Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Kingsley Owusu, who was seeking asylum and withholding of removal from the United States. Owusu, originally from Ghana, claimed that he had suffered three violent incidents in his home country due to his political affiliations, leading him to fear future persecution. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals both found that Owusu had failed to demonstrate that the Ghanaian government was unable or unwilling to address the harm he faced from private actors, that his past incidents did not constitute persecution, that he could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he could avoid persecution by relocating within Ghana. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that for Owusu to be eligible for asylum or withholding, he must show state action, either by demonstrating that his persecutor is a state actor or that the Ghanaian government was unable to protect him. The court found that Owusu failed to meet this burden, as he presented no compelling evidence that the Ghanaian police would either persecute him or fail to protect him from persecution. As such, the court denied Owusu's petition for review. View "Owusu v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

This case concerns Ana Sanchez Sebastian-Sebastian, a native and citizen of Guatemala, who appealed the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the BIA did not fully consider whether Sebastian-Sebastian was persecuted due to her membership in certain social groups, including "Guatemalan Chuj Women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave" and "Guatemalan Chuj Women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship." The court noted that the BIA ended its analysis prematurely, failing to consider the possibility that Sebastian-Sebastian's persecutors may have had mixed motives for their persecution. The BIA also failed to consider whether her husband's motives were intertwined with her particular social groups. As a result, the court granted Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review in part, vacated the BIA's denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration. However, the court denied Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review regarding her CAT claim and dismissed her due process claim, finding that her right to due process was not violated. View "Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland" on Justia Law

Zheng and Wu owned and operated the Tokyo Dragon restaurant, where they employed noncitizens who were working in the U.S. illegally. In 2017, Homeland Security received a tip from a nurse who suspected that they were human trafficking. Agents executed a warrant at Tokyo Dragon and discovered that the business had not filed any government paperwork with respect to the noncitizens’ employment. Four Hispanic men lived in the basement of Zheng and Wu’s home. The owners transported the men to and from work every day and to the grocery store weekly, paying them in cash. Other employees were paid by check. A Mexican citizen testified he began working as a Tokyo Dragon cook in 2015, generally working six or seven days a week for 11-12 hours per day; he did not interact with customers. Zheng instructed the noncitizens that they “should not go outside” the house and should not make noise, to avoid being deported.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Zheng and Wu on four counts of harboring illegal noncitizens for commercial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court rejected arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of “harboring” by not including a requirement that the defendants acted intentionally and knowingly in shielding the illegal noncitizens from law enforcement and invaded the province of the jury by giving examples of “harboring.” View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

In 2012, Lin arrived from China and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Lin testified that Lin’s girlfriend became pregnant in 2001. When Lin refused to share his girlfriend’s whereabouts, family planning officials hit and kicked him and started destroying possessions. Lin’s girlfriend gave birth in secret. Local officials eventually discovered their location, took his girlfriend to be forcibly inserted with an IUD, and imposed fines to obtain a household registration for their son, and for having a child out of wedlock. Ten years later, Lin began attending an “underground” Christian church and, during a gathering, was arrested locked in a small room, interrogated, and beaten for three days. After he left China, Lin’s parents told him that the village cadre continued to look for him. In 2017, Lin declined to attend his mother’s funeral based on warnings from his father.An IJ found Lin to be credible but concluded that Lin did not demonstrate that the harm he experienced, on account of either his religion or his opposition to China’s family planning policies, rose to the level of persecution nor a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA dismissed Lin’s appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Findings that Lin failed to show a reasonable likelihood of individualized persecution in China and that it would be reasonable for Lin to internally relocate within China were not supported by substantial evidence. View "Lin v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1999, Kolov sought asylum and related protections. Kolov was removed to Bulgaria in 2012. In 2014, Kolov reentered the U.S. His prior removal order was reinstated. In an interview, Kolov indicated that he was a member of the “Roma” ethnic group and had been subjected to harassment, abuse, and physical violence in Bulgaria; the police were not interested in protecting the Roma. The asylum officer referred his case for withholding-only proceedings. Before his hearing, Kolov submitted a Form I-589, assisted by counsel, listing the same incidents that he described in his interview. At his 2019 hearing, Kolov was represented by counsel and testified in English. He recounted a 2012 incident for the first time. Kolov’s wife testified that she noticed that Kolov had bruises on several occasions during video calls when he was in Bulgaria. Kolov also submitted statements from family and friends, news articles, and country condition materials.The IJ denied Kolov’s application for relief, finding Kolov not credible regarding the alleged incidents of persecution; Kolov’s explanation for the omissions, that he was nervous and under stress, was “not credible.” The IJ concluded that Kolov failed to show government acquiescence to torture. The BIA found that Kolov’s omissions were substantially related to his claim and rendered him not credible. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA’s decision contains no legal error. View "Kolov v. Garland" on Justia Law

