Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Luis Alberto Sustaita-Cordova, a Mexican national, appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his applications for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. Sustaita-Cordova argued that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his U.S. citizen child, Judith, who has significant hearing loss. He also contended that he had good moral character and that the BIA abused its discretion by denying his motion for administrative closure or a continuance, ignoring his request for a remand to pursue a waiver of inadmissibility, and failing to terminate his removal proceedings due to a deficient Notice to Appear (NTA).The IJ found that Sustaita-Cordova did not meet the requirements for cancellation of removal, specifically failing to demonstrate good moral character and exceptional hardship to his child. The IJ noted his past criminal charge and failure to file taxes as negative factors. The BIA upheld the IJ’s findings and denied administrative closure, citing Sustaita-Cordova’s delay in pursuing a U visa and lack of diligence. The BIA also rejected his argument regarding the deficient NTA, stating that the omission of time and place did not deprive the IJ of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Sustaita-Cordova’s claims regarding administrative closure and a waiver of inadmissibility were moot due to the denial of his U visa application and his removal to Mexico. The court upheld the BIA’s decision on the cancellation of removal, agreeing that Sustaita-Cordova did not demonstrate the required exceptional hardship to his child. The court also affirmed that the deficient NTA did not affect the jurisdiction of the immigration court, following precedent that such deficiencies are claim-processing errors that must be timely raised.The Fifth Circuit denied Sustaita-Cordova’s petition for review. View "Sustaita-Cordova v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hector Diaz-Arellano, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. illegally in 1989. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as a removable alien. Diaz-Arellano conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal, claiming it would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his U.S.-citizen daughter, who was under 21 at the time. However, by the time of his final removal hearing, his daughter had turned 21, making her ineligible as a qualifying relative under the statute.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially warned Diaz-Arellano that his daughter's upcoming 21st birthday could affect his eligibility for cancellation of removal. Despite this, Diaz-Arellano delayed filing his application and did not object to a hearing date set after his daughter's birthday. At the final hearing, the IJ denied his application, noting that his daughter no longer qualified as a "child" under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, citing Matter of Isidro-Zamorano, which holds that a child must be under 21 at the time of the final adjudication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court held that the statute unambiguously requires a qualifying relative to be under 21 at the time of the final decision on cancellation of removal. The court rejected Diaz-Arellano's argument that the BIA's interpretation was incorrect and found no undue or unfair delay in his proceedings that would warrant an exception. Consequently, the court denied Diaz-Arellano's petition for review, affirming that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his daughter was no longer a qualifying child. View "Diaz-Arellano v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Three practicing Muslim men alleged that federal agents asked them to serve as informants in Muslim communities. When they refused, the agents placed or retained them on the "No Fly List" and suggested they could be removed from the list if they agreed to work as informants. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), claiming that their religious beliefs precluded them from serving as informants and that the agents substantially burdened their exercise of religion by conditioning their removal from the No Fly List on actions that violated those beliefs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, concluding that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right not to be pressured to inform on members of one's religious community through the coercive or retaliatory use of the No Fly List.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in their position would not have understood that their conduct implicated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not disclose their religious objections to the agents, and there were no facts plausibly supporting the conclusion that the agents knew the plaintiffs' objections were grounded in their religious beliefs. Therefore, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity from damages in their personal capacities. View "Tanvir v. Tanzin" on Justia Law

The case involves Meisam Sedighi, who sought reimbursement from his employer, Schnackel Engineers, Inc., for $3,000 he paid to an immigration attorney for the preparation and filing of a permanent labor certification application. Sedighi argued that under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b), Schnackel Engineers was responsible for these costs. Schnackel Engineers contended that Sedighi was to pursue his green card at his own expense, as stipulated in his employment contract, and that it did not agree to pay for the certification application.The small claims court of the county court for Douglas County ruled in favor of Sedighi, finding that Schnackel Engineers was responsible for the attorney fees under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b). Schnackel Engineers appealed to the district court for Douglas County, which reversed the small claims court's decision. The district court found that the employment contract controlled the parties' obligations and that Sedighi was responsible for his own green card expenses. It concluded that the Michigan immigration attorney represented Sedighi, not Schnackel Engineers.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its appellate review. The Supreme Court noted that the small claims court's judgment was supported by competent evidence showing that Schnackel Engineers actively participated in the preparation and filing of the permanent labor certification application. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have presumed that the small claims court found the Michigan immigration attorney represented both Sedighi and Schnackel Engineers. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and directed it to reinstate the small claims court's judgment in favor of Sedighi. View "Sedighi v. Schnackel Engineers" on Justia Law

Alex Francois, a Haitian national, left Haiti in 1979 to reunite with his U.S. citizen father. He has lived in New York City, raised six U.S. citizen children, and suffers from severe mental illnesses, including schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Francois has been hospitalized multiple times for his mental health and has had several encounters with law enforcement, often related to his mental illness. In 2017, he was arrested for trespassing in Texas, found incompetent to stand trial, and subsequently transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody. The Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially granted Francois withholding of removal, finding that he would likely be persecuted in Haiti due to his mental illness. The IJ based this decision on expert testimony and country conditions evidence, which highlighted the dire conditions and violent treatment of mentally ill individuals in Haitian prisons. The government appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case for further factfinding, questioning whether Francois would be singled out for persecution and whether there was a pattern of persecution against similarly situated individuals.The IJ, on remand, reversed the initial decision, denying Francois's claims for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ found that Francois had not proven he would be targeted for persecution in Haiti based on his mental illness. The BIA affirmed this decision, finding no clear error in the IJ's findings. Francois then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit held that the BIA deprived Francois of due process by violating its own regulations, specifically by remanding for further factfinding instead of reviewing the IJ's initial findings for clear error. The court granted Francois's petitions for review, vacated the BIA's orders, and remanded the case for the BIA to review the IJ's initial order under the proper standards of review. View "Francois v. Garland" on Justia Law

