Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum based on its finding that she had not shown she was persecuted on account of her membership in her alleged particular social group, "family members of Guisela Toledo-Vasquez." The court concluded that, despite the tragic circumstances that caused petitioner to flee Mexico, substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion that she was not persecuted on account of her family relationship with Guisela. Rather, petitioner's family membership to Guisela is merely an incidental, tangential, superficial and subordinate reason for her persecution. In this case, the record suggests that had petitioner been someone else other than Guisela's sister, she would have been targeted just the same. View "Toledo-Vasquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

After Mejia-Velasquez entered the United States without inspection, she sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, claiming that she and other members of her family had been the victims of physical harm due to their membership in a particular Honduran political party, and their affiliation with a family member who was elected mayor of the family’s hometown as a member of that same party. Because Mejia-Velasquez failed to produce biometrics (such as her photograph, fingerprints, and signature) in support of her application, after having been warned of the consequences of failing to do so, the immigration judge deemed her application abandoned pursuant to 8 C.F.R.1003.47(c) and 1208.10 and ordered her removed.The BIA and Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1003.47(d) is unambiguous as to the three requirements specified — oral notification, a biometrics notice, and instructions. Mejia-Velasquez actually received a biometrics notice from the IJ at her master calendar hearing. That document, entitled “Fingerprint Warning,” contained all the information that could reasonably be contemplated by the regulation’s requirement of “a biometrics notice.” It warned of the consequences for failing to submit the required information (abandonment) and set a deadline. View "Mejia-Velasquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Tomas-Ramos, a citizen of Guatemala, reentered the U.S. illegally in 2018. A removal order previously entered against him was reinstated. Tomas-Ramos expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala because gang members had threatened to kill him for resisting their recruitment of his son. An asylum officer conducted a screening interview and determined that Tomas-Ramos failed to establish a reasonable fear of harm and was not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. The asylum officer recognized that Tomas-Ramos might have been threatened because of his relationship to his son but held that immediate family is not a qualifying “particular social group” under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A) because it “lacks social distinction.” An IJ agreed.The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The primary ground for the IJ’s decision was an erroneous conclusion that there was no “nexus” between the harm Tomas-Ramos faced and a protected ground. The record compels the conclusion that Tomas-Ramos was persecuted on account of a protected ground, in the form of his family ties. The IJ’s finding that “[Tomas-Ramos] can relocate” is not an independent ground for affirmance, because that finding is called into question by the determination that Tomas-Ramos has established past persecution. View "Tomas-Ramos v. Garland" on Justia Law

Cabrera, a citizen of Mexico, legally entered the U.S. on a B-2 visa and overstayed. In 2015, her boyfriend physically assaulted her in front of her child. The responding officer noted her physical injuries. Cabrera’s child stated that the man had grabbed Cabrera and choked her. Cabrera’s boyfriend was charged with criminal domestic violence, Cabrera aided the police in prosecuting him, rendering her eligible to seek a U visa, available to noncitizens who have been a victim of criminal activity and who help authorities investigating or prosecuting that crime, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U). Cabrera obtained the required certification, attesting to her help, from law enforcement in December 2017. In February 2018, before Cabrera filed her U visa application, DHS issued her notice to appear. A month later, Cabrera filed her U visa application. She moved to continue the deportation proceedings.The IJ denied the motion, acknowledging there was a “significant probability” that USCIS would grant the U visa. The BIA dismissed Cabrera's appeal, finding that she failed to show good cause for a continuance. The Fourth Circuit vacated. The BIA and IJ abused their discretion. The BIA has held that there is a “rebuttable presumption” that a movant who has filed a prima facie approvable application for a U visa warrants a favorable exercise of discretion for a continuance. The BIA failed to explain why it departed from established policies. View "Cabrera v. Garland" on Justia Law

