Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Discover Bank seeks to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims that Discover Bank unlawfully discriminated against her based on citizenship and immigration status when it denied her application for a consolidation loan for her student loan. Discover Bank argues that two arbitration agreements—one Plaintiff made in connection with the student loan and one she made in connection with the application for the consolidation loan—require arbitration here. The district court declined to compel arbitration, finding that neither agreement required arbitration.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order declining to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate. The panel held that Discover Bank was judicially estopped from arguing that Perez did not opt out of the Discover Bank agreement. The panel determined that Discover Bank’s past position clearly contradicted its current position that the opt-out would only apply to Plaintiff’s future discrimination claims, Discover Bank persuaded the court to accept its previous position, and Discover Bank would derive an unfair advantage absent estoppel. Citing Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC, 977 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2020), the panel further held that Perez and Discover Bank never formed an agreement to arbitrate her discrimination claims involving her application for a consolidation loan via the Citibank agreement. View "ILIANA PEREZ, ET AL V. DISCOVER BANK" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration, in a case in which the panel held that: (1) where the adjudication of a non-citizen’s visa application implicates a citizen’s constitutional rights, due process requires that the government provide timely and adequate notice to the citizen of a decision that will deprive the citizen of that interest; and (2) because the government failed to provide timely notice here, it was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. View "SANDRA MUNOZ, ET AL V. DOS, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration in a case in which the panel held that: (1) subject only to a very limited form of habeas corpus review that is inapplicable in this case, Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “clearly and unambiguously” precludes judicial review of expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders; and (2) as applied in this case—which involved an arriving alien with no previous ties to the United States—that denial of all judicial review was constitutional. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to 13 drug-related charges, including possession of cocaine for sale under California Health and Safety Code Section 11351. In removal proceedings, the agency found Petitioner removable for having committed a drug-trafficking aggravated felony and for having committed a controlled-substance offense. Applying the presumption established in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002)—that drug-trafficking offenses are, particularly serious crimes—the agency concluded that Petitioner’s Section 11351 conviction was a particularly serious crime that barred withholding. The agency also denied CAT relief.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel explained that in Matter of Y-L-, the Attorney General instructed that aggravated felonies involving illicit drug trafficking are presumptively, particularly serious crimes and that this presumption may be overcome only in the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling. The panel noted that the BIA’s particularly-serious-crime analysis here was cursory but concluded that the BIA applied Matter of Y-L- ’s presumption and that the BIA’s decision was supported by adequate reasoning. Observing that neither the IJ nor the BIA recited the Matter of Y-L- criteria, the panel explained that they are not required to do so.   The panel further concluded that, even if it had found that the BIA erred by considering facts not expressly incorporated into Matter of Y-L-’s minimum standard, it would still deny Petitioner’s petition because it was a legal certainty that Petitioner could not satisfy Matter of Y-L-’s minimum criteria. Thus, the panel concluded that this was one of those narrow circumstances where remand was unwarranted. View "KWANG PARK V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the denial of his application to adjust his immigration status to lawful permanent resident while in removal proceedings. During two prior arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol, Petitioner falsely presented himself as a U.S. citizen. Based on these incidents, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found that Petitioner was barred from adjusting status under 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), which renders inadmissible “any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal or State law.”   The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s misrepresentations about his citizenship to police officers for the purpose of avoiding removal proceedings did not render him inadmissible. The panel explained that the key question was what it means for a purpose or benefit to be “under” federal or state law. The BIA concluded that this means that a false claim must be made to achieve a purpose or obtain a benefit that is “governed by” federal or state law. The panel concluded that the BIA’s interpretation was untenable, agreeing with the Third Circuit that its construction was unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the statute. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s misrepresentations about his citizenship to police officers did not trigger Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). View "EFRAIN RAMIREZ MUNOZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging that he had entered the United States without inspection at a time and place unknown to the government. Petitioner conceded that he was removable but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b) and adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. Section 1255. Petitioner petitioned for review of a final order of removal of the Board of Immigration Appeals. After Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status, the Board upheld an immigration judge’s denial of those applications and a request for a continuance, and it denied a motion to remand. Petitioner challenged the denial of the continuance and the motion to remand.