Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Kolov sought asylum and related protections. Kolov was removed to Bulgaria in 2012. In 2014, Kolov reentered the U.S. His prior removal order was reinstated. In an interview, Kolov indicated that he was a member of the “Roma” ethnic group and had been subjected to harassment, abuse, and physical violence in Bulgaria; the police were not interested in protecting the Roma. The asylum officer referred his case for withholding-only proceedings. Before his hearing, Kolov submitted a Form I-589, assisted by counsel, listing the same incidents that he described in his interview. At his 2019 hearing, Kolov was represented by counsel and testified in English. He recounted a 2012 incident for the first time. Kolov’s wife testified that she noticed that Kolov had bruises on several occasions during video calls when he was in Bulgaria. Kolov also submitted statements from family and friends, news articles, and country condition materials.The IJ denied Kolov’s application for relief, finding Kolov not credible regarding the alleged incidents of persecution; Kolov’s explanation for the omissions, that he was nervous and under stress, was “not credible.” The IJ concluded that Kolov failed to show government acquiescence to torture. The BIA found that Kolov’s omissions were substantially related to his claim and rendered him not credible. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA’s decision contains no legal error. View "Kolov v. Garland" on Justia Law

Banuelos-Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, arrived in the U.S. in 1999. DHS began removal proceedings in 2010. Those proceedings were administratively closed and re-calendared at the Department’s request. In 2017, Arkansas police arrested Banuelos-Jimenez following a “screaming” incident with his wife. He pleaded guilty to, third-degree assault on a family or household member. DHS re-initiated removal proceedings.Banuelos-Jimenez applied for cancellation of removal. An IJ denied his application, concluding that the Arkansas statute was a crime of violence: Banuelos-Jimenez acted at least recklessly and that “crimes of violence” encompass not only crimes that require specific intent but also reckless conduct. The BIA affirmed. Despite the Supreme Court’s 2021 “Borden” holding that a crime of violence does not encompass reckless conduct, the BIA concluded that Banuelos-Jimenez’s conviction was a crime of violence—his conduct was also purposeful and necessarily involved a threat of force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Arkansas conviction is categorically a crime of violence because it involves the “threatened use of force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 16(a). While the statute may not require the perpetrator to intend actual harm, he still intends to threaten harm. View "Banuelos-Jimenez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Turcios-Flores and her husband operated merchant stands in Honduras and were subject to a “war tax” imposed by the MS-13 gang. Turcios-Flores’s husband inherited a farm, where they grew coffee and plantains, careful not to reveal their ownership. A cousin later joined MS-13 and shared Turcios-Flores’s secret landownership. MS-13 demanded additional payment in an amount 100 times greater than what the family had previously paid, threatening to kill her husband. Turcios-Flores’s husband fled to the U.S. alone, hoping that MS-13 would stop threatening his family. The gang then threatened Turcios-Flores herself. Turcios-Flores complied. MS-13 increased their demands, warning Turcios-Flores that her children would be killed if she did not pay. The police only offered her a phone number to call if gang members returned. Turcios-Flores and her children entered the U.S. without the required entry documents. She filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on behalf of her and her sons.The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for review, in part. The Board correctly denied Turcios-Flores’s application for CAT protection and her asylum application insofar as it relates to her membership in her husband’s family. The decision with respect to two of Turcios-Flores’s additional proposed social groups (rural landowners or farmers, single mothers living without male protection) was not supported by substantial evidence, however, and the withholding-of-removal analysis was flawed. View "Turcios-Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law

Al-Adily is a citizen of Iraq and a lawful U.S. permanent resident. After returning his rental car to Thrifty 163 days past its due date, Al-Adily pleaded guilty to failing to return rental property worth between $1,000 and $20,000, under Michigan law. The state court ordered him to pay $10,660.56 in restitution, matching Thrify's itemized restitution request, including a daily loss-damage-waiver charge for 170 days, repair costs, an airport concession fee, and state and municipal taxes.In removal proceedings, DHS alleged that Al-Adily’s conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), allowing for deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an offense that "involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” The IJ noted oddities in Thrifty’s itemization but felt bound by the restitution amount. With the assistance of new counsel seven years later, Al-Adily successfully moved to reopen his removal proceedings. A new IJ concluded that Thrifty’s loss amount was necessarily equal to the amount of court-ordered restitution and denied Al-Adily’s applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court has warned that restitution orders must be considered with caution, especially where the amount was determined under a lower evidentiary standard. Thrifty’s itemization is internally inconsistent. Several enumerated charges do not stem from “the specific counts covered by the conviction” or are not losses at all. View "Habib Al-Adily v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hernandez, a citizen of El Salvador, came to the U.S. in 1994, without inspection. In 1999, an IJ ordered him removed in his absence. More than 10 years later, another IJ reopened his removal proceedings. In the meantime, Hernandez married. Hernandez sought cancellation of removal, which required proof that he had remained in the U.S. for the past 10 years; that he had “been a person of good moral character”; that he had not been convicted of certain crimes; and that his “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to” his wife. 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). The IJ concluded that Hernandez lacked good moral character because of his failure to pay taxes and because, in 2007 and 2010, he pleaded guilty to DUI.Meanwhile, his wife’s petition to allow him to become a permanent resident was approved. On remand, the IJ administratively closed Hernandez’s case to allow him to apply for a waiver to receive the visa while remaining in this country. Hernandez never sought the waiver. An IJ reopened his removal proceedings and found that Hernandez’s removal would cause his wife exceptional hardship but Hernandez still lacked “good moral character,” having been arrested twice for DUI in 2016.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, first holding that the question of whether the historical facts show that an immigrant lacks “good moral character” qualifies as a mixed question within its jurisdiction. The BIA properly concluded that Hernandez’s history of alcohol use and drinking-and-driving convictions showed his lack of “good moral character.” View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2004, Enriquez-Perdomo a nine-year-old Honduran national, was ordered removed. INS signed a warrant of removal/deportation but never removed her. The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), program applied to persons who immigrated to the U.S. when they were under the age of 16 and were under age 31 in 2012 and meet other specific requirements. In 2013, USCIS approved Enriquez-Perdomo for DACA. She renewed her DACA status through January 2019. In 2017, Enriquez-Perdomo went to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for ICE detainees. Enriquez-Perdomo alleges that ICE officers (Defendants) confirmed that she had received DACA, but nevertheless arrested her without a warrant, motivated by her ethnicity and by her assistance of detainees. She claims that Defendants transported her between facilities and deprived her of sleep and food during her eight days in custody. Enriquez-Perdomo sued Defendants in their individual capacities, seeking money damages under “Bivens.”The district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g). The Sixth Circuit vacated in part. Notwithstanding her removal order, Enriquez-Perdomo was eligible for DACA relief and was granted affirmative relief from removal. Although the government could terminate that relief, it did not. Enriquez-Perdomo’s arrest and detention were unauthorized so 1252(g) does not preclude her claims; her removal order was not executable. There is no Bivens remedy for First Amendment retaliation claims; the court remanded Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law

