Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Rosendo Valdivias-Soto, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States after being previously removed. During his removal proceedings, Valdivias, who only speaks Spanish and has cognitive impairments, was misinformed about his right to counsel due to translation errors. The interpreter repeatedly used the Spanish word for "hire," suggesting that Valdivias could only have an attorney if he could pay for one, which led him to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Additionally, the immigration judge (IJ) incorrectly advised him that he was ineligible for any relief due to his aggravated felony conviction, which affected his waiver of the right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, finding that the removal order was invalid due to due process violations. The court held that Valdivias did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel or his right to appeal because of the translation errors and the IJ's incorrect advice. The court also found that Valdivias was prejudiced by these errors, as he could have plausibly obtained a U-visa and avoided deportation if he had been properly informed and represented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Valdivias's removal proceedings were fundamentally unfair due to the due process violations stemming from the translation errors and the IJ's misstatements. The court also held that Valdivias satisfied the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies because the erroneous advice and translation errors rendered administrative review unavailable. Finally, the court concluded that Valdivias was improperly deprived of the opportunity for judicial review due to the invalid waiver of his right to appeal. Therefore, the dismissal of the indictment was affirmed. View "United States v. Valdivias-Soto" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on nonimmigrant work visas and their children, sought to adjust their status to permanent residents. They challenged policies by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) that determine the eligibility of derivative beneficiaries, claiming these policies violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing them to amend their complaint. Instead of amending, the plaintiffs appealed. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Patel v. Garland, which held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review factual findings in discretionary-relief proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The government argued that this ruling meant the courts also lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over most of the plaintiffs' claims because they were not ripe. The Ninth Circuit concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not strip federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear collateral challenges to generally applicable policies and procedures. However, the claims were not ripe because the plaintiffs had not applied for adjustment of status, and USCIS had not denied their applications based on the challenged policies. For the one plaintiff who did apply and was denied, the court held that her claims must be channeled through a petition for review from a final order of removal, as per §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and (D). The Ninth Circuit's interpretation aligns with other circuits, maintaining that general policy challenges are not precluded by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). View "NAGENDRA NAKKA V. USCIS" on Justia Law

Sandeep Kumar, a native of India and member of the Mann Party, faced threats and physical harm from members of the opposing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). After joining the Mann Party, Kumar was threatened and beaten by BJP members, resulting in a two-day hospital stay. He attempted to report the incidents to the police, but was ignored and threatened by a senior officer. Fearing for his life, Kumar fled to the United States. His family continued to face harassment from BJP members after his departure.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Kumar's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that the threats and physical harm Kumar experienced did not cumulatively constitute persecution. The BIA relied on the precedent set in Sharma v. Garland, which found that threats alone do not amount to persecution unless they cause significant suffering or harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the BIA erred in its reliance on Sharma. The court noted that unlike in Sharma, Kumar experienced specific threats connected to physical harm. The court concluded that the cumulative effect of the threats and physical harm Kumar suffered rose to the level of persecution, especially in the context of India's political and social turmoil. The court remanded the case to the BIA to complete its past-persecution analysis and reconsider Kumar's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The court emphasized that the BIA should consider the credible death threats and physical harm Kumar experienced in tandem. View "KUMAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States as a child and later obtained lawful permanent residency. He was convicted of petty theft and felony assault in California. Following these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. The petitioner sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), citing a fear of future persecution and torture by his father, a member of the Los Zetas cartel, and other cartels in Mexico.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioner removable based on his theft and assault convictions. The IJ denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal, determining that his assault conviction constituted a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for withholding relief. The IJ also concluded that the petitioner had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution or that the Mexican government would be unwilling or unable to protect him. The IJ further denied CAT relief, finding insufficient evidence that the petitioner would more likely than not be tortured upon return to Mexico.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, agreeing that the assault conviction was a particularly serious crime and that the petitioner had not demonstrated eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. The BIA also affirmed the denial of CAT relief, concluding that the petitioner had not shown a likelihood of future torture with the acquiescence of the Mexican government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the assault conviction was a particularly serious crime. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that the petitioner had not demonstrated a likelihood of future torture in Mexico. The court emphasized that the evidence of past abuse in the United States did not compel a conclusion that the petitioner would be tortured in Mexico. View "G. C. V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

