Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Sharma entered the U.S. in 1997, on a nonimmigrant visitor visa. In 2011, he was charged as removable. Sharma sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, alleging that he had been threatened by the Senior Superintendent of the Ludhiana, Punjab Police, Saini, based on Sharma’s investigation of the disappearance of Sharma's client. In 1997, days after a protest against Saini, police came to Sharma’s office, took Sharma’s files, tied Sharma’s hands, blindfolded him, put him in a van, and made threats, By phone, Saini told Sharma to “worry about [his] family,” and if he continued to investigate the disappearance. Sharma’s captivity lasted 18-19 hours. He does not identify any resulting physical injuries.After he left India, the police “initially harassed” Sharma’s wife. As of Sharma’s hearing, Saini worked as Chairman of the Punjab Police Housing Corporation. Sharma’s daughters live in Australia, Sharma’s wife splits her time between India, Australia, and the U.S.. Sharma’s son lives in India. None of Sharma’s family members has ever been physically harmed. The IJ found Sharma’s application timely, given changed circumstances, and his testimony “generally” credible but concluded that Sharma’s past harm did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ denied voluntary departure based on Sharma’s 2011 DUI conviction. The BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. Sharma failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, given the family’s “travel history.” View "Sharma v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sura served in the Salvadoran Army and helped local police arrest gang members, including members of MS-13. In February 2016, MS-13 members told him that they had an order for him to disappear. He did not report it to the police because he was concerned that some police officers were also MS-13 members. Sura continued his military service until it was completed, later testifying that he did not want to be AWOL. In May 2016, four men were murdered five kilometers from where Sura was stationed. According to an Interpol Red Notice, an arrest warrant was issued for Sura and others asserting that they murdered four MS-13 gang members.Sura entered the U.S. months later and was removed after stating that he had no fear of returning to El Salvador. Eight days later, he re-entered and was placed in withholding-only proceedings after expressing a fear of returning to El Salvador. Sura applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Sura denied any prior knowledge of either arrest warrant and any role in the murders. Sura testified that he feared returning to El Salvador and being placed in custody based on false charges, where he would be vulnerable to MS-13 and his former colleagues who framed him.The IJ ordered Villalobos Sura removed, finding him statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical crime bar. The IJ found Sura’s testimony insufficiently credible and that the isolated threat did not amount to past persecution. The BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Interpol Red Notice, among other evidence, created a serious reason to believe Sura committed a serious nonpolitical crime before entering the U.S., rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal. View "Villalobos-Sura v. Garland" on Justia Law

Flores-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1989 when he was two years old. Arrested by DHS in 2010, he stated that he was a citizen and had a U.S. birth certificate. He later sought adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen and claimed he never knowingly made a false claim, having been raised to believe he was a citizen. At a 2012 hearing, the IJ stated that, if DHS pursued a false claim of citizenship charge, and that charge was sustained, Flores-Rodriguez would not be eligible for adjustment. At a 2014 hearing, the IJ recommended that Flores-Rodriguez testify on that issue. Flores-Rodriguez did so; Flores-Rodriguez’s wife and brother also testified. The IJ and BIA concluded that Flores-Rodriguez was ineligible for adjustment.The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review. Flores-Rodriguez was not put on notice that his alleged false claim of citizenship would be at issue in his 2014 hearing. By then, his alleged false claim of citizenship had not been raised by the IJ for two years; the last time it had been discussed the IJ implied it would only be dispositive if DHS sustained a charge against him, but no charge was ever brought. Because Flores-Rodriguez was not given notice, his attorney was not prepared to discuss it; he was unable to submit testimony from his purported midwife, a copy of his U.S. birth certificate, or his parents’ testimony. View "Flores-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Guerrier, a citizen of Haiti, does not speak English. Guerrier entered the U.S. unlawfully. He was apprehended and issued an expedited removal order. He was referred to an asylum officer for a credible fear interview, during which he agreed to proceed without an attorney. After the interview, he asked for a list of lawyers. The asylum officer found that Guerrier failed to establish a credible fear of persecution. Guerrier requested review by an immigration judge (IJ). Guerrier appeared without counsel, stating that he had not received a list of lawyers. The IJ stated that he was not entitled to representation and that he had already received the list of attorneys as an attachment to the paperwork for the review. Guerrier responded, “Maybe I did not see it. I don’t know if it’s the fact that I don’t speak English that I don’t understand it ... I don’t understand what’s going on.” The IJ responded, “that’s not something that I can control,” and proceeded with the hearing, ultimately agreeing with the negative credible fear decision. He entered an order for expedited removal.Guerrier acknowledged that courts typically lack jurisdiction to review direct challenges to expedited removal orders but argued that he raised a colorable constitutional claim. The Ninth Circuit dismissed his petition for review. The Supreme Court’s 2020 “Thuraissigiam” holding abrogated any “colorable constitutional claim” exception to the jurisdictional limits on reviewing challenges to expedited removal orders, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). View "Guerrier v. Garland" on Justia Law