Yousif, a citizen of Iraq, came to the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee. He became a lawful permanent resident. In 2010, he was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. In removal proceedings, Yousif applied for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture and under the Immigration and Nationality Act, or deferral of removal. He argued that if he returned to Iraq, he would be persecuted because of his religion. Yousif did not appeal a 2011 removal order. In 2017, he moved to reopen his application based on changed conditions in Iraq, alleging he would face torture because of “his Christian religion, long residence in the U.S. [and] . . . his ethnicity.” At Yousif’s hearing, Yousif testified, stating that he feared “all Muslims.” The IJ found the government’s evidence “more persuasive,” and rejected Yousif’s claims.The BIA affirmed, finding that the IJ correctly applied the aggregate approach in assessing the probability of torture and that the evidence did not establish that Yousif would “be singled out for torture.” The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of his application, and the BIA acted within its discretion in denying Yousif’s motion to remand. View "Yousif v. Garland" on Justia Law

Iris and Jose lived with their two children in Usulután, a part of El Salvador that they believed to be controlled by MS-13. They ran a small retail business. In 2016, gang members began extorting Jose, threatening to kill the family if Jose did not pay. Gang members robbed Jose and a colleague at gunpoint. Jose did not report the crimes to the police. He knew that the police conducted daily raids in his neighborhood to combat gang activity but he believed that the gangs had infiltrated the government. He feared that MS-13 would learn of his complaints and kill him. The mayor was subsequently arrested for helping gang members collect “rent.” Members of MS-13 interrogated Jose about his dealings with the police. Jose left El Salvador but the gang continued to extort and threaten Iris. Eventually, she fled to the United States.The family sought asylum and withholding of removal, submitting country-condition reports about gang activity in El Salvador that corroborated their testimony. An IJ ordered the family’s removal, finding Iris and Jose credible, but concluding that they had not established that the government was unable or unwilling to control MS-13. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA did not commit a legal error in interpreting and applying the asylum and withholding-of-removal statutes. Its opinion permits discernment of the grounds on which it relied and its findings have a fair evidentiary basis. View "Rodriguez de Palucho v. Garland" on Justia Law

Tantchev, a citizen of Bulgaria, entered the U.S. in 1999, with a business visa. He received lawful permanent resident status in 2012., Tantchev ran a trucking business out of a Chicago warehouse. In 2008, Tantchev started a side business coordinating the export of shipping containers from Chicago to Mongolia for customers. Tantchev never looked inside the containers; he completed customs paperwork describing the contents of the containers using the information provided by the customers. Customs learned that several of these shipping containers held stolen cars. In 2016, Tantchev was convicted of exporting stolen vehicles, 18 U.S.C. 553. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting a challenge to the use of an “ostrich” instruction, referencing situations where the defendant is willfully blind to material facts,After Tantchev was released from prison, he was placed in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), on the grounds that his conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). An immigration judge ordered Tantchev deported. The BIA affirmed. Tantchev was deported in 2022. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA in Tantchev’s case did not err in concluding that the mens rea of willful blindness encompassed in section 553(a)(1) categorically matches the mens rea requirement of a receipt of stolen property crime under section 1101(a)(43)(G). View "Tantchev v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Homeland Security’s 2021 Guidance notes that the Department lacks the resources to apprehend and remove all of the more than 11 million removable noncitizens in the country and prioritizes apprehension and removal of noncitizens who are threats to “national security, public safety, and border security.” Whether a noncitizen poses a threat to public safety "requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.” The Guidance lists aggravating and mitigating factors that immigration officers should consider and does not “compel an action to be taken or not taken,” and “may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit.” In a suit by Arizona, Montana, and Ohio, the district court issued a “nationwide preliminary injunction,” blocking the Department from relying on the Guidance priorities and policies in making detention, arrest, and removal decisions. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal and subsequently reversed the order. The court noted “many dubious justiciability questions” with respect to standing. The Guidance leaves considerable implementation discretion and does not create any legal rights for noncitizens, suggesting it is not reviewable. Even if the states cleared the justiciability hurdles, they are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Guidance violates the Administrative Procedure Act, whether on the grounds that it is contrary to law, it is arbitrary or capricious, or it lacks a required notice and comment, 5 U.S.C. 706(2), 553. View "Arizona v. Biden" on Justia Law