Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Singh, a citizen of India, entered the U.S. without inspection. DHS served him with a Notice to Appear that did not provide a date or time for Singh’s removal hearing, instead stating that the date and time were “TBD.” DHS released Singh after he posted a bond. Singh then traveled to Indiana to live with a friend but provided the immigration court with the address of the friend’s other residence because it was the more reliable mailing address. The immigration court sent multiple hearing notices to the address, but his friend did not promptly forward them to Singh. An IJ ordered him removed in absentia.The Ninth Circuit granted Singh’s petition for review. Noncitizens must receive a Notice to Appear in a single document specifying the time and date of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings, otherwise, any in absentia removal order directed at the noncitizen is subject to rescission. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The omission of the time or date of a removal hearing cannot be cured by a subsequent hearing notice; such an interpretation would contravene the unambiguous statutory text and the Supreme Court’s 2021 "Niz-Chavez" decision. The government must provide all statutorily required information in a single Notice to Appear, not only to trigger the stop-time rule but for all removal proceedings that require notice pursuant to section 1229(a). View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Castellanos-Avalos arrived in the United States as a child in 1989. He was placed in removal proceedings in 2005 after being convicted for possession of stolen property and reckless endangerment. He retained then-attorney Mahr. While Castellanos-Avalos’s appeal of his removal order was under consideration, his family hired attorney Rios to pursue a state-bar complaint against Mahr based on Mahr’s failure to request the only relief he was arguably entitled to, voluntary departure. The Ninth Circuit denied Castellanos-Avalos’s appeal of the removal order. Castellanos-Avalos was removed to Mexico in 2008 but returned to the United States.In 2019, he was indicted for being found in the United States after having been ordered removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment by collaterally attacking his removal order. The Ninth Circuit reversed an order granting that motion. In a criminal proceeding under section 1326, an alien may not challenge the validity of a removal order unless the alien demonstrates exhaustion of available administrative remedies; that the removal proceedings improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and that entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. Each of the statutory requirements is mandatory. Castellanos-Avalos did, in fact, seek and receive judicial review. View "United States v. Castellanos-Avalos" on Justia Law

When Jimenez-Sandoval was apprehended upon entry into the United States, an immigration officer interviewed her and prepared a Record of Deportable Alien, indicating that Jimenez-Sandoval was 20 years old. Immigration officers released her on her own recognizance and served her with an Order to Show Cause (OSC) and a Notice of Hearing. Jimenez-Sandoval failed to appear at her hearing; she was ordered deported in absentia. Almost 20 years later, Jimenez-Sandoval filed a motion to reopen, seeking to set aside the order on the basis that the agency did not comply with the notice requirements for minors. Jimenez-Sandoval provided a copy of her birth certificate, which indicated that she was 17 years old when apprehended. The IJ denied her motion. The BIA dismissed her appeal.The Ninth Circuit denied Jimenez-Sandoval’s petition for review. Jimenez-Sandoval was released on her own recognizance presumably based on the immigration officers’ belief that she was not a minor. There was no adult present to assume responsibility for ensuring her appearance at future proceedings, so the requirement of notice to an adult was not triggered. View "Jimenez-Sandoval v. Garland" on Justia Law

Togonon, a citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. He was later convicted of arson (California Penal Code 451(b)). DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on his conviction for "an aggravated felony," “an offense described in” 18 U.S.C. 844(i). The BIA upheld a removal order.The Ninth Circuit vacated. The California statute is not a categorical match to its federal counterpart, under which a defendant acts “maliciously” if he either intentionally damages or destroys property covered by section 844(i) or acts with “willful disregard” of the likelihood that damage or injury would result from his acts; acting with “willful disregard” requires that a defendant be subjectively aware of the risk that his actions will damage or destroy property. California courts have interpreted the term “maliciously” in section 451(b) more broadly. A defendant may be convicted under the California statute for engaging in an intentional act that results in the burning of an inhabited structure or property even if he was not subjectively aware of the risk that his actions would result in that harm. View "Togonon v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order withdrawing the opinion and dissent filed on June 23, 2021, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion denying the petition for review of a decision of the BIA.In the amended opinion, the panel held that, in determining whether a conviction satisfies the thirty-gram limit of the personal-use exception to the ground of removability based on drug convictions, the circumstance-specific approach applies to determining the amount of marijuana involved in the conviction. In this case, the circumstance specific to petitioner clearly established that the amount of marijuana in his possession exceeded thirty grams. View "Bogle v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision agreeing with the IJ that petitioner's convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and that she was not entitled to cancellation of removal. The panel concluded that petitioner's convictions are not CIMTs and therefore she was not removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).In 2010, petitioner was convicted of solicitation to possess for sale less than two pounds of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1002 (solicitation), 13-3405(A)(2) (possession for sale), and (B)(4) (less than two pounds). Shortly thereafter, petitioner was convicted of offering to transport less than two pounds of marijuana for sale, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3405(A)(4) (offer to transport) and (B)(10) (less than two pounds). The panel concluded that Arizona Revised Statutes 13-3405(A)(4), which prohibits certain conduct relating to marijuana, is overbroad and divisible; petitioner's section 13-3505(A) convictions, which involved categories in the statute involving the smallest quantity of marijuana, were not CIMTs; and petitioner was therefore not removable. View "Walcott v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order pretermitting his application for cancellation. The BIA held that petitioner failed to establish that he had not been convicted of offenses with an aggregate sentence of at least 5 years.The panel concluded that the phrase "an offense" in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the multiple criminal convictions described in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) that render an alien inadmissible. The panel rejected petitioner's contention that because the statutory disqualification is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses do not trigger ineligibility. The panel also rejected petitioner's contention that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on the 2013 judgment, a record not clearly related to petitioner. Rather, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that petitioner did not satisfy his burden to show that he had not been convicted of the qualifying offenses. View "Ramirez-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review, concluding that the BIA sufficiently considered the evidence relevant to petitioner's claim of future torture and announced its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted to petitioner's claims. The panel explained that this is all that is required; the agency need not provide a detailed explanation of every argument or piece of evidence in its decision. The panel also concluded that petitioner's due process claim fails for lack of prejudice because substantial evidence supports the BIA's rejection of his Convention Against Torture claim, irrespective of any testimonial inconsistencies. View "Rodriguez-Jimenez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The en banc court held that an individual's inadmissible status renders that individual's reentry illegal for purposes of reinstatement of a prior removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), regardless of the individual's manner of reentry. The en banc court reaffirmed the holdings of two of its prior published opinions, which are in turn consistent with the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) adopted by the two other circuits to have squarely addressed this issue. In this case, petitioner was a noncitizen subject to a previous removal order who illegally reentered the United States, and thus DHS did not err in reinstating his removal order.The en banc court found petitioner's contention, that the reinstatement of the removal order violates due process because it interferes with his right to remain in the United States with his wife, lacking in merit. The en banc court further concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's contention that insufficient evidence supported his original removal order. Accordingly, the en banc court denied in part and dismissed in part the petition for review. View "Tomczyk v. Garland" on Justia Law

The panel's order withdrew the opinion filed on September 16, 2021, on remand from the Supreme Court; replaced it with a superseding opinion; and unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing, and ordered that no further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc would be entertained.The panel granted in part and denied in part the petition for review of a decision of the BIA, and remanded, concluding that, in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine its declarants, the Board erred in relying on a probation report to conclude that petitioner had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The panel also concluded that the Board did not err in denying petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Garland" on Justia Law