Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Juan Carlos Bejar-Guizar was spotted by U.S. Border Patrol agents walking along a divided highway near the U.S.-Mexico border in San Diego. The agents noticed that Bejar-Guizar had muddy legs and boots, suggesting he had recently crossed the Tijuana River. He admitted to the agents that he was in the United States unlawfully. Bejar-Guizar was subsequently convicted of unlawful entry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of California convicted Bejar-Guizar. He appealed, arguing that the Border Patrol agents lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and that his admissions of alienage were not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence under the doctrine of corpus delicti.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Border Patrol agents had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Bejar-Guizar based on the totality of the circumstances, including his proximity to the border, the time of day, and his muddy appearance. The court also held that Bejar-Guizar's admissions of alienage were sufficiently corroborated by circumstantial and other evidence, including his prior deportation and the consistency of his statements. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Bejar-Guizar's conviction. View "USA V. BEJAR-GUIZAR" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Veronica Pineda De Aquino used a false identity to apply for a U.S. passport, submitting fraudulent documents. Investigators, with the cooperation of the real identity holder, A.E., determined Pineda was a Mexican citizen who had entered the U.S. in 1999. In June 2023, a grand jury indicted Pineda for making a false statement in a passport application and using another person’s social security number. Pineda initially pled not guilty but later entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the first count in exchange for the dismissal of the second count.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas accepted Pineda’s guilty plea but deferred the decision on the plea agreement until reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR detailed Pineda’s difficult background and calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 0 to 6 months of imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR without objection but varied upward, sentencing Pineda to 32 months of imprisonment, citing the seriousness of her offense and the need for deterrence. The court dismissed the second count as per the plea agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Pineda argued that the district court erred by not expressly accepting or rejecting the plea agreement and by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. The appellate court found that the district court constructively accepted the plea agreement and that any error was not plain. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Pineda above the Guidelines range, considering the aggravating factors and the need for deterrence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. De Aquino" on Justia Law

Robert Lanoue, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to submitting false claims to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 287. He operated a scuba school that was part of a government program funded by the post-9/11 GI Bill, which reimbursed him for teaching veterans. Lanoue admitted to submitting false and fraudulent claims, resulting in a loss of over $3 million to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge found that Lanoue's crime met the criteria for an aggravated felony and denied his request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision, leading Lanoue to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Lanoue's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 categorically involved deceit, as the statute requires knowingly submitting false claims to the government. The court also found that the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the loss exceeded $10,000, based on Lanoue's stipulation and plea agreement indicating losses between $1.5 and $3.5 million.Lanoue's argument for a retroactive waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) was rejected. The court noted that to qualify for such a waiver, a lawful permanent resident must have been convicted or admitted to the crime at the time of reentry, which was not the case for Lanoue.The Third Circuit held that filing false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287 is an aggravated felony involving deceit, and the government sufficiently proved the loss amount. Consequently, Lanoue is removable and ineligible for a waiver. The court denied his petition for review. View "Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Hector David Tipan Lopez, a native of Ecuador, suffered persecution by a local gang, the Lobos, due to his efforts to encourage young drug addicts to stop using drugs after converting to Evangelical Christianity. The gang targeted him multiple times, robbing, beating, and threatening him, and he did not seek medical care or report these incidents to the police due to distrust. Fearing for his life, he entered the United States in February 2023 and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after his arrest for domestic violence. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him credible but denied his applications, ruling that his religion, race, and political opinions were not central reasons for his persecution. The IJ also concluded that Ecuadorian authorities would not acquiesce to his torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by using a subordination-based test and an animus-based test for determining the nexus between Tipan Lopez's persecution and his religion. The court remanded the religious-nexus question to the BIA with instructions not to apply these tests. The court also remanded the CAT claim for the BIA to determine whether Ecuador can protect Tipan Lopez from torture, as the BIA did not make this determination. The court denied the petition for review regarding the BIA's findings on race and political opinion. View "Lopez v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The case involves two organizations, Doc Society and International Documentary Association (IDA), which promote documentary filmmaking globally. They challenged a policy by the Secretary of State requiring visa applicants to disclose their social media information from the past five years. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming it impeded their core activities and harmed their members.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing but dismissed their claims on the merits, stating they failed to state a claim under the First Amendment or the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that a favorable decision would redress their claimed injuries. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not provide specific allegations showing that their partners and members would return to their prior use of social media or reconsider their willingness to travel to the United States if the policy were vacated. The court reversed the district court's determination that the plaintiffs had standing, vacated the remainder of the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, including whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their complaint. View "Doc Society v. Rubio" on Justia Law

