Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Meza, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without being formally admitted or paroled in 1996, when he was nine years old. He has remained in this country ever since. He is married to another Mexican native, with whom he has five U.S.-citizen children. Meza’s parents also reside in the U.S. and have lawful permanent resident status. Around 2012, DHS initiated removal proceedings against him under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Meza applied for discretionary cancellation of removal under section 1229b(b), arguing that his removal would create exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his parents and his U.S.- citizen children.While his removal proceedings were pending, Meza was convicted of DUI. He collided with another vehicle. No one was injured, but the incident caused $5,000 in damage to the other car. Meza later pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle without a license and to operating a motor vehicle without insurance. He later pleaded guilty to failing to install an ignition interlock on his vehicle. Meza admitted that he used a fabricated social security number to obtain employment, 2003-2015. The BIA and Seventh Circuit upheld an IJ’s determination that Meza was ineligible for cancellation because he had failed to establish that he was a person of “good moral character.” View "Meza v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and filed a new opinion concurrently with this order. The panel denied defendant's petition for rehearing en banc as moot.The panel reversed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendant of illegal reentry after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The panel applied the majority's holding in its recently published opinion in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, —F.3d —, 2021 WL 345581 (9th Cir. 2021), which held that the jurisdiction of the immigration court vests upon the filing of the Notice to Appear (NTA), even one that does not at the time inform the alien of the time, date, and location of the hearing.The panel concluded that defendant's argument is foreclosed by United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct. 1615, 1622 (2021). Therefore, the panel held that defendant has failed to show that he can satisfy the section 1326(d) requirements based simply on the NTA's lack of date and time information, standing alone. Therefore, he is foreclosed from making that argument on remand. The panel explained that defendant may collaterally attack the underlying order on remand on other grounds, but only if he can meet all the requirements of section 1326(d). Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia" on Justia Law

iTech filed an I-140 (petition for alien worker) immigrant visa petition on behalf of Reddy. USCIS approved the petition two months later. In its application, iTech produced evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage and evidence that Reddy had obtained a bachelor’s degree, “in the form of a degree certificate from the University of Madras along with transcripts.” About 18 months later, USCIS issued a notice of intent to revoke the approval based on “inconsistencies in the record calling into question whether the beneficiary meets the educational requirements of the labor certification” and whether iTech “continues to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.”iTech provided additional documentation but USCIS revoked its approval on the basis that iTech misrepresented Reddy’s degree-conferring institution and employment qualifications, and did not establish its ability to pay the proffered wage. iTech brought suit, alleging that USCIS’s decision to revoke its I-140 petition was arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to engage in rational decision-making based on the record. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statute preserves the Secretary’s ability to revoke an I-140 petition at any time and for any reason and renders USCIS’s revocation decision discretionary under 8 U.S.C. 1155; section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprives the courts of jurisdiction to review the decision. View "iTech U.S., Inc v. Renaud" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in an action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that the Secretary violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to consider the environmental impacts of various immigration programs and immigration-related policies. Plaintiffs, organizations and individuals, seek to reduce immigration into the United States because it causes population growth, which in turn, they claim, has a detrimental effect on the environment.In regard to Count I, which challenged DHS's 2015 Instruction Manual, the panel concluded that the Manual does not constitute final agency action subject to the court's review under section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed this count.In regard to Count II, which asserted that DHS implemented eight programs that failed to comply with NEPA, the panel concluded that Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), squarely foreclosed plaintiffs' request for judicial review of seven non-Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programs. Therefore, the panel agreed with the district court that none of these programs are reviewable because they are not discrete agency actions.In regard to Counts II, where plaintiffs challenged DACA, as well as Counts III-V, which facially challenged categorical exclusions (CATEXs), the panel concluded that plaintiffs lack Article III standing. In this case, the panel rejected plaintiffs' enticement theory and "more settled population" theory; plaintiffs made no attempt to tie CATEX A3 to any particular action by DHS; plaintiffs offered no evidence showing that population growth was a predictable effect of the DSO and STEM Rules, as well as the AC21 Rule; plaintiffs failed to show injury-in-fact or causation concerning their challenge to the International Entrepreneur Rule; any cumulative effect analysis required by NEPA did not bear on whether plaintiffs had standing to challenge the rules; plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the sufficiency of the environmental assessments and findings of no significant impact issued in relation to President Obama's Response to the Influx of Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest border. View "Whitewater Draw Natural Resource Conservation District v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that the substitution of immigration judges between the removal hearing and the decision did not violate the text of 8 U.S.C. 1229a(a)(1) nor petitioner's due process rights. The court explained that the phrase "the immigration judge" used in subsequent clauses simply refers to whichever immigration judge is conducting that part of the removal proceedings; the phrase does not require that the first immigration judge oversee the case from initiation to completion. Furthermore, the judge who wrote the decision fully complied with the governing regulations. Finally, petitioner failed to establish a due process right. View "Orpinel-Robledo v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal because petitioner's prior Texas conviction for delivering cocaine, in violation of Texas Health and Safety Code 481.112, is included in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).The court concluded that the rule of orderliness does not apply to the court's previous reliance on the government's concession that an offer to sell falls outside the CSA. Because there is no binding precedent, the court held that section 481.112's offer-to-sell theory falls within the CSA, which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute a controlled substance. The court explained that section 481.112's offer-to-sell theory requires (1) the requisite culpability and (2) a substantial step. Therefore, it falls within the CSA's definition of an attempted transfer. View "Ochoa-Salgado v. Garland" on Justia Law

Sanchez immigrated from Honduras in 1994 and became a lawful permanent resident when he married a U.S. citizen. In 1999, Sanchez pleaded guilty to sexual battery in Ohio. He was ordered removed because sexual battery is a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The BIA noted that Sanchez implied that he pled guilty in reliance on his attorney's assurance that a conviction would not result in immigration consequences but concluded that it had no authority to look behind his conviction. Immigration authorities encountered Sanchez in the U.S. again in 2012 and 2018, twice reinstated the removal order, and removed him.Following his 2018 detention, Sanchez's counsel realized that his guilty plea was legally infirm. Ohio law requires that a judge advise defendants such as Sanchez that a guilty plea might result in deportation but the judge in Sanchez’s case failed to give that advisement. The court vacated the sexual battery conviction. Sanchez entered a new plea for simple assault—which is not a crime involving moral turpitude.Sanchez moved the BIA to reopen his 2008 removal order, citing ineffective assistance by former counsels. The BIA denied the motion, determining that it lacked jurisdiction because 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), “prohibits reopening of removal proceedings if those proceedings are subject to reinstatement.” The Sixth Circuit denied relief. Nothing in section 1231(a)(5) implies exceptions for exceptional circumstances. Sanchez’s original removal order “is not subject to being reopened” because he illegally reentered the country. View "Sanchez-Gonzalez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order determining that petitioner was removable because his prior conviction for enticing a minor under Iowa law was a "crime of child abuse." Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that the Board's decision cannot be upheld on the rationale advanced by the government because it conflates two separate elements in the Iowa statute. Looking only at the plain text of the Iowa statute, the court cannot exclude the possibility that an offender could be prosecuted for enticing a minor with intent to commit disorderly conduct or harassment upon a minor. Furthermore, the Board's decision is not clear about how it understood the "realistic probability" requirement. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pah Peh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Valarezo-Tirado, an Ecuadorian citizen, entered the U.S. illegally in 2017. In 2020, DHS reinstated a 2015 removal order and conducted a reasonable fear interview. Valarezo-Tirado was twice informed of his right to postpone the interview to procure an attorney and was provided with a list of pro bono attorneys. He proceeded without an attorney. Valarezo-Tirado described his interactions with police concerning a conflict with a neighbor who was involved in drug trafficking and his fear for his family’s safety, The asylum officer found that Valarezo-Tirado was “credible,” but that he did not establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if removed to Ecuador, stating that the verbal threats of unspecified harm did not rise to the level of severe physical or mental pain. Valarezo-Tirado failed to provide specific and persuasive evidence to establish a reasonable possibility that a public official would acquiesce to his future harm. On appeal, he again declined to seek legal representation. The IJ found that the situation amounted to “a personal matter.”The Third Circuit remanded. The IJ did not adequately explain the reasons for her decision. On remand, if the IJ concludes Valarezo-Tirado must come forth with corroborating evidence, she must reopen the proceedings, inform Valarezo-Tirado of the evidence that requires corroboration, and must give Valarezo-Tirado an opportunity to furnish such information or provide an explanation for its absence. The court rejected Valarezo-Tirado’s argument that he was denied his right to counsel. View "Valarezo-Tirado v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff in an action brought against several officials under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court concluded that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred the government's rationale for denying plaintiff's application for adjustment of status.The court concluded that the disputed issue of whether plaintiff solicited funds for a terrorist organization was not actually litigated in an earlier proceeding, and thus issue preclusion does not apply. In this case, the record shows that whether plaintiff was inadmissible because he solicited funds for a terrorist organization was not raised, contested, and submitted for determination in the 2001 asylum proceeding. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Fofana v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law