Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for habeas relief after being held in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. A district court judge granted Petitioner’s petition for relief and ordered the Government to provide her with a bond hearing on statutory grounds, relying on Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government appealed on the ground that Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s remaining constitutional argument. The court explained that t Jennings’s reasoning is “clearly irreconcilable” with Casas-Castrillon’s detention-shifting framework and held that Jennings abrogated this portion of Casas-Castrillon. Next, the panel explained that Subsection A provides the Government with authority to detain noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and that Jennings provides that Subsection C authorizes detention during the same period as Subsection A, but does not define that period. The panel looked to Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008), and held that detention authority under Subsection A continues through judicial review. The panel held that the authority under Subsection C likewise continues through judicial review. Finally, the district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question in the first instance. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that a particular noncitizen in immigration detention poses a danger to the community, and so is not entitled to release on bond. Judge Berzon, joined by Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Paez, Christen, Hurwitz, Koh, Sung, Mendoza, and Desai, disagreed with the Court’s refusal to reconsider the panel opinion en banc. View "JAVIER MARTINEZ V. LOWELL CLARK, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also challenged the BIA’s determination that defects in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not require termination of his proceedings and that the BIA lacked authority to administratively close his case.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order withdrawing the opinion filed March 17, 2023, and reported at 62 F.4th 1223 (9th Cir. 2023), replacing that opinion with a concurrently filed amended opinion and, with these amendments, denying the government’s motion to amend; and 2) an amended opinion denying in part and granting in part Petitioner’s petition for review. In the amended opinion, the panel: (1) denied the petition as to Petitioner’s unexhausted argument that the omission of required time and place information in his NTA amounted to a claim-processing error; (2) remanded Petitioner’s administrative closure claim for further consideration in light of intervening precedent; and (3) remanded Petitioner’s asylum and withholding claims because the BIA erroneously reviewed the immigration judge’s nexus determination for clear error, rather than de novo. The panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite government involvement or government acquiescence to any torture. View "JOSUE UMANA-ESCOBAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States following prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Section 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and is, therefore, facially invalid.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court wrote that Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that Section 1326 was enacted with the intent to be discriminatory towards Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. The court held that the district court erred factually and legally in holding otherwise. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s equal protection challenge fails even under the usual test for assessing such claims set forth in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the panel declined to address whether immigration laws should be evaluated through a more deferential framework. As drafted, Section 1326 is facially neutral as to race. The panel, therefore, turned to the question of whether Defendant carried his burden of showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting Section 1326. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s argument that a Senate Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is replete with racism. The panel held that the district court clearly erred when it relied on Congress’s decision to override President Truman’s veto of the INA as evidence that Section 1326 was enacted in part by discriminatory animus. View "USA V. GUSTAVO CARRILLO-LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in excluding periods of delay resulting from ends-of-justice continuances granted due to events caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that the district court complied with the applicable statutory requirements. First, the district court’s finding that the ends of justice were best served by granting continuances during the period from August 14, 2020, until December 1, 2020, was timely because the district court put this finding on the record during the July 12, 2021, hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. Section 3162(a)(2). The continuances were also specifically limited in time to successive 30-day periods. Next, the district court made the requisite findings under Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court erred by not dismissing his information on the ground that 8 U.S.C. Section 1326 violates the Equal Protection Clause. View "USA V. ARMANDO OROZCO-BARRON" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered the United States in 1981 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. He has been married to his U.S. citizen wife, with whom he has two U.S. citizen children, since 1993. After being convicted of possession of a controlled substance for sale under California law, he was ordered removed in absentia and deported in 1999. He re-entered the United States without authorization shortly thereafter. In 2008, during a school festival, Plaintiff tackled an active shooter, knocked his gun away and helped restrain the shooter till law enforcement arrived. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security apprehended Plaintiff and reinstated his 1996 removal order. To avoid removal, Plaintiff applied for a U-visa and a waiver of inadmissibility. USCIS denied Plaintiff’s request for a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion and subsequently denied his U-visa application on account of his inadmissibility.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of USCIS’s denial of a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) because the latter statute commits the decision to the agency’s sole discretion. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his claim. The panel concluded that by all accounts, Plaintiff demonstrated remarkable courage by intervening to stop an active shooter,  and his efforts to care for his wife were equally worthy of praise. But however compelling his objections to USCIS’s denial of a waiver of inadmissibility may be, judicial review of that decision was barred by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). View "JAIRO VEGA V. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP SERV, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his second motion to reopen removal proceedings. Petitioner’s more pressing concern is to avoid a decision on the merits of this petition for review until he has successfully obtained relief from removal. To do so, he joins the government’s request to transfer this matter to mediation.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s and denied the parties’ joint request to send this case to mediation in order to put the appeal into abeyance while Petitioner pursued other forms of relief from removal. The panel found that the parties had not disguised the fact that the objective of transferring the matter to mediation was to delay Petitioner’s removal from the country until the government had agreed to provide discretionary relief. The panel wrote that it was an abuse of the court’s mediation process to use it for a purpose unrelated to resolving disputes and as a substitute for the issuance of a stay. The panel additionally noted that the government had numerous means to avoid enforcement against Petitioner, including specific procedural tools to hold Petitioner's case in abeyance, such as remanding the matter to the BIA, moving to reopen proceedings with the BIA or to dismiss the proceedings, requesting a continuance from the BIA, or simply deciding not to execute Petitioner’s final order of removal—decisions which are the prerogative of the Executive Branch, not the judiciary. Thus, the panel denied the motion to refer to mediation. View "NSHAN AYANIAN V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted under Wash. Rev. Code Section 9A.56.190 and served a fifteen-month prison sentence. The BIA concluded that he was removable for having committed an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G), which describes “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.”   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision that he was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(43)(G). A plurality of the court concluded that it was necessary to consider Washington's accomplice liability in conducting the categorical analysis of Washington robbery. The plurality explained that, in Valdivia-Flores, the court relied on Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), in which the Supreme Court concluded that generic theft encompasses aiding and abetting. Because Petitioner’s conviction did not establish that he acted as a principal, the plurality concluded that it must consider the possibility he acted as an accomplice. Having held that second-degree robbery under Wash. Rev. Code Section  9A.56.190 is a categorical match with generic theft, the en banc court concluded that Petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony and denied his petition for review. View "MCKENZY ALFRED V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was born in the former Soviet Union in what is now Armenia. He entered the United States with his family in 1992 at age seven, becoming a lawful permanent resident in 1994. Petitioner and several others were charged in a 20-count indictment in district court and the Department of Homeland Security sought Petitioner’s removal. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Petitioner’s conspiracy conviction rendered him removable and that he was not entitled to relief from removal. The IJ thus ordered that Petitioner be removed to Armenia. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel held that: (1) in evaluating whether the government has satisfied the “exceed[ing] $10,000” requirement, the relevant loss amount for a conspiracy conviction is the loss associated with the conspiracy; and (2) the agreed-upon sentencing enhancement in Petitioner’s plea agreement was sufficient to prove that his offense of conviction involved more than $10,000 in losses. The panel held that under Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), the loss tied to a conspiracy conviction is the loss associated with the scheme that forms the basis for the conviction. The panel explained that when an alien has been convicted of a conspiracy to commit a qualifying crime of “fraud or deceit,” the government need not ascribe to the alien coconspirator some individual portion of the overall conspiracy-related loss to demonstrate that the loss threshold has been satisfied. The panel also concluded that the government had met its burden of proving that the conspiracy to which Petitioner pleaded guilty involved more than $10,000 in losses. View "ARMAN KHALULYAN V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also challenged the BIA’s determinations that defects in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not require termination of his proceedings and that the BIA lacked authority to administratively close his case.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed the defective NTA claim for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petition as to the CAT claim. The panel granted the petition and remanded as to the administrative closure issue, given the government’s recommendation that the panel does so based on an intervening decision by the Attorney General. The panel granted the petition and remanded as to the asylum and withholding of removal claims because the BIA applied the wrong standard in reviewing the IJ’s determination that the evidence failed to establish the requisite nexus between a protected ground and past or future harm. The panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite government involvement or government acquiescence to any torture View "JOSUE UMANA-ESCOBAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law