Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, Nayanaben Patel, entered the United States in March 2000 under unclear circumstances. She applied for adjustment of status based on her husband's legal status but lied about her manner of entry. She later admitted to lying but provided conflicting testimonies. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application for adjustment of status and ordered her removal to India, citing factual inconsistencies. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The IJ's decision was discretionary and protected by statute from judicial review. The petitioner did not raise any colorable constitutional claims that would allow for judicial review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the IJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's multiple contradictory statements and lack of credible evidence regarding her manner of entry.The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under sections 1182(i) and 1255. The court also found that the petitioner did not exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial bias, and that her judicial bias claim was not a constitutional issue but rather a factual dispute.The court denied the petition for review, emphasizing that the IJ's decision was within his discretion and supported by the evidence. The court also noted a significant error in the IJ's understanding of the difference between a visa and an I-94 form but concluded that this error did not affect the overall decision. View "Patel v. Garland" on Justia Law

Marta Lidia Tista-Ruiz De Ajualip, a native of Guatemala, applied for asylum and withholding of removal for herself, her three children, and her grandson after entering the U.S. in 2016. They fled Guatemala due to threats from Marta’s son-in-law, Marvin, who had a history of domestic violence and gang affiliations. Despite credible testimony about the abuse and threats, an immigration judge (IJ) denied their asylum and withholding claims, citing outdated precedent that did not recognize domestic violence victims as a protected group under U.S. asylum laws.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2016. In 2019, the IJ denied Marta’s claims, relying on Matter of A-B-, which stated that domestic violence victims generally do not qualify for asylum. The IJ also applied the wrong legal standard for withholding of removal. In 2023, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed the IJ’s decision, despite acknowledging a significant change in precedent that overruled Matter of A-B-. The Board did not remand the case for further review and summarily affirmed the denial of withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Board’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal was inconsistent with current precedent and immigration authority. The court held that the Board failed to consider the record as a whole and did not properly evaluate the evidence regarding the particular social group (PSG) and the Guatemalan government’s inability to protect Marta’s family. The court granted Marta’s petition for review, vacated the Board’s denial, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the updated legal standards. View "Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland" on Justia Law

Mirvat Elgebaly, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a conditional permanent resident after marrying American citizen Saladin Muhammad. They later filed a joint petition to remove the conditions on her status, but Muhammad withdrew it, leading to the termination of her conditional status and initiation of removal proceedings. Elgebaly applied for two hardship waivers, claiming she entered the marriage in good faith and suffered extreme cruelty. The immigration judge (IJ) denied both waivers, finding her testimony not credible and insufficiently corroborated, and ordered her removal.Elgebaly appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed her appeal, affirming the IJ's decision and finding no clear error in the credibility assessment or the conclusion that she did not enter the marriage in good faith. The BIA also found that the IJ conducted the hearing fairly. Elgebaly then filed a motion to reopen proceedings, presenting new evidence, which the BIA denied, stating that the evidence was either not new or not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Elgebaly’s petitions for review. The court held that the IJ’s credibility determination was sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful judicial review and that substantial evidence supported the finding that Elgebaly did not marry in good faith. The court also found that the IJ adequately assisted Elgebaly in developing the record during her pro se proceedings. Additionally, the court upheld the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, agreeing that the new evidence was either previously available or immaterial. Finally, the court rejected Elgebaly’s constitutional challenge to the structure of immigration proceedings, referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. Jarkesy, which clarified that immigration adjudications concern public rights and do not require a jury trial. View "Elgebaly v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Mike Govender Hatchet, a Sierra Leone citizen who sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident in the United States. Hatchet applied for discretionary relief multiple times, but the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied each application, citing facts that rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. Hatchet challenged the agency's actions in federal district court, arguing that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The district court dismissed Hatchet's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet's claims were not subject to judicial review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and because Hatchet's arguments were entirely fact-bound, the court agreed that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel, which held that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review both discretionary and non-discretionary judgments related to the granting of relief, including factual findings. View "Hatchet v. Andrade" on Justia Law

