Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Two sisters from Guatemala fled to the United States in 2015 after gang members threatened to maim and kill them. They entered the U.S. without inspection and were placed in removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The sisters applied for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming they were targeted due to their membership in two particular social groups (PSGs): "Guatemalan female children without parental protection" and "the Rodas family."An immigration judge (IJ) denied their applications, finding that the harm they suffered did not rise to the level of persecution, that their proposed PSGs were not cognizable, and that there was no nexus between the harm and their family membership. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, assuming without deciding that the harm constituted persecution but agreeing that the gang members were motivated by financial gain rather than animus toward the family.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Petitioners' arguments regarding due process and the "Guatemalan female children without parental protection" PSG were unreviewable because they were not raised before the BIA. However, the court held that the BIA's no-nexus determination regarding the "Rodas family" PSG was inconsistent with precedents. The court emphasized that persecutors can have mixed motives, and the BIA failed to consider whether the gang members' financial motives were intertwined with the Petitioners' family membership.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review in part, dismissed it in part, vacated the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court instructed the BIA to reconsider the nexus between the harm and the Petitioners' family membership and to address whether the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control the persecutors. View "Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland" on Justia Law

Astrid Dariana Lopez Orellana, a noncitizen, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2019, fleeing gang threats in Honduras. In 2022, she was convicted of accessory after the fact to armed robbery under Louisiana law. Subsequently, she was taken into ICE custody and designated as an aggravated felon, leading to expedited removal proceedings.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) and a Notice of Intent (NOI) to remove her, alleging her conviction was an aggravated felony. Lopez requested withholding of removal, and an asylum officer found she had a reasonable fear of persecution if returned to Honduras. Her case was referred to an Immigration Judge (IJ). DHS later issued a new NOI and FARO on the same day, claiming her conviction was an aggravated felony related to obstruction of justice. Lopez challenged this, arguing the Louisiana statute did not match the federal definition of obstruction of justice, and that DHS violated procedural regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Louisiana accessory-after-the-fact statute requires only general intent, whereas the federal obstruction of justice offense requires specific intent. Therefore, the state statute is not a categorical match for the federal offense. The court also determined that DHS violated Lopez’s due process rights by not following proper procedures, such as issuing the FARO and NOI on the same day and failing to serve the FARO in a timely manner.The Fifth Circuit granted Lopez’s petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case to DHS for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court directed the government to facilitate Lopez’s participation in these proceedings. View "Orellana v. Garland" on Justia Law

Andre Bowyer, a Jamaican national, pleaded guilty to re-entering the United States without permission after being previously removed. During his sentencing, Bowyer attempted to highlight his ties to a family he had formed in the U.S. The district judge interrupted him frequently, characterizing Bowyer's account as lacking insight and unconvincing. Bowyer received a below-guidelines sentence.Bowyer appealed, arguing that his right to make his own statement at sentencing was violated. He conceded that he did not object during the district court proceedings, so the review was limited to the plain-error standard. Bowyer did not specify what additional arguments he would have made if given more time. The district court had read a letter from Bowyer detailing his background and his relationship with the family, but the judge found this information irrelevant to the sentencing factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that while the district judge's interruptions were frequent, they did not completely prevent Bowyer from speaking. The judge also solicited further comments from Bowyer at the end of the allocution. The court found that even if there was an error, it was not plain because there was no unambiguous case law against such interruptions. Additionally, Bowyer's arguments were already considered by the judge, and there was no indication that further allocution would have led to a different sentence.The Seventh Circuit concluded that Bowyer did not meet the plain-error test for reversal and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Bowyer" on Justia Law

Nyynkpao Banyee, a citizen of Ivory Coast and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was detained for a year while awaiting a decision on his deportation. His criminal history includes theft, lying to the police, and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, culminating in a robbery with a dangerous weapon conviction. This led federal authorities to initiate deportation proceedings. Initially, an immigration judge ruled the robbery conviction as a "crime of violence," disqualifying Banyee from certain discretionary relief. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States, the government argued the conviction was an attempted "theft offense." The immigration judge eventually canceled Banyee's removal, but the government successfully appealed, and Banyee's appeal is still pending.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted Banyee's habeas petition, ruling that his year-long detention without individualized review violated due process. The court ordered a bond hearing, which resulted in Banyee's release after the government failed to prove he was a danger or flight risk. The government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Eighth Circuit held that detention during deportation proceedings is constitutionally valid, as established in Demore v. Kim. The court emphasized that the length of detention does not determine its legality as long as deportation remains a possibility and the detention serves its purpose. The court found no evidence of dilatory tactics by either side and noted that Banyee's detention was not punitive. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case for the denial of Banyee's habeas petition. View "Banyee v. Garland" on Justia Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. View "United States v. Suquilanda" on Justia Law

