Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

A conviction under Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a)—which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to "own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical weapon or device"—does not constitute a "firearm offense" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C), and its cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3).The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's final order of removal and vacated the BIA's decision deeming petitioner removable under section 1227(a)(2)(C) of the INA, based on his conviction for a violation of Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a). Applying the categorical approach, the court explained that the prohibited items for the possession and concealed carrying offenses in section 790.23(1)(a) are means of committing those crimes, and not elements of separate crimes. View "Simpson v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's order denying petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Petitioner claims that he fears persecution by the gangs and police of El Salvador on account of his status as a former member of the MS-13 gang.The court concluded that petitioner does not identify any purported error in the social-distinction standard applied by the BIA in its order. In this case, the BIA agreed with the IJ that petitioner's proposed groups do not satisfy the social-distinction test because he has not shown that gang members who have renounced their gang membership are recognized in Salvadoran society to be a distinct group. The court concluded that the IJ did not apply the wrong standard and correctly stated that the relevant inquiry was whether "society in El Salvador recognizes former gang members as a group." The court explained that, although the IJ referred to petitioner's repeated testimony that his tattoos would identify him as a former gang member, it did not employ a literal visibility standard for social distinction. The court also concluded that the record does not support petitioner's claim that the IJ failed to consider the documentary evidence in assessing whether his proposed social groups were cognizable. To the contrary, the IJ made clear reference to documents submitted by petitioner and DHS. Finally, the court concluded that, viewed as a whole, the administrative record does not compel a finding that Salvadoran society views former MS-13 members or former MS-13 members who left for moral reasons as socially distinct.In regard to petitioner's CAT claim, the court concluded that the IJ and BIA specifically addressed some of the evidence petitioner contends they ignored; the BIA similarly referenced country-conditions evidence; and petitioner presents nothing to rebut the presumption that the agency considered that evidence to the extent it was relevant. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner has not shown it is more likely than not he will be tortured if removed to El Salvador. View "Nolasco v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) for making a false representation of U.S. citizenship for a purpose or benefit under Nevada law. The panel held that, because petitioner was not an applicant for admission, the BIA impermissibly applied the clearly and beyond doubt burden of proof in finding him inadmissible and therefore ineligible for adjustment of status. The panel remanded for the BIA to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. View "Romero v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner is removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because his two prior convictions for violating Hawaii’s fourth degree theft statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-833(1), constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 708-833(1), a petty misdemeanor involving property valued at less than $250, is overbroad with respect to the BIA's definition of a CIMT. The panel explained that Hawaii's definition of "theft" does not always require the government to prove the defendant acted with an intent to permanently deprive or substantially erode the owner’s property rights. Furthermore, section 708-833(1) is indivisible because it proscribes one crime that can be committed eight different ways, not eight distinct crimes. Accordingly, the BIA erred in concluding that petitioner's section 708-833(1) convictions were CIMTs rendering him removable. View "Maie v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's order denying petitioner removal relief. The court concluded that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption set out in In re Y-L-, 23 I.&N. Dec. 270, 274 (A.G.), that unlawful trafficking in controlled substances presumptively constitutes a particularly serious crime. Furthermore, the IJ did not err in not considering mental health as a factor in the particularly serious crime analysis.In regard to relief under the Convention Against Torture, the court agreed with the IJ's finding that, while cartel violence continues in Mexico, that alone cannot show a more-likely-than-not chance that the Mexican government would acquiesce in petitioner's torture. In this case, petitioner's evidence falls short of this standard where the threats she experienced where not sufficient to support her claims. View "Gilbertson v. Garland" on Justia Law

Omowole, a citizen of Nigeria, married her first husband, Festus, in 2007. Festus had won a diversity lottery visa for admission to the U.S. in 2006, and Omowole, as his spouse, was eligible for a derivative visa. By the time they emigrated (separately), months later they were estranged as a result of Festus’s disclosure that he had fathered a child with another woman before he married Omowole. Omowole settled in Indiana and Festus in California. The two never cohabited in the U.S. as husband and wife. In 2011, they divorced. Festus subsequently married the mother of his child. When he then attempted to become a naturalized U.S. citizen and sought lawful permanent resident status for his new wife and his child, USCIS investigated and determined his marriage to Omowole had been a sham entered into for the purpose of facilitating her entry into the United States.The Board of Immigration Appeals sustained the findings of two immigration judges that Omowole is removable for having procured an entry visa by fraud and not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The decision rested on the immigration judges’ adverse findings as to Omowole’s credibility and that of her ex-husband, and those findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Omowole v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ and the BIA determined that petitioner failed to establish a nexus between either the harm she suffered or her fears of future persecution and her particular social group. The court concluded that petitioner fails to demonstrate that substantial evidence compels a different conclusion. Rather, the BIA and the IJ both correctly concluded that familial ties did not sufficiently motivate the Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel, to target petitioner and thus she has not established that she is eligible for asylum relief. Furthermore, petitioner fails to establish that she is eligible for withholding of removal. View "Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was removeable and denial of his request for a form of cancellation of removal available to children who have been battered by parents who are lawful permanent residents. The court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust his claim that the BIA engaged in improper fact finding, the issue is not before the court, and the issue will not be considered. Although the court has jurisdiction to review the predicate legal question whether the Board properly applied the law in determining eligibility, the court lacked jurisdiction to review an ultimate decision denying cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion. View "Mencia-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint challenging USCIS's denial of her application for naturalization because the complaint did not plausibly plead that plaintiff had not been convicted of an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which "the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000," 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), and therefore had the requisite good moral character.The panel concluded that under the "circumstance-specific" approach to the monetary threshold in section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), the district court is not limited to reviewing the record in the applicant's criminal case in determining the "loss to the victim." Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the complaint here cannot survive a motion to dismiss, because it does not plausibly allege that the loss to the victim of the applicant's criminal offense did not exceed $10,000. In this case, plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim that the total loss to the victim of her violation of section 550(b)(3) of California Penal Code did not exceed $10,000 and thus she failed to plausibly allege that she was not convicted of an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and USCIS did not err in ruling that she failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Estella Orellana v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Ortiz, raised in Guatemala, suffered significant domestic abuse by her intoxicated father and later by her boyfriend, Carlos, who raped her. She became pregnant and, fearing aggravating her father’s violence, moved in with Carlos. Clinic records confirm that Carlos assaulted Ortiz during her pregnancy. Ortiz later discovered bruises on her newborn. Worried that Carlos would routinely abuse her baby, Ortiz returned to her parents. Her father had become gravely ill. She continued to fear Carlos, who had threatened to kill her if she left him. Ortiz fled to the U.S. and applied for asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A).An IJ denied her claim, holding that she failed to show that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control her abuser. The BIA affirmed, citing a State Department report noting that Guatemala had “taken steps” to curb domestic violence. About a week after the Board's final order, the Sixth Circuit decided “Antonio.” Ortiz unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that Antonio changed the asylum law. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Antonio relied on the totality of the evidence to reject the Board’s finding; the fact-specific rationales, in that case, do not transfer to Ortiz. The police twice ignored Antonio’s request for assistance, Ortiz never asked the authorities for help View "Ortiz v. Garland" on Justia Law