Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
by
Miguel Angel Moctezuma-Reyes, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally in 2005 and has since lived in Michigan with his wife, three of his four children, and his niece. His two youngest sons are American citizens, while his wife and daughter lack legal status. Moctezuma-Reyes works in a fence factory, and his daughter is a medical assistant. Together, they support the family financially. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him in 2018.An Immigration Judge denied Moctezuma-Reyes's application for cancellation of removal, concluding that he did not meet the statutory requirement of demonstrating "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his qualifying relatives. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the hardship his family would face did not meet the necessary threshold.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requires hardship that is significantly different from or greater than that typically associated with deportation. The court found that the financial and emotional hardships cited by Moctezuma-Reyes, while severe, were not uncommon in deportation cases. The court also noted that his daughter’s employment mitigated some financial hardship and that his sons did not have special needs that would make their situation exceptional. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland" on Justia Law

by
Broadgate, Inc. employed an H-1B visa holder who filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division in February 2018, alleging that Broadgate had not paid him the full wages required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Division’s investigation substantiated the claim and found additional violations, including failure to post required workplace notices. Consequently, the Division issued a determination letter in December 2018, finding Broadgate had willfully violated the Act, barring it from the H-1B program for two years, requiring payment of back wages, and assessing a civil penalty.Broadgate sought review before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), challenging only the determination regarding the workplace notices. The ALJ agreed with Broadgate, vacating the determination. However, the Department’s Administrative Review Board reversed this decision. On remand, Broadgate argued that the Division exceeded its authority by investigating violations not alleged in the original complaint. The ALJ rejected this argument, and the Review Board and the district court affirmed the Director’s imposition of fines and penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Broadgate argued that the District Director lacked authority to issue the determination letter and that the Wage and Hour Division exceeded its authority by investigating the notice violations. The court held that the presumption of regularity applied, meaning the Director’s issuance of the letter was presumptive proof of her authority. The court also found that the Division was entitled to investigate the notice violations discovered during the investigation of the wage complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Broadgate’s arguments. View "Broadgate, Inc v. Su" on Justia Law

by
Safiya Tayo Tukur Seldon, a native of Nigeria, entered the United States in 1992 using her sister’s passport and a tourist visa. In 1997, she married a U.S. citizen and obtained conditional permanent resident status. However, in 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) concluded that her marriage was a sham and terminated her conditional status, ordering her removal. Seldon did not appear at her initial removal hearing in 2002, leading to an in-absentia removal order. In 2011, she successfully moved to reopen her case, claiming she never received notice of the hearing.An immigration judge (IJ) in Detroit later sustained the charges against her, including marriage fraud, and ordered her removal to Nigeria. Seldon appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the IJ failed to inform her of her rights to apply for a waiver of removal and to seek asylum. The BIA dismissed her appeal, finding that she was not eligible for a waiver of removal and that the IJ had fulfilled his duty to inform her of her right to apply for asylum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Seldon was not "apparently eligible" for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) because her failure to attend the interview was independent of her fraudulent actions. The court also found that the IJ did not err in failing to advise her of her right to apply for asylum, as her counsel had confirmed that she did not express fear of returning to Nigeria and would not be filing other applications for relief. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit denied Seldon's petition for review. View "Seldon v. Garland" on Justia Law

by
Adrian Galvez-Bravo, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1994 and has lived in the Memphis area since then, except for a brief return to Mexico to marry his wife. He has three children, two of whom are U.S. citizens. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging he was a noncitizen present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Galvez-Bravo conceded the charge and sought cancellation of removal under § 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children.An Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed with Galvez-Bravo's assessment of hardship, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, ordering his removal to Mexico. Galvez-Bravo then filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings, citing new evidence, including his daughter's recent dyslexia diagnosis and the potential impact on his children's education and well-being if he were removed. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the new evidence did not meet the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the legal challenges presented by Galvez-Bravo, noting that his arguments focused on whether the BIA engaged in reasoned decision-making. The court found that the BIA had articulated a rational explanation for its decision, considering the new evidence but determining that the hardship did not exceed what would normally be expected upon the removal of a close family member. The court also rejected Galvez-Bravo's argument that the BIA's decision was inconsistent with its prior decisions, noting that the unpublished decisions he cited did not establish a pattern of conflicting outcomes.The Sixth Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Galvez-Bravo's motion to reopen and denied his petition for review. View "Galvez-Bravo v. Garland" on Justia Law

by
Two sisters from Guatemala fled to the United States in 2015 after gang members threatened to maim and kill them. They entered the U.S. without inspection and were placed in removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The sisters applied for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming they were targeted due to their membership in two particular social groups (PSGs): "Guatemalan female children without parental protection" and "the Rodas family."An immigration judge (IJ) denied their applications, finding that the harm they suffered did not rise to the level of persecution, that their proposed PSGs were not cognizable, and that there was no nexus between the harm and their family membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, assuming without deciding that the harm constituted persecution but agreeing that the gang members were motivated by financial gain rather than animus toward the family.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Petitioners' arguments regarding due process and the "Guatemalan female children without parental protection" PSG were unreviewable because they were not raised before the BIA. However, the court held that the BIA's no-nexus determination regarding the "Rodas family" PSG was inconsistent with precedents. The court emphasized that persecutors can have mixed motives, and the BIA failed to consider whether the gang members' financial motives were intertwined with the Petitioners' family membership.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review in part, dismissed it in part, vacated the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court instructed the BIA to reconsider the nexus between the harm and the Petitioners' family membership and to address whether the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control the persecutors. View "Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland" on Justia Law

