enforce the Magistrate Judge's [September release] Order." The court considered decisions by six other circuits that have addressed the issue and concluded that pretrial release under the BRA does not preclude pre-removal detention under the INA. The court explained that, fundamentally, the BRA and INA concern separate grants of Executive authority and govern independent criminal and civil proceedings. The court concluded that the remaining claims lacked merit and vacated the district court's December order precluding ICE from detaining defendant pending completion of her criminal proceedings. View "United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging USCIS's denial of their application to adjust their immigration status to lawful permanent residents under the diversity visa program. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and dismissed the case, holding that the case was moot prior to the entry of the district court's final judgment. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that a claim challenging the denial of a diversity visa status adjustment application becomes moot after the relevant fiscal year expires. In this case, plaintiffs' claim was moot at the time they filed their initial complaint. View "Ermuraki v. Renaud" on Justia Law

An alien who entered the United States without being "inspected and admitted or paroled" may not have his status adjusted to lawful permanent resident by virtue of obtaining Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Petitioner, a native of Honduras, challenged the USCIS's denial of his application to obtain lawful-permanent-resident status in district court. The government moved to dismiss, but the district court denied the motion and remanded to the agency. The government appealed.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted and applied the relevant immigration statutes. The court held that the text of the relevant statutory provisions confirms that TPS does not cure the bar to status adjustment in 8 U.S.C. 1255. The court rejected petitioner's and amici's contention that because a TPS recipient is considered as "being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant," section 1255(a)'s requirement that an alien be inspected and admitted is satisfied. The court concluded that this contention failed because granting TPS does not constitute an admission under section 1255(a); granting TPS does not constitute a waiver of the admission requirement in section 1255; and being "admissible" under section 1254a does not create an alternative method for satisfying the requirement that one be admitted under section 1255. In this case, the court concluded that TPS does not excuse petitioner from the requirement of being inspected and admitted into the United States. The court explained that, because petitioner was never lawfully admitted, he cannot now seek to adjust his status under section 1255(a). View "Rodriguez Solorzano v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Tanzania, petitions for review of an order issued by the BIA dismissing his appeal from the IJ's decision denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner separately seeks review of the BIA's order denying his motion to reopen and denying his request for review of that motion by a three-member panel.The Fifth Circuit denied in part the petitions for review and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review factual challenges to the removal order; substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the IJ and BIA that petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof for CAT relief; and the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioner did not present newly discovered evidence to corroborate his claim for CAT relief. The court dismissed the petition for review of the unexhausted claims, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review of the BIA's non-referral of petitioner's motion to a three-member panel. View "Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for review, holding that the use of an unauthorized social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) such that petitioner is ineligible for cancellation of his removal to Mexico.Reviewing de novo, the court explained that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, a section 408(a)(7)(B) offense categorically constitutes a CIMT because it necessarily involves intentional deception. The court concluded that the offender's deceptive intent is dispositive. Even assuming arguendo that the conviction requires a further aggravating element beyond deceptive intent, the court was satisfied that such an element is present where a conviction under section 408(a)(7)(B) necessarily involves conduct that obstructs the function of government. Therefore, petitioner's application for cancellation of removal is pretermitted. View "Munoz-Rivera v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former alien detainee, filed suit alleging that CoreCivic's work programs are not voluntary. Plaintiff claimed that CoreCivic forced her to clean detention facilities, cook meals for company events, engage in clerical work, provide barber services for fellow detainees, maintain landscaping, and other labors. Furthermore, if she refused, CoreCivic would impose more severe living conditions, physical restraints, and deprivation of basic human needs.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of CoreCivic's motion to dismiss under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. 1589(a). The court concluded that sections 1589(a) and 1595 impose civil liability on "[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of" four coercive methods. The court rejected CoreCivic's contention that this language does not capture labor performed in work programs in a federal immigration detention setting. The court explained that nothing in the text supports this claim; CoreCivic is clearly an entity covered by the term "whoever;" and it has clearly "obtain[ed]" the labor of these alien detainees. The court rejected CoreCivic's remaining claims to the contrary and declined to apply the rule of lenity. Because on its face section 1589 unambiguously protects labor performed in work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, the court concluded that the "judicial inquiry is complete." View "Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc." on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the BIA's denial of equitable tolling to petitioner's motion to reopen in light of Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016). A panel of this court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.The Board had concluded that petitioner did not demonstrate due diligence because he waited approximately eight months after the Fifth Circuit decided Lugo-Resendez to file his current motion. Now considering the merits, the Fifth Circuit explained that the Board's conclusion applies with even grater force in light of the conclusion in Londono-Gonzalez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 2020), that Lugo-Resendez did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance that stood in the way of aliens seeking equitable tolling. Furthermore, petitioner presented no viable alternative from which he can show compliance with the 90-day filing deadline even with the benefit of equitable tolling. View "Ovalles v. Rosen" on Justia Law