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition. The panel concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the claim because—with an exception not at issue here— Congress forbade judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” the provisions governing cancellation and adjustment. The panel noted that, under Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006), a court may review the denial of a motion to reopen proceedings for cancellation in certain circumstances, including if the new evidence submitted addresses a hardship ground so distinct from that considered previously as to make the motion a request for new relief. The panel concluded that it need not decide whether that holding survives Patel, explaining that, even on its own terms, Fernandez does not help Petitioner because he did not present a request for new relief within the meaning of Fernandez. View "JESUS FIGUEROA OCHOA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of attempting to elude police in violation of RCW Section 46.61.024 in 2016 and 2018. An Immigration Judge and the BIA concluded that RCW Section 46.61.024 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and found Petitioner removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA relied on Matter of RuizLopez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 2011).    The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel concluded that the BIA failed to address substantive changes the Washington Legislature made to the statute and subsequent Washington case law interpreting the revised statute and remanded. Applying the categorical approach, the panel identified the elements of statute of conviction. As relevant here, the version of the statute at issue in Matter of Ruiz-Lopez required driving with “wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others.” However, in 2003, the Washington Legislature altered that element: the current version requires proof that the vehicle was driven “in a reckless manner.” The panel explained that although the term “reckless manner” is not defined by statute, the Washington Supreme Court has held that operating a motor vehicle in a “reckless manner” means operating it in “a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” The panel explained that, in some circumstances, “reckless” may be the equivalent of “willful or wanton,” but under current Washington law, “reckless manner” is not the equivalent of “recklessness,” and “reckless manner” is the required mens rea in Petitioner’s statute of conviction. View "ZHOVTONIZHKO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removed from the United States after the IJ ruled that Petitioner’s application for relief from removal was untimely. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed with the IJ and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned for review, arguing that the rejection of his relief application violated his due process rights.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the IJ’s rejection of the opportunity to file a relief application on December 18 deprived Petitioner of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were fundamentally unfair because (1) the purported deadline to submit a relief application was ambiguous; (2) Petitioner’s counsel offered to submit the application on the day of the apparent deadline while the IJ was still on the bench, making any delay in the proceeding practically nonexistent; and (3) the IJ’s denial of a continuance so that Petitioner’s recently-retained counsel could submit the application was an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the IJ’s rejection of Petitioner’s application clearly affected the outcome of the proceedings and thus caused him prejudice because the merits of his application were never considered by the agency at all. View "ARIZMENDI-MEDINA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was born in 1967 in Western Samoa to a Western Samoan father and an American Samoan mother. His mother is now a non-citizen national, but she only became eligible under the 1986 amendments and did not attain her status until after Petitioner was born. Petitioner sought a declaration that his mother’s status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. The district court held that Petitioner’s mother’s status as a national commenced only on the date it was conferred and was not retroactive to her date of birth. The court, therefore, found Petitioner did not qualify to be a non-citizen national.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the Government’s motion to dismiss. The panel explained that Congress has extended citizenship to individuals born in every United States territory except American Samoa, meaning that those with ties to American Samoa are the only group eligible for noncitizen national status. The status of an American Samoan is a hybrid. The panel concluded that the text of the 1986 amendments makes clear that Congress intended for the addition to apply retroactively and to bestow the same status on those born before, on, or after the date of enactment: “national, but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” The panel concluded that Petitioner’s mother’s non-citizen national status extends back to her birth and, as a result, that Petitioner qualifies for non-citizen national status too. View "ILAI KOONWAIYOU V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner testified that she was afraid to return to Guatemala because a woman had attempted to rob her after she withdrew money from a bank. The woman told Petitioner that she targeted her because Petitioner had family in the United States and a lot of money. The woman also threatened that Petitioner’s son would “pay for it” due to Petitioner’s refusal to give her the money. Petitioner and her son asserted that she had suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion of refusing to submit to violence by criminal groups or gangs and their claimed membership in three particular social groups: “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector,” “Guatemalan women,” and “immediate family members of Petitioner.”   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner and her son’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of their appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of asylum and related relief. The panel held that Petitioner failed to show that the agency erred in concluding that her proposed social group comprised of “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector” was not cognizable. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner had not expressed a political opinion. The panel explained that Petitioner’s refusal to give money to the threatening robber was not evidence of a “conscious and deliberate” decision that would naturally result in attributing a political position to her and that she instead simply reacted to being robbed. View "DORIS RODRIGUEZ-ZUNIGA, ET AL V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law