Herrera-Martinez owned a restaurant and a bar in Honduras with a business partner. In 2002, narco-traffickers began to pressure him to sell drugs; they allegedly beat him and threatened his life after he reported them to police. Herrera-Martinez fled to the United States and hired a lawyer, but skipped his last immigration hearing. Herrera-Martinez was later deported but returned after five days. Herrera-Martinez pled guilty to burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft and was, again, deported. During his third stay in the U.S. Herrera-Martinez was detained for illegal reentry. He sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, testifying that the narco-traffickers killed his former business partner after he left Honduras and murdered his brother-in-law.An IJ held that Herrera-Martinez experienced “at best a severe level of harassment,” did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, did not show persecution on account of any recognized social groups, and did not establish that Honduran officials would acquiesce in any torture. On remand, the IJ additionally found Herrera-Martinez not credible. The BIA affirmed. The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review. Herrera-Martinez’s withholding claim failed because the particular social group he advanced, prosecution witnesses, was not particular. Herrera-Martinez’s testimony was not credible; he failed to show that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if he returned to Honduras and that the Honduran government would acquiesce to such torture. View "Herrera-Martinez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ge, then a citizen of China, entered the U.S. on a student visa. After pursuing his education for four years, he enlisted in the Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which allows foreign nationals to enlist in the armed forces and thereafter apply for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440(a). Ge filed his application in May 2016. After completing interviews and tests administered by USCIS, he received notice in July 2017, that his naturalization oath ceremony had been scheduled for later that month. Days later, he was informed that the ceremony had been canceled. USCIS had a new policy, requiring that enhanced Department of Defense background checks for all MAVNI applicants before their naturalization applications could be granted.Ge filed suit in December 2018, under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). The district court directed USCIS to adjudicate Ge’s naturalization application within 45 days. Shortly after the court’s remand order, Ge reported that he had been sworn in as a citizen. The court dismissed Ge’s action. Ge then sought attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, alleging that he was the “prevailing party” and that USCIS’s position was not “justified in law and fact at all stages.” The district court denied his motion, ruling that Ge did not qualify as a prevailing party because its remand was not a judgment on the merits or consent decree that created a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. After the remand order, Ge was still the applicant; USCIS was still the agency that could grant or deny the application. The legal relationship had not changed. View "Ge v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Pugin, a citizen of Mauritius, was admitted to the U.S. in 1985 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2014, Pugin pleaded guilty in Virginia to being an accessory after the fact to a felony. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with nine months suspended. Pugin was charged with removability because he was convicted of an aggravated felony: “an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or subornation of perjury,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).The IJ employed the categorical approach to determine whether the Virginia conviction qualified as obstruction of justice, noting that the BIA had previously decided that a federal conviction for accessory after the fact is a crime relating to obstruction of justice. The IJ then held that Virginia accessory after the fact is an offense relating to obstruction of justice because, like its federal counterpart, the offense requires the defendant “act with the ‘specific purpose of hindering the process of justice.’” The Fourth Circuit affirmed that Pugin may be deported. The BIA definition of “obstruction of justice” under the Act is entitled to "Chevron" deference and the Virginia offense of accessory after the fact categorically matches that definition. View "Pugin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Canales-Granados, born in El Salvador, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2001. In 2018, he was convicted of criminal offenses, which he attributes to a multi-year struggle with substance abuse. He pleaded guilty to Virginia petit larceny, felony eluding, felony hit and run, and driving under the influence. For the latter three convictions, he was sentenced to 15 years and 60 days in prison. All but five days of the sentence were suspended; he was instead sentenced to a residential addiction treatment program.Charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because he was an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, Canales-Granados contended that neither Virginia felony hit and run nor Virginia felony eluding qualified as CIMTs. An IJ agreed that the hit and run conviction was not a CIMT but determined that felony eluding was. That conviction, when combined with Canales-Granados’ petit larceny conviction, gave him two CIMTs, rendering him removable. The BIA affirmed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is neither unconstitutionally vague nor violative of the nondelegation doctrine. Virginia’s felony eluding statute qualifies as such an offense. View "Granados v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2016, Gonzalez was granted deferred action on his removal from the U.S. under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). After his conviction for a misdemeanor in North Carolina, the DHS terminated Gonzalez’s grant of deferred action; he was immediately placed in removal proceedings. During the course of his proceedings before the IJ, DHS restored Gonzalez’s DACA grant of deferred action. Gonzalez asked the IJ to either administratively close his case, terminate the removal proceedings, or grant a continuance based on his mother’s pending application to be a legal permanent resident (LPR). The IJ denied all requests for relief. While the matter was pending in the BIA, Gonzalez’s mother obtained LPR status, and Gonzalez sought remand. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the motion to remand, reasoning that neither the IJs nor the BIA had the authority to terminate removal proceedings and that administrative closure and a continuance were inappropriate based on the speculative possibility of Gonzalez’s mother earning LPR status.The Fourth Circuit vacated. IJs and the BIA possess the inherent authority to terminate removal proceedings. The BIA improperly denied the request for administrative closure because it failed to address Gonzalez’s specific argument based on his DACA status. View "Gonzalez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Council established the Emergency Assistance Relief Payment Program (EARP) in March 2020 to provide emergency cash assistance to County residents with incomes equal to or less than 50% of the federal poverty benchmark who were not eligible for federal or state pandemic relief. Although eligibility for EARP aid is not dependent on a person’s status as an undocumented immigrant, such individuals are eligible to receive EARP payments. To fund EARP, the County appropriated $10,000,000 from reserve funds to the County’s Department of Health and Human Services. Taxpayers filed suit in Maryland state court, asserting that EARP violated 8 U.S.C. 1621(a), which, with few exceptions, generally prohibits undocumented persons from receiving state and local benefits. Recognizing that Section 1621 does not authorize private enforcement, the plaintiffs cited the Maryland common law doctrine of taxpayer standing, which “permits taxpayers to seek the aid of courts, exercising equity powers, to enjoin illegal and ultra vires acts of [Maryland] public officials where those acts are reasonably likely to result in pecuniary loss to the taxpayer.” The case was removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1331. The court granted the County summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Congress has declined to authorize private parties to enforce Section 1621, a legislative decision that cannot be circumvented by invocation of a state’s law of taxpayer standing. View "Bauer v. Elrich" on Justia Law