Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

After the U.S. Consulate in El Salvador denied the immigrant visa application of Plaintiff, he and his U.S.-citizen spouse (collectively "Plaintiffs") sought judicial review of the government’s visa decision. Relying on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, the district court granted summary judgment to the government.   Vacating the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government, and remanding, the panel held that (1) where the adjudication of a non-citizen’s visa application implicates the constitutional rights of a citizen, due process requires that the government provide the citizen with timely and adequate notice of a decision that will deprive the citizen of that interest; and (2) because the government failed to provide timely notice in this case, the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. The panel explained that, as set forth in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), and Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015), the doctrine of consular nonreviewability admits an exception in certain circumstances where the denial of a visa affects the fundamental rights of a U.S. citizen. View "SANDRA MUNOZ, ET AL V. DOS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought asylum and related relief on the ground that he was persecuted in China for his Christian faith. In a statement in support of his application, Petitioner wrote that he was arrested at a church gathering and detained, and during that detention, the police beat him, questioned him about church activities, and forced him to sign a document stating that he would not participate in the church. Before an immigration judge, Petitioner later testified that he was detained for one week, during which he was interrogated twice. Petitioner also testified in response to questions regarding his injuries and failure to get medical care, and the IJ asked him to clarify other apparent discrepancies between his application and testimony. 
 The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review the BIA’s decision upholding the denial of his application for asylum and related relief on credibility grounds, the panel concluded that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. The panel concluded that, in light of Petitioner’s apparent demeanor, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that his omission of the first interrogation from his application, together with his questionable explanation for that omission, undermined his credibility. The panel explained that the omission was not enough to undermine his credibility, but Petitioner’s shifting explanation could be reasonably viewed as internally inconsistent, and therefore, implausible. The panel also gave credit to the IJ’s finding that Petitioner exhibited a suspect demeanor during this exchange, explaining that such findings merit special deference. View "MINGNAN DONG V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Ninth Circuit concluded: (1) the record, in this case, compels the conclusion that two of Petitioner’s attackers were police officers during a July 2011 incident; (2) Petitioner showed acquiescence on the part of the Guatemalan government with respect to that incident because government officials— namely, the two police officers—directly participated in the incident; and (3) the record indicates that the IJ and BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner is not likely to be subjected to torture with government acquiescence if returned to Guatemala disregards several important circumstances pertinent to evaluating the likelihood of future torture. View "RISVIN DE LEON LOPEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was immediately detained by Officers from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Two days later, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225, DHS issued an expedited removal order against him. Petitioner asserted a fear of persecution, an asylum officer conducted a credible fear interview and concluded that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s s petition for review from a decision of an immigration judge affirming an asylum officer’s negative credible fear determination in expedited removal proceedings. The court held that because Congress has clearly and unambiguously precluded the court from asserting jurisdiction over the merits of individual expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders, and because that prohibition on jurisdiction raises no constitutional difficulty, the court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s petition for review. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered the United States without authorization, and after being convicted in California state court of assault with a deadly weapon, he was removed to Mexico. He later reentered the United States and was again removed. After Petitioner entered the United States for the third time, he was yet again placed in removal proceedings, and he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied relief on all claims.   The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court concluded that the agency did not commit legal error in determining that Petitioner’s state-court conviction was for a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. And substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that he is not entitled to CAT relief. The panel wrote that the record did not support Petitioner’s arguments that the Board relied on factual inaccuracies in finding that he could obtain medication in Mexico, that he is unlikely to be institutionalized in Mexico, and that healthcare workers and the police would not intentionally subject him to torture. The panel also did not agree with Petitioner that the agency failed to consider evidence that Mexican healthcare workers and police specifically target mentally ill individuals for torture. View "GIOVANNY HERNANDEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that noncitizens must receive a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in a single document specifying the time and date of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings, otherwise any in absentia removal order directed at the noncitizen is subject to rescission pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). View "VARINDER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that noncitizens must receive a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in a single document specifying the time and date of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings, otherwise any in absentia removal order directed at the noncitizen is subject to rescission pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). View "RAUL MENDEZ-COLIN V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