Adrian Galvez-Bravo, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1994 and has lived in the Memphis area since then, except for a brief return to Mexico to marry his wife. He has three children, two of whom are U.S. citizens. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging he was a noncitizen present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Galvez-Bravo conceded the charge and sought cancellation of removal under § 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children.An Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed with Galvez-Bravo's assessment of hardship, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, ordering his removal to Mexico. Galvez-Bravo then filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings, citing new evidence, including his daughter's recent dyslexia diagnosis and the potential impact on his children's education and well-being if he were removed. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the new evidence did not meet the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the legal challenges presented by Galvez-Bravo, noting that his arguments focused on whether the BIA engaged in reasoned decision-making. The court found that the BIA had articulated a rational explanation for its decision, considering the new evidence but determining that the hardship did not exceed what would normally be expected upon the removal of a close family member. The court also rejected Galvez-Bravo's argument that the BIA's decision was inconsistent with its prior decisions, noting that the unpublished decisions he cited did not establish a pattern of conflicting outcomes.The Sixth Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Galvez-Bravo's motion to reopen and denied his petition for review. View "Galvez-Bravo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the "metering" policy implemented by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the U.S.-Mexico border. Under this policy, asylum seekers without valid travel documents were turned away when ports of entry were deemed at capacity. Plaintiffs, including an immigrant rights organization and individual asylum seekers, argued that this policy unlawfully prevented them from applying for asylum. They also challenged the subsequent application of the "Asylum Transit Rule," which required asylum seekers to apply for asylum in a third country before seeking it in the U.S., to those turned away under the metering policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found the metering policy unlawful under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates that courts compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to those turned away under the metering policy before the rule took effect. The court also ordered the government to unwind past asylum denials based on the rule. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the APA § 706(1) and due process claims but did not reach the APA § 706(2) claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the metering policy violated § 706(1) of the APA, holding that noncitizens stopped at the border are eligible to apply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) and that border officials have a mandatory duty to inspect them under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The court also affirmed the classwide declaratory relief but vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim, deeming it unnecessary. The court affirmed the negative injunctive relief prohibiting the application of the Asylum Transit Rule to class members but vacated the portion of the injunction requiring the government to reopen or reconsider past asylum denials on its own initiative, as it violated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). View "AL OTRO LADO V. AMAYORKAS" on Justia Law

A mother and her child from El Salvador sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. They claimed persecution by the M-18 gang, which had murdered the child's father, Carlos, and subsequently threatened their lives. After the father's murder, the gang members, including one of the convicted murderers, began following and threatening the child, Javi, demanding he join the gang or face death along with his family. The threats and subsequent break-in by armed men at their home led them to flee to the United States.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the mother’s testimony credible but denied their applications, concluding that the threats and harassment did not amount to past persecution and that the feared harm was due to generalized violence rather than a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the experiences did not rise to the level of persecution and that the gang's motives were not sufficiently linked to the family's relationship to Carlos.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the threats and harassment, combined with the gang's capability and willingness to carry out the threats, constituted persecution. The court also found that the BIA erred in not considering the psychological harm suffered by Javi, who was diagnosed with PTSD, and in failing to account for his young age. Additionally, the court determined that the gang's motives included targeting Javi because of his relationship to Carlos, satisfying the nexus requirement for both asylum and withholding of removal.The Ninth Circuit granted the petition in part, recognizing the past persecution and the protected ground nexus, and remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether the persecution was by forces the government was unable or unwilling to control, or if there was a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "CORPENO-ROMERO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States on a tourist visa in January 2000 and overstayed. In April 2018, he applied for asylum, citing his dangerous job as a bodyguard for a congressman in Guatemala and fear of extortion and threats from gang members. Removal proceedings were initiated against him, and he conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). His application mentioned only one entry into the U.S. and claimed ignorance of the one-year filing requirement for asylum.An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing in December 2018, where the petitioner testified about his fears of returning to Guatemala. The IJ found the petitioner not credible due to inconsistencies between his oral testimony and written application, such as unlisted entries into the U.S. and unmentioned incidents of threats. The IJ also noted the petitioner's use of false documentation and legal violations in the U.S. The IJ found no extraordinary circumstances to excuse the late asylum application and determined that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ also found insufficient evidence for CAT protection.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision in September 2023, agreeing that the petitioner had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA noted the lack of evidence of threats in the past twenty years and upheld the IJ's findings on withholding of removal and CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the adverse credibility determination and agreed that the petitioner had not established eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. The petition for judicial review was denied. View "Garcia Oliva v. Garland" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketed fraudulent franchise opportunities to foreign nationals seeking to invest in the United States to obtain residency visas. The complaint included claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misrepresented the nature of the investment opportunities, leading the plaintiffs to believe they were purchasing franchises that would qualify them for E-2 or EB-5 visas. Instead, they received licenses that did not meet visa requirements, resulting in financial losses and visa application issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege a cognizable enterprise under RICO and failed to meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also denied the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, citing undue delay and the plaintiffs' failure to provide a proposed amended complaint or additional facts that would cure the deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to plead a RICO enterprise, as the complaint did not provide sufficient factual detail to support the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. The court also upheld the dismissal of the fraud and fraudulent inducement claims, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint and the dismissal of claims against certain defendants for failure to effect timely service of process. View "Crosswell v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law