Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Eucineia Soares da Silva Pazine, a Brazilian national, sought asylum in the United States, claiming she faced persecution from her husband, Lucas Luiz Pazine, and his associates. She testified that her husband was abusive, both physically and emotionally, and that after she left him and returned to Brazil with their children, she continued to receive threats from his cousin Dulce and his lawyers. These threats included surveillance and attempts to coerce her into giving up custody of her children and her property.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found her testimony credible but denied her asylum claim, stating that the abuse she suffered in the United States did not qualify as persecution under asylum law, which requires harm to occur in the applicant's home country. The IJ also concluded that the threats from Dulce and the lawyers were motivated by a personal dispute over custody and property, not by her membership in a particular social group (PSG) such as "Brazilian Women." Consequently, the IJ denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, agreeing that there was no nexus between the harm she feared and a protected ground under asylum law. The BIA found no clear error in the IJ's determination that the threats were related to a personal dispute rather than her membership in a PSG. The BIA also declined to address her new "pattern or practice" theory of persecution, as it was not raised before the IJ.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court found that substantial evidence supported the agency's no-nexus finding, concluding that the threats from Dulce and the lawyers were primarily motivated by personal disputes over custody and property, not by her gender or membership in a PSG. The court also noted that the BIA correctly applied the "one central reason" standard in its analysis. View "Pazine v. Garland" on Justia Law

Zohaib Zia, a citizen of Pakistan, entered the United States as a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, Anum Haq. After their marriage ended in divorce, Zia sought a waiver to remove the conditions on his residency, claiming the marriage was entered into in good faith. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his petition, finding the marriage was not in good faith, and terminated his conditional status. The Department of Homeland Security then issued a notice to appear, charging him as removable. Zia renewed his petition before an Immigration Judge (IJ), who also denied it, citing an adverse credibility finding and insufficient evidence of a good faith marriage.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the adverse credibility determination and finding the remaining evidence insufficient to prove a good faith marriage. Zia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the BIA erred in its findings and that his due process rights were violated due to an incomplete hearing transcript.The Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the adverse credibility finding, as such factual determinations are unreviewable under Patel v. Garland. The court also found that while it had limited jurisdiction to review the good faith marriage determination as a mixed question of fact and law, the BIA's decision was not in error. The court concluded that Zia's testimony was of little weight due to the adverse credibility finding, and the remaining evidence did not compel a reversal. Additionally, the court rejected Zia's due process claim, finding no prejudice from the incomplete transcript. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "ZIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Victor Meza-Carmona, born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen mother, Victoria, claimed U.S. citizenship based on his mother's status. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952), Victoria could transmit citizenship to him only if she had been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of one year before his birth. Victoria was born in Los Angeles and baptized in El Paso, Texas, but later moved to Mexico. The case hinges on whether Victoria met the continuous physical presence requirement.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Meza-Carmona in 2012. An immigration judge ordered his removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Meza-Carmona then petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit transferred the case to the District of Arizona to resolve factual disputes about his citizenship claim. The district court found that Meza-Carmona failed to prove his mother's continuous physical presence in the U.S. for one year before his birth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's findings. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) requires a person claiming citizenship to show that their mother stayed in the U.S. for one year without leaving. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Meza-Carmona failed to establish his mother's continuous presence. The evidence allowed for either inference—that Victoria stayed continuously in the U.S. or that she did not. Given the record, the district court's conclusion was not clear error. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Meza-Carmona's petition for review. View "MEZA-CARMONA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Collins Enyong Aben, a native and citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States without valid entry documents and was placed in removal proceedings. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming persecution due to his political opinion and membership in several particular social groups. Aben testified that he was targeted by the Cameroonian military for treating separatist fighters as a nurse, leading to multiple arrests, beatings, and death threats.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, citing the Third-Country Transit Bar and doubting Aben's credibility due to inconsistencies in his testimony. The IJ also found that Aben failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that his harm was not politically motivated but due to his occupation as a nurse. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aben's appeal, assuming his credibility but agreeing with the IJ that he did not establish past persecution or a nexus to a protected ground. The BIA also found that Aben failed to corroborate his claims and that changed country conditions in Cameroon undermined his fear of future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA failed to address key evidence, including credible death threats and the imputation of a political opinion to Aben. The court held that the BIA's determinations regarding past persecution, nexus, and corroboration were not supported by substantial evidence. The court vacated the BIA's decision on Aben's asylum and withholding of removal claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court denied the petition for review regarding Aben's CAT claim, finding that he had forfeited any challenge to the BIA's determination on that issue. View "Aben v. Garland" on Justia Law