Bessy Orbelina Castellanos-Ventura, a citizen of Honduras, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. She claimed past persecution due to her membership in a social group of Honduran women, citing physical and sexual abuse by family members and a local criminal. She did not report the abuse to authorities, believing they would not help her.The Immigration Judge (IJ) assumed without deciding that Castellanos-Ventura's social group was cognizable and that she suffered persecution. However, the IJ denied her application, finding she failed to show that the Honduran government was "unable or unwilling to control" her persecutors. The IJ noted her failure to report the abuse and pointed to her mother's success in obtaining a restraining order as evidence of government action. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, adopting the same reasoning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency incorrectly applied the "unable or unwilling to control" standard. It noted the agency failed to consider whether it would have been futile or dangerous for Castellanos-Ventura, as an abused child, to seek protection. Additionally, the agency did not evaluate significant evidence indicating the Honduran government's inability to protect women and children from violence. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland" on Justia Law

Christian Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, was brought to the United States by his mother at the age of two to escape domestic violence from his father. Lopez lived in the U.S. without lawful status for thirteen years before obtaining T-5 nonimmigrant status in 2013. In 2017, he inadvertently allowed his T-5 status to expire. In 2019, Lopez was arrested and later convicted of multiple offenses, including four counts of petit larceny under the Reno Municipal Code (RMC) § 8.10.040. Following his release from prison, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him.An immigration judge (IJ) found Lopez removable for committing crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that Lopez's asylum application was untimely and that he failed to demonstrate a nexus between his fear of future harm and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that Lopez's municipal convictions involved CIMTs and that he did not qualify for an exception to the asylum filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Lopez's petition for review. The court held that Lopez's petit larceny convictions under RMC § 8.10.040 are CIMTs, making him removable. The court also concluded that the BIA's interpretation of the statute regarding CIMTs was entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. Additionally, the court found that the lack of availability of a pardon for a conviction does not render the conviction an improper basis for removal. Finally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the denial of withholding of removal, as Lopez did not demonstrate that he would face future persecution in Mexico based on his identity as his mother's son. View "LOPEZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Nayanaben Patel, entered the United States in March 2000 under unclear circumstances. She applied for adjustment of status based on her husband's legal status but lied about her manner of entry. She later admitted to lying but provided conflicting testimonies. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application for adjustment of status and ordered her removal to India, citing factual inconsistencies. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The IJ's decision was discretionary and protected by statute from judicial review. The petitioner did not raise any colorable constitutional claims that would allow for judicial review. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the IJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the petitioner's multiple contradictory statements and lack of credible evidence regarding her manner of entry.The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under sections 1182(i) and 1255. The court also found that the petitioner did not exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial bias, and that her judicial bias claim was not a constitutional issue but rather a factual dispute.The court denied the petition for review, emphasizing that the IJ's decision was within his discretion and supported by the evidence. The court also noted a significant error in the IJ's understanding of the difference between a visa and an I-94 form but concluded that this error did not affect the overall decision. View "Patel v. Garland" on Justia Law

Four aliens who were denied asylum and an organization assisting them filed FOIA requests for copies of the aliens’ Assessments to Refer and associated documents. USCIS released the factual portions of the Assessments but withheld portions containing analysis by the asylum officers, including opinions, deliberations, and recommendations regarding each applicant’s eligibility for asylum. The plaintiffs sued to obtain the full Assessments.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the government. It held that the deliberative-process privilege covers the requested Assessments and that USCIS had adequately shown that releasing the withheld portions would foreseeably harm USCIS’s interest in receiving candid recommendations from its asylum officers. After the plaintiffs appealed, the case was remanded for further consideration in light of a new decision, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. FBI. On remand, USCIS submitted a supplemental declaration elaborating on the agency’s assessment of foreseeable harm, and the district court again granted summary judgment to DHS.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deliberative-process privilege applies to the four requested Assessments and that DHS adequately showed that disclosure of their analysis portions would foreseeably harm interests the privilege protects. The court found that the supplemental declaration provided by USCIS’s Chief FOIA Officer sufficiently demonstrated foreseeable harm by explaining the sensitive nature of asylum adjudications and the specific concern about facilitating asylum fraud. The court affirmed the summary judgment for DHS. View "Emuwa v. DHS" on Justia Law

A mother filed for sole custody of her two daughters, alleging the father, who resides in Guatemala, had abused, neglected, and abandoned the children. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted her sole custody but denied her request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings, which are necessary for the children to seek