Banuelos-Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, arrived in the U.S. in 1999. DHS began removal proceedings in 2010. Those proceedings were administratively closed and re-calendared at the Department’s request. In 2017, Arkansas police arrested Banuelos-Jimenez following a “screaming” incident with his wife. He pleaded guilty to, third-degree assault on a family or household member. DHS re-initiated removal proceedings.Banuelos-Jimenez applied for cancellation of removal. An IJ denied his application, concluding that the Arkansas statute was a crime of violence: Banuelos-Jimenez acted at least recklessly and that “crimes of violence” encompass not only crimes that require specific intent but also reckless conduct. The BIA affirmed. Despite the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” holding that a crime of violence does not encompass reckless conduct, the BIA concluded that Banuelos-Jimenez’s conviction was a crime of violence—his conduct was also purposeful and necessarily involved a threat of force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Arkansas conviction is categorically a crime of violence because it involves the “threatened use of force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 16(a). While the statute may not require the perpetrator to intend actual harm, he still intends to threaten harm. View "Banuelos-Jimenez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Turcios-Flores and her husband operated merchant stands in Honduras and were subject to a “war tax” imposed by the MS-13 gang. Turcios-Flores’s husband inherited a farm, where they grew coffee and plantains, careful not to reveal their ownership. A cousin later joined MS-13 and shared Turcios-Flores’s secret landownership. MS-13 demanded additional payment in an amount 100 times greater than what the family had previously paid, threatening to kill her husband. Turcios-Flores’s husband fled to the U.S. alone, hoping that MS-13 would stop threatening his family. The gang then threatened Turcios-Flores herself. Turcios-Flores complied. MS-13 increased their demands, warning Turcios-Flores that her children would be killed if she did not pay. The police only offered her a phone number to call if gang members returned. Turcios-Flores and her children entered the U.S. without the required entry documents. She filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on behalf of her and her sons.The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for review, in part. The Board correctly denied Turcios-Flores’s application for CAT protection and her asylum application insofar as it relates to her membership in her husband’s family. The decision with respect to two of Turcios-Flores’s additional proposed social groups (rural landowners or farmers, single mothers living without male protection) was not supported by substantial evidence, however, and the withholding-of-removal analysis was flawed. View "Turcios-Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law

Al-Adily is a citizen of Iraq and a lawful U.S. permanent resident. After returning his rental car to Thrifty 163 days past its due date, Al-Adily pleaded guilty to failing to return rental property worth between $1,000 and $20,000, under Michigan law. The state court ordered him to pay $10,660.56 in restitution, matching Thrify's itemized restitution request, including a daily loss-damage-waiver charge for 170 days, repair costs, an airport concession fee, and state and municipal taxes.In removal proceedings, DHS alleged that Al-Adily’s conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), allowing for deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an offense that "involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” The IJ noted oddities in Thrifty’s itemization but felt bound by the restitution amount. With the assistance of new counsel seven years later, Al-Adily successfully moved to reopen his removal proceedings. A new IJ concluded that Thrifty’s loss amount was necessarily equal to the amount of court-ordered restitution and denied Al-Adily’s applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has warned that restitution orders must be considered with caution, especially where the amount was determined under a lower evidentiary standard. Thrifty’s itemization is internally inconsistent. Several enumerated charges do not stem from “the specific counts covered by the conviction” or are not losses at all. View "Habib Al-Adily v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, came to the U.S. in 1994, without inspection. In 1999, an IJ ordered him removed in his absence. More than 10 years later, another IJ reopened his removal proceedings. In the meantime, Hernandez married. Hernandez sought cancellation of removal, which required proof that he had remained in the U.S. for the past 10 years; that he had “been a person of good moral character”; that he had not been convicted of certain crimes; and that his “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to” his wife. 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). The IJ concluded that Hernandez lacked good moral character because of his failure to pay taxes and because, in 2007 and 2010, he pleaded guilty to DUI.Meanwhile, his wife’s petition to allow him to become a permanent resident was approved. On remand, the IJ administratively closed Hernandez’s case to allow him to apply for a waiver to receive the visa while remaining in this country. Hernandez never sought the waiver. An IJ reopened his removal proceedings and found that Hernandez’s removal would cause his wife exceptional hardship but Hernandez still lacked “good moral character,” having been arrested twice for DUI in 2016.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, first holding that the question of whether the historical facts show that an immigrant lacks “good moral character” qualifies as a mixed question within its jurisdiction. The BIA properly concluded that Hernandez’s history of alcohol use and drinking-and-driving convictions showed his lack of “good moral character.” View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2004, Enriquez-Perdomo a nine-year-old Honduran national, was ordered removed. INS signed a warrant of removal/deportation but never removed her. The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), program applied to persons who immigrated to the U.S. when they were under the age of 16 and were under age 31 in 2012 and meet other specific requirements. In 2013, USCIS approved Enriquez-Perdomo for DACA. She renewed her DACA status through January 2019. In 2017, Enriquez-Perdomo went to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for ICE detainees. Enriquez-Perdomo alleges that ICE officers (Defendants) confirmed that she had received DACA, but nevertheless arrested her without a warrant, motivated by her ethnicity and by her assistance of detainees. She claims that Defendants transported her between facilities and deprived her of sleep and food during her eight days in custody. Enriquez-Perdomo sued Defendants in their individual capacities, seeking money damages under “Bivens.”The district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g). The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. Notwithstanding her removal order, Enriquez-Perdomo was eligible for DACA relief and was granted affirmative relief from removal. Although the government could terminate that relief, it did not. Enriquez-Perdomo’s arrest and detention were unauthorized so 1252(g) does not preclude her claims; her removal order was not executable. There is no Bivens remedy for First Amendment retaliation claims; the court remanded Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law