Matias, a native of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2014. El Salvadoran authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent gang. In Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree after being involved in a shooting that authorities determined was retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and identified Matias as an MS-13 “affiliate.” ICE detained Matias in 2018. Matias requested to be housed with a gang aligned with MS-13. An IJ denied him bond and later denied Matias relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review in 2021.Matias moved the BIA to reopen his case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding his request for CAT relief: claimed political changes in El Salvador and an alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a “snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El Salvador. The BIA denied his request for an emergency stay. Matias filed a habeas petition, asking the court to enjoin the government from removing him until the BIA ruled on his motion to reopen. The district court denied his motion. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, which denied Matias’s motion for a temporary restraining order, determining that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)’s jurisdictional limits barred his claims. View "Rauda v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Sanchez-Ruano, a citizen of Mexico, was admitted into the U.S. in 1995 as a visitor. He overstayed and has amassed criminal convictions including for possessing marijuana, receiving stolen property, DUI, and being the driver in two hit-and-runs. In 2013, he was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the country longer than permitted. He requested a continuance pending the status of his U Nonimmigrant Status application. After numerous continuances, his U-visa application was denied. The IJ found Sanchez-Ruano statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his conviction for marijuana possession, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2). Sanchez-Ruano argued that, given his previous admittance, section 1182(a)(2) did not apply to him for the purposes of cancellation of removal and that the personal use exception for violations involving 30 grams or less of marijuana under section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) rendered him eligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed his appeal without analyzing his argument.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. Aliens who have been admitted and commit certain crimes are deportable under section 1227(a); section 1229b(b)(1)(C) bars cancellation of removal if an alien has been convicted of “an offense under” sections 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3). Given Sanchez-Ruano’s conviction of an offense described under 1182(a)(2), the BIA correctly determined that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation. View "Sanchez-Ruano v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the denial of petitioner's application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The panel agreed with the agency's determination that petitioner did not establish eligibility for withholding of removal on account of his political opinion. Although petitioner did not present his social group claim to the agency, the panel concluded that it may consider it now because presenting it to the agency would have been futile. The panel also concluded that the agency failed to consider certain evidence in the record showing that it is more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured if removed to El Salvador. In this case, the exhaustion requirement contains an exception for cases in which exhaustion would be futile, the futility exception is satisfied here, and the agency's treatment of claims of persecution based on imputed gang membership is legally flawed. The panel remanded for the BIA to consider in the first instance petitioner's social group claim based on his perceived gang membership, and to reconsider petitioner's CAT claim. View "Vasquez-Rodriguez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) for making a false representation of U.S. citizenship for a purpose or benefit under Nevada law. The panel held that, because petitioner was not an applicant for admission, the BIA impermissibly applied the clearly and beyond doubt burden of proof in finding him inadmissible and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status. The panel remanded for the BIA to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. View "Romero v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner is removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because his two prior convictions for violating Hawaii’s fourth degree theft statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-833(1), constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 708-833(1), a petty misdemeanor involving property valued at less than $250, is overbroad with respect to the BIA's definition of a CIMT. The panel explained that Hawaii's definition of "theft" does not always require the government to prove the defendant acted with an intent to permanently deprive or substantially erode the owner’s property rights. Furthermore, section 708-833(1) is indivisible because it proscribes one crime that can be committed eight different ways, not eight distinct crimes. Accordingly, the BIA erred in concluding that petitioner's section 708-833(1) convictions were CIMTs rendering him removable. View "Maie v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint challenging USCIS's denial of her application for naturalization because the complaint did not plausibly plead that plaintiff had not been convicted of an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which "the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000," 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), and therefore had the requisite good moral character.The panel concluded that under the "circumstance-specific" approach to the monetary threshold in section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), the district court is not limited to reviewing the record in the applicant's criminal case in determining the "loss to the victim." Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the complaint here cannot survive a motion to dismiss, because it does not plausibly allege that the loss to the victim of the applicant's criminal offense did not exceed $10,000. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim that the total loss to the victim of her violation of section 550(b)(3) of California Penal Code did not exceed $10,000 and thus she failed to plausibly allege that she was not convicted of an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and USCIS did not err in ruling that she failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Estella Orellana v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law