by
The petitioner, Nayanaben Patel, entered the United States in March 2000 under unclear circumstances. She applied for adjustment of status based on her husband's legal status but lied about her manner of entry. She later admitted to lying but provided conflicting testimonies. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application for adjustment of status and ordered her removal to India, citing factual inconsistencies. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The IJ's decision was discretionary and protected by statute from judicial review. The petitioner did not raise any colorable constitutional claims that would allow for judicial review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the IJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's multiple contradictory statements and lack of credible evidence regarding her manner of entry.The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under sections 1182(i) and 1255. The court also found that the petitioner did not exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial bias, and that her judicial bias claim was not a constitutional issue but rather a factual dispute.The court denied the petition for review, emphasizing that the IJ's decision was within his discretion and supported by the evidence. The court also noted a significant error in the IJ's understanding of the difference between a visa and an I-94 form but concluded that this error did not affect the overall decision. View "Patel v. Garland" on Justia Law

by
Marta Lidia Tista-Ruiz De Ajualip, a native of Guatemala, applied for asylum and withholding of removal for herself, her three children, and her grandson after entering the U.S. in 2016. They fled Guatemala due to threats from Marta’s son-in-law, Marvin, who had a history of domestic violence and gang affiliations. Despite credible testimony about the abuse and threats, an immigration judge (IJ) denied their asylum and withholding claims, citing outdated precedent that did not recognize domestic violence victims as a protected group under U.S. asylum laws.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2016. In 2019, the IJ denied Marta’s claims, relying on Matter of A-B-, which stated that domestic violence victims generally do not qualify for asylum. The IJ also applied the wrong legal standard for withholding of removal. In 2023, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed the IJ’s decision, despite acknowledging a significant change in precedent that overruled Matter of A-B-. The Board did not remand the case for further review and summarily affirmed the denial of withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Board’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal was inconsistent with current precedent and immigration authority. The court held that the Board failed to consider the record as a whole and did not properly evaluate the evidence regarding the particular social group (PSG) and the Guatemalan government’s inability to protect Marta’s family. The court granted Marta’s petition for review, vacated the Board’s denial, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the updated legal standards. View "Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland" on Justia Law

by
Mirvat Elgebaly, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a conditional permanent resident after marrying American citizen Saladin Muhammad. They later filed a joint petition to remove the conditions on her status, but Muhammad withdrew it, leading to the termination of her conditional status and initiation of removal proceedings. Elgebaly applied for two hardship waivers, claiming she entered the marriage in good faith and suffered extreme cruelty. The immigration judge (IJ) denied both waivers, finding her testimony not credible and insufficiently corroborated, and ordered her removal.Elgebaly appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed her appeal, affirming the IJ's decision and finding no clear error in the credibility assessment or the conclusion that she did not enter the marriage in good faith. The BIA also found that the IJ conducted the hearing fairly. Elgebaly then filed a motion to reopen proceedings, presenting new evidence, which the BIA denied, stating that the evidence was either not new or not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Elgebaly’s petitions for review. The court held that the IJ’s credibility determination was sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful judicial review and that substantial evidence supported the finding that Elgebaly did not marry in good faith. The court also found that the IJ adequately assisted Elgebaly in developing the record during her pro se proceedings. Additionally, the court upheld the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, agreeing that the new evidence was either previously available or immaterial. Finally, the court rejected Elgebaly’s constitutional challenge to the structure of immigration proceedings, referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, which clarified that immigration adjudications concern public rights and do not require a jury trial. View "Elgebaly v. Garland" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Mike Govender Hatchet, a Sierra Leone citizen who sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident in the United States. Hatchet applied for discretionary relief multiple times, but the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied each application, citing facts that rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. Hatchet challenged the agency's actions in federal district court, arguing that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The district court dismissed Hatchet's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet's claims were not subject to judicial review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and because Hatchet's arguments were entirely fact-bound, the court agreed that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel, which held that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review both discretionary and non-discretionary judgments related to the granting of relief, including factual findings. View "Hatchet v. Andrade" on Justia Law

by
Thabet Mahdi Saleh, an Iraqi refugee, was granted asylum in the United States in 2010. However, after being convicted of crimes under Michigan law, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Saleh sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing torture if he returned to Iraq due to his work with the U.S. Army and his mixed marriage. The immigration judge denied all forms of relief and ordered Saleh's removal. Saleh did not appeal this decision.In 2018, Saleh moved to reopen his proceedings, seeking deferral of removal under the CAT. He alleged changed country conditions and an increased risk of torture due to his past experiences and criminal convictions in the U.S. The immigration judge granted the motion to reopen but later denied Saleh’s application for relief. Saleh appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which assumed Saleh’s credibility but found no error in the other decisions, thus denying Saleh’s petition.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Saleh challenged the BIA's decision, arguing that the immigration judge erred by treating a key witness as a fact witness rather than an expert. However, the court found that Saleh's counsel had agreed to this treatment of the witness, and Saleh had not shown that the agency erred by treating the witness as a fact witness only. The court also found that the BIA had properly analyzed Saleh’s probability of torture in the aggregate, considering all the factors together. Therefore, the court denied Saleh's petition for review. View "Mahdi Saleh v. Garland" on Justia Law