N.S. was arrested for robbery and destruction of property and was released on his own recognizance by a Magistrate Judge. However, before he could leave the courthouse, U.S. Marshals detained him based on an ICE detainer. N.S. filed a class complaint alleging that the Marshals acted beyond their statutory authority by making a civil immigration arrest, violating the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified the proposed class and granted N.S.'s request for a permanent injunction, prohibiting Marshal Dixon and his agents from arresting and detaining criminal defendants in the Superior Court for suspected civil immigration violations. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests as they had not undergone the required training. The court also found that the 2002 Order delegating authority to the Marshals lacked sufficient legal support.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests due to the lack of required training. However, the court found that the class-wide injunction issued by the district court was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits lower courts from enjoining the operation of certain immigration provisions. The court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate remedy. View "N.S. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Victor Manuel Castro-Aleman, originally from El Salvador, was brought to the United States illegally in 1973 as a child. Over the years, he had multiple encounters with law enforcement, including four DUI convictions in Virginia between 2009 and 2014. In 2016, while serving a sentence for his fourth DUI, he was visited by ICE agents and subsequently issued a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings. He was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge (IJ) after failing to submit an asylum application and not appealing the removal order. Castro-Aleman reentered the United States illegally and was discovered in Virginia in 2023, leading to his indictment for illegal reentry.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Castro-Aleman's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that his 2016 removal order was invalid due to due process violations. The district court found that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the removal order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Castro-Aleman failed to demonstrate that his removal order was "fundamentally unfair" under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). The court found that even if there were due process violations, such as the IJ's failure to inform him adequately of his right to appeal, Castro-Aleman could not show actual prejudice. His extensive criminal history and admissions during the removal hearing established multiple independent grounds for his removability, making any appeal futile. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss and upheld his conviction for illegal reentry. View "United States v. Castro-Aleman" on Justia Law

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Riley sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be killed by a drug kingpin if returned to Jamaica. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal under the CAT. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the IJ’s order, allowing the removal order to be enforced.Riley filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit within 30 days of the BIA’s decision but long after the DHS issued the final administrative review order (FARO). The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a final order of removal is jurisdictional and that the final order of removal was the FARO, not the BIA’s decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in withholding-only proceedings are not final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1). The Court also held that the 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Consequently, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Riley v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Jacinto Xiquin Xirum and Bartola Romero Santos, who petitioned for review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed the denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. The petitioners argued that their removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their two U.S. citizen children.The U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the petitioners on July 10, 2018. They applied for cancellation of removal, which allows a noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully if they meet certain criteria, including proving that their removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child. On October 10, 2019, the immigration judge (IJ) denied their applications, finding that the petitioners did not meet the burden of proving that their children would suffer such hardship if the petitioners were removed. The IJ noted that the petitioners were healthy, employed, and owned a home in Mexico, and that there was no evidence the children could not continue their education in Mexico or Guatemala.The petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision on March 27, 2024. The BIA highlighted the IJ's findings, including the petitioners' health, employment status, and home ownership in Mexico, as well as the children's fluency in Spanish and lack of learning disabilities. The BIA concluded that the petitioners had not demonstrated the required level of hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition in part, finding it lacked jurisdiction to review challenges to the agency's factual findings. The court denied the petition in part, concluding that the agency's determination that the petitioners had not shown exceptional and extremely unusual hardship was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found that the agency had considered the evidence in the aggregate and had not ignored relevant facts. The petition for review was dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Xirum v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Honduras entered the United States without authorization in 2003. In 2019, an Immigration Judge (IJ) indicated intent to grant his application for cancellation of removal, but due to a legislative cap, the decision was reserved until a visa became available in January 2023. By then, the initial IJ had retired, and a new IJ was assigned. The new IJ scheduled a new merits hearing because the petitioner was charged with a felony during the interim period. The new IJ ultimately denied the application, citing a lack of good moral character.The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that a binding policy required the reserved grant of cancellation to be issued within five days of visa availability, which would have precluded consideration of the new felony charge. The BIA rejected this argument, stating that the policy was not binding and did not create a remedy for exceeding the time frame. The BIA affirmed the new IJ's decision, finding the petitioner lacked good moral character and did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the policy the petitioner relied upon was not binding and, even if it were, it would not have imposed a five-day deadline in this case. The court noted that the policy was an internal guideline not intended to confer individual rights or have the force of law. Additionally, the court found that the petitioner was not substantially prejudiced by the delay, as he was required to maintain good moral character throughout the proceedings. The petition for review was denied. View "Zalaya Orellana v. Bondi" on Justia Law