ICE has decided to rely almost exclusively on privately owned and operated facilities in California. Two such facilities are run by appellant The Geo Group, Inc. AB 32 would override the federal government’s decision, pursuant to discretion conferred by Congress, to use private contractors to run its immigration detention facilities.The Ninth Circuit en banc court vacated the district court’s denial of the United States and The Geo Group, Inc.’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and held that California enacted Assembly Bill (AB) 32, which states that a “person shall not operate a private detention facility within the state,” would give California a virtual power of review over Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s detention decisions, in violation of the Supremacy Clause.The en banc court held that whether analyzed under intergovernmental immunity or preemption, California cannot exert this level of control over the federal government’s detention operations. The en banc court remanded for further proceedings. The en banc court held that AB 32 would breach the core promise of the Supremacy Clause. To comply with California law, ICE would have to cease its ongoing immigration detention operations in California and adopt an entirely new approach in the state. This foundational limit on state power cannot be squared with the dramatic changes that AB 32 would require ICE to make. The en banc court held that appellants are likely to prevail on their claim that AB 32 violates the Supremacy Clause as to ICE-contracted facilities. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC., ET AL V. GAVIN NEWSOM, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner asserted that, if he were removed to his native country of El Salvador, he would be identified as a gang member based on his gang tattoos and face a significant risk of being killed or tortured—either by Salvadoran officials or by members of a rival gang with the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government. The Board concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear probability of torture because he did not establish that every step in a hypothetical chain of events was more likely than not to happen.   The Ninth Circuit filed: (1) an order amending its opinion filed on June 24, 2022, otherwise denying a motion to amend, and stating that petitions for rehearing and for rehearing en banc may be filed, and (2) an amended opinion granting Petitioner’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and remanding. In the amended opinion, the panel held that the Board erred by failing to adequately consider Petitioner’s aggregate risk of torture from multiple sources, and erred in rejecting Petitioner’s expert’s credible testimony solely because it was not corroborated by additional country conditions evidence.   The panel concluded that the Board erred by failing to assess Petitioner’s aggregate risk of torture. The panel concluded that the Board also erred by disregarding credible testimony from Petitioner’s expert. The panel remanded for the agency to properly assess the aggregate risk that Petitioner will be tortured if he is removed to El Salvador and, as part of that assessment, to properly consider the expert testimony. View "MIGUEL VELASQUEZ-SAMAYOA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s cancellation of removal concluding that his receipt of temporary protected status (TPS) was not admission and, therefore, he could not meet the statutory requirement that he has seven years of continuous residence in the United States after admission. The BIA also denied Petitioner’s application for asylum concluding that his 2016 domestic-violence conviction was a “particularly serious crime” that barred him from relief. Petitioner challenges the BIA’s decision raising two primary arguments: (1) under Ninth Circuit precedent, his TPS does constitute an admission “in any status” under the cancellation statute, 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(a), and (2) the BIA applied an improper legal standard in deciding that his 2016 conviction was for a particularly serious crime.   The Ninth Circuit filed: (1) an order amending the opinion filed June 28, 2022, otherwise denying the petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc and stating that no further petitions for rehearing would be accepted, and (2) an amended opinion denying Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA decision. In the amended opinion, the panel held that: (1) Petitioner’s receipt TPS was not an admission, and he, therefore, could not meet the statutory requirement that he has seven years of continuous residence in the United States after admission for purposes of lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal; and (2) the BIA properly concluded that Petitioner’s domestic-violence conviction was a particularly serious crime (“PSC”) that barred him from obtaining asylum. The panel rejected Petitioner’s argument that the BIA legally erred in its PSC determination by considering the cumulative effect of his three domestic-violence convictions. View "JOSE HERNANDEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law