Thabet Mahdi Saleh, an Iraqi refugee, was granted asylum in the United States in 2010. However, after being convicted of crimes under Michigan law, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Saleh sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), fearing torture if he returned to Iraq due to his work with the U.S. Army and his mixed marriage. The immigration judge denied all forms of relief and ordered Saleh's removal. Saleh did not appeal this decision.In 2018, Saleh moved to reopen his proceedings, seeking deferral of removal under the CAT. He alleged changed country conditions and an increased risk of torture due to his past experiences and criminal convictions in the U.S. The immigration judge granted the motion to reopen but later denied Saleh’s application for relief. Saleh appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which assumed Saleh’s credibility but found no error in the other decisions, thus denying Saleh’s petition.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Saleh challenged the BIA's decision, arguing that the immigration judge erred by treating a key witness as a fact witness rather than an expert. However, the court found that Saleh's counsel had agreed to this treatment of the witness, and Saleh had not shown that the agency erred by treating the witness as a fact witness only. The court also found that the BIA had properly analyzed Saleh’s probability of torture in the aggregate, considering all the factors together. Therefore, the court denied Saleh's petition for review. View "Mahdi Saleh v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Jose Yanel Sanchez-Perez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who entered the United States in 1998. In 2009, Sanchez-Perez pleaded guilty to committing misdemeanor domestic assault under Tennessee law. The following day, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. In 2015, an immigration judge found Sanchez-Perez ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to establish that he had been continuously present in the United States for ten years prior to receiving the notice to appear. However, the judge also found that Sanchez-Perez was not statutorily barred from seeking cancellation of removal due to his 2009 domestic-violence conviction.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal and agreed with the immigration judge’s findings that Sanchez-Perez lacked the requisite continuous physical presence and thus was not eligible for cancellation of removal. In 2018, the immigration judge found that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction is categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed Sanchez-Perez’s appeal from this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in determining that Sanchez-Perez’s 2009 conviction was categorically a crime of violence, and thus Sanchez-Perez was statutorily barred from obtaining cancellation of removal. The court noted that the Tennessee statute at issue criminalizes conduct that does not require the use or threatened use of violent physical force. Therefore, the court granted Sanchez-Perez’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the case to the BIA for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sanchez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Walid Abdulahad, an Iraqi national who sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings based on changed country conditions in Iraq. Abdulahad, who had been living in the U.S. since 1997, was ordered removed in absentia in 2006 following a criminal conviction in Aruba. He remained in the U.S. under supervision and filed multiple motions to reopen his case, arguing that he faced a risk of torture if returned to Iraq due to his status as a Chaldean Christian and his ties to the U.S.The BIA denied Abdulahad's latest motion to reopen, finding that his evidence was cumulative of evidence submitted with prior motions, and that he had not established a particularized risk of torture or that each step in his causal-chain claim was more likely than not to occur. Abdulahad petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case back to the BIA. The court found that the BIA had applied the incorrect legal standards when determining whether Abdulahad's evidence was new, cumulative, or material, and had failed to assess Abdulahad's claims in the aggregate. The court also found that the BIA had not sufficiently explained or considered the evidence related to Abdulahad's particularized likelihood of torture. View "Abdulahad v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sandra Sabastian-Andres, an indigenous Mayan Akateko woman from Guatemala, appealed the Board of Immigration Appeals' affirmation of the Immigration Judge's decision to deny her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Sabastian-Andres had fled to the U.S. after a man named Pedro threatened her for refusing his demand to become his wife and join his gang.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case under the substantial evidence standard, considering the Board's finding as reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record as a whole. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that there was no nexus between the threats Sabastian-Andres received and her identity as a Mayan Akateko woman. Sabastian-Andres's own testimony confirmed that Pedro's threats were not due to her indigenous identity.Additionally, substantial evidence supported the decision that Sabastian-Andres was ineligible for withholding of removal. Despite the less stringent standard for demonstrating a nexus in the context of withholding of removal compared to asylum, the complete lack of a nexus rendered her ineligible.Finally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the decision that Sabastian-Andres did not qualify for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Despite her claims that she could not report Pedro's threats to the police due to language barriers and her belief that the police collaborated with gangs, the court found that the Guatemalan government had taken steps to address gang violence. Therefore, the court denied Sabastian-Andres's petition for review. View "Sabastian-Andres v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gloris Sarai Vasquez-Rivera, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without authorization in 2014, at the age of nine. She was served with a notice to appear in removal proceedings and charged as a noncitizen present in the country without being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. Vasquez-Rivera applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing fear of gang violence in El Salvador.Vasquez-Rivera proposed four social groups for her asylum and withholding of removal claims: Salvadoran women and girls whose parents live outside the country; her family; family members of persons targeted for gang recruitment whose family is threatened when they refuse to join the gangs; and young Salvadoran women considered to be property of the gangs. Both the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found that three of these groups were not cognizable under federal immigration law. As for her family, the BIA assumed it constituted a distinct social group but agreed with the IJ that Vasquez-Rivera did not establish a nexus between this group and the harm she experienced and fears.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to grant in part and deny in part the petition for review. It found that the BIA's conclusions regarding the nexus required for the family-as-a-particular-social-group claim lacked support in the record and amounted to improper de novo factfinding. The case was remanded to the BIA for further proceedings, applying circuit nexus precedent to Vasquez-Rivera’s asylum claim and claim for withholding of removal based on her membership in her family. The court upheld the BIA’s determination that Vasquez-Rivera had failed to establish eligibility for Convention Against Torture protection. View "Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an appeal by Karnail Singh, who was charged with using a fraudulently procured passport and making false statements to immigration officials. Singh pleaded guilty to using a fraudulently procured passport in exchange for a lower sentencing range and the dismissal of the false-statement count. After his plea, the government initiated proceedings to revoke his citizenship. In response, Singh petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, requesting the district court to set aside his conviction, arguing he would not have pled guilty had he known his plea could affect his citizenship. The district court denied his petition, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court ruled that Singh's plea was knowing and satisfied due process, regardless of whether he understood it could impact his citizenship. They found that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the court to inform the defendant that a conviction may have immigration-related consequences.Singh also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney incorrectly informed him that his plea would only affect his citizenship if he committed another crime. The court rejected this claim, citing lack of evidence that Singh would have chosen to go to trial if he had received different advice from his counsel.Finally, the court rejected Singh's argument that the district court should have held a hearing before ruling on his coram nobis petition, stating that the record clearly showed Singh was not entitled to coram nobis relief. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law