Edson Pires Rosa, a citizen of Cape Verde, entered the U.S. on a visitor visa in 2015, which expired later that year. His mother, a lawful permanent resident, filed a petition for him, which was approved, but his subsequent application for adjustment of status was denied. In 2019, Rosa was accused of participating in a sexual assault, leading to a police report and a pending criminal charge. Despite his denial of the allegations, he was placed in removal proceedings for overstaying his visa. Rosa applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and voluntary departure.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Rosa's asylum and withholding of removal applications but granted voluntary departure. Rosa appealed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remanded the case to consider his adjustment of status application after his mother became a U.S. citizen. On remand, a new IJ denied his adjustment of status and voluntary departure requests, citing the pending criminal charge as a significant negative factor. Rosa appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ's decision, finding no error in the reliance on the police report and pending charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in deeming Rosa's challenge to the voluntary departure denial as waived and vacated the BIA's decision on both adjustment of status and voluntary departure. The court remanded the case to the BIA to reconsider these issues, particularly whether the police report and pending charge alone could justify the denial of discretionary relief without corroborating evidence, as required by precedent. View "Rosa v. Garland" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. In 1999, she was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine in California. In 2015, upon returning from a trip to Mexico, she was detained and later charged with inadmissibility due to her drug conviction. She sought cancellation of removal and later moved to terminate the removal proceedings.The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charges of removability and denied her relief, ordering her removal to Mexico. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), requesting remand to the IJ to pursue derivative U visa status based on her husband's pending U visa application. She also moved for administrative closure of her removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed her appeal and denied both motions, finding it speculative whether she would receive U visa relief and noting the need for an inadmissibility waiver due to her conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motions for remand and administrative closure due to the criminal jurisdiction bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The court found that the petitioner’s motions merged with her final order of removal and that judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. The court also noted that the decision did not disturb the result in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, which requires an agency determination of removability based on a covered conviction for the criminal alien bar to apply. The petition for review was dismissed. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Fredly Charles, a native and citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States in 2007 and became a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis in 2009. He lost this status in 2012, and in 2019, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability. Charles conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his U.S. citizen children and parents. An Immigration Judge denied his applications in 2019, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 2020.Charles submitted three motions to reopen his immigration proceedings. The first two motions, filed in 2020, were denied by the BIA, which found that he had not demonstrated the required exceptional hardship or materially changed conditions in Haiti. His third motion, filed in 2022, cited the birth of his daughter with serious medical conditions as new evidence. The BIA denied this motion as untimely and numerically barred, stating that Charles had not provided sufficient evidence to warrant reopening his case sua sponte.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's denial of Charles' third motion to reopen. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review refusals to reopen sua sponte only if the BIA commits legal error. The court found no indication that the BIA ignored relevant evidence about Charles' daughter's medical condition and concluded that the BIA did not arbitrarily depart from its prior practices. Consequently, the court dismissed Charles' challenge to the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen. View "Charles v. Garland" on Justia Law

David Bernardo-De La Cruz, a Mexican national, has lived in the U.S. without legal authorization for nineteen years. He was pulled over for speeding in 2014, which led to his immigration status being questioned. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, citing his long-term residence, good moral character, and the potential hardship his removal would cause his U.S. citizen daughters. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application, finding that his removal would not cause an "exceptionally high level of hardship" for his daughters. However, the IJ granted him voluntary departure. Bernardo-De La Cruz appealed the denial of cancellation of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision. Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge (TAIJ) Gabriel Gonzalez upheld the IJ's findings, including the determination that Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters would remain in the U.S. after his removal. The TAIJ acknowledged evidence suggesting that one daughter required special educational services but did not find it sufficient to warrant a different outcome. Bernardo-De La Cruz then petitioned for review, arguing that the agency exceeded its authority in promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), the appointment of the TAIJ was unconstitutional, and the IJ and BIA failed to adequately consider the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), which limits voluntary departure for noncitizens contesting a removal order, was within the agency's statutory authority. The court also found that TAIJ Gonzalez was lawfully appointed by the Acting Attorney General, not the EOIR Director, thus complying with the Appointments Clause. Finally, the court determined that the IJ and BIA had adequately considered the evidence regarding the hardship to Bernardo-De La Cruz's daughters. The petition for review was denied. View "Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Claude Stephen Bent, a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica, pleaded no contest to two felony charges in California in 2006. The judge did not inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. After serving his sentence, Bent was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2016 and charged with removability based on his felony conviction. Bent applied for asylum and other relief, but an immigration judge (IJ) denied his application and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. Bent appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the case to the BIA. The BIA again dismissed his appeal, and Bent petitioned for review.Bent moved to vacate his 2006 conviction in California state court, which was granted in 2022 on the grounds that his plea was involuntary and violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Bent then moved to reopen his removal proceedings before the BIA, arguing that his vacated conviction invalidated the basis for his removal. The BIA denied the motion, stating it was untimely and not subject to equitable tolling, and mischaracterized the California statute as allowing vacatur solely to mitigate immigration consequences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) and the state court's order, which vacated Bent's conviction due to a constitutional defect, not to alleviate immigration consequences. The Ninth Circuit also held that the BIA misapplied equitable tolling precedent by not properly assessing whether Bent diligently pursued his rights. The court granted Bent's petition for review in part and remanded the case to the BIA to adjudicate his motion to reopen under the correct legal standards. View "BENT V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law