John Doe, a detained alien, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Northern District of California, challenging his detention at the Golden State Annex (GSA) in the Eastern District of California. He named several federal officials, including the Attorney General and the Acting Director for the San Francisco ICE Field Office, as respondents. Doe sought release unless he was provided a bond hearing. The district court granted Doe’s petition, leading to his release after a bond hearing.The district court denied the respondents' motion to dismiss, which argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because Doe did not name his immediate custodian and filed the petition outside the district of confinement. The court held that the Northern District of California was an appropriate jurisdiction for petitions filed by aliens detained by the San Francisco ICE Field Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Doe’s habeas petition. The court explained that under Rumsfeld v. Padilla, a core habeas petition challenging present physical confinement must name the immediate custodian, typically the warden, and be filed in the district of confinement. Doe’s petition was a core habeas petition because it sought release from detention. However, Doe failed to name the Facility Administrator of GSA as the respondent and filed the petition in the Northern District of California instead of the Eastern District of California, where he was confined. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to vacate the grant of Doe’s habeas petition. View "DOE V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Peng Shen, a Chinese citizen, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming she was subjected to a forced abortion in China in 2003. Shen testified that a mandatory premarital health exam revealed her pregnancy, leading to the forced abortion. During cross-examination, DHS counsel suggested that the Chinese government had eliminated the premarital health check-up requirement by January 2003, causing Shen to become flustered and change her testimony.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Shen's application, finding her not credible based on her demeanor and inconsistencies in her testimony. The IJ noted Shen's initial confusion about the abortion date, her inconsistent statements about the premarital check-up, and discrepancies in her documentary evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, focusing on Shen's inconsistent testimony about the premarital check-up and the notarial certificate's incorrect date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that DHS counsel had misstated Chinese law regarding the premarital check-up requirement, which was repealed effective October 1, 2003. This misstatement likely affected the IJ's adverse credibility determination. The court concluded that Shen's flustered response to the incorrect information could have been due to the pressure of the situation rather than dishonesty.The Ninth Circuit granted Shen's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the agency to reassess Shen's credibility without the influence of the incorrect legal information provided during cross-examination. The court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances in making credibility determinations. View "SHEN V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves several companies that post immigration surety bonds challenging a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rule. The rule, promulgated by Acting Secretary Chad Wolf in 2020, allowed DHS to refuse business from certain surety firms. The plaintiffs argued that Wolf was not duly appointed and thus lacked the authority to issue the rule. In 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, who was duly appointed, ratified the rule.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that Wolf was not properly serving as Acting Secretary when he promulgated the rule and that Mayorkas's ratification was barred by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). The district court vacated the rule, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the rule was improperly promulgated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FVRA did not bar Mayorkas from ratifying the rule and that the ratification cured any defects in the rule’s promulgation. The court explained that the Ratification Bar in the FVRA applies only to nondelegable functions or duties, which are those required by statute or regulation to be performed by the applicable officer and only that officer. Since the promulgation of the rule was a delegable duty, the ratification by Mayorkas was valid.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding was that the ratification by a duly appointed Secretary cured any defects in the rule’s initial promulgation by an improperly appointed Acting Secretary. View "GONZALES & GONZALES BONDS & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Sergio Manrique Gutierrez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of carjacking under California law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that Gutierrez was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence and for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.The BIA held that Gutierrez's conviction for carjacking under California law is a categorical crime of violence. The BIA did not address the second ground for removal, concluding that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. Gutierrez separately petitioned for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that California carjacking under Cal. Penal Code § 215(a) is not a categorical crime of violence. The court also concluded that the BIA erroneously determined that Gutierrez waived his challenge to the moral turpitude removal charge. The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, in the first instance, whether Gutierrez is removable for having been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude. The court dismissed Gutierrez’s petition for review of the IJ’s sua sponte reopening of his case to consider a change in the law. The court denied Gutierrez’s petition as to his remaining claims concerning the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, the discretionary denial of his application for waiver of admissibility, the denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case to consider new evidence that he was incompetent and to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "GUTIERREZ v. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves Gilberto Azael Leon Perez, a Mexican national and legal permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, in violation of Nevada law. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged Perez as removable based on his conviction, which they argued constituted an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). An immigration judge agreed, finding that the conviction was for an attempted aggravated felony that rendered Perez removable from the United States. Perez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, thus affirming the immigration judge's removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was tasked with reviewing the case. The court had to decide whether their precedent, which sets out the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor, was clearly irreconcilable with a Supreme Court decision, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions. The court held that it was not. The court also held that the BIA did not err in concluding that Perez’s conviction categorically constituted an attempted “sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated felony that renders him removable. Therefore, the court denied Perez's petition for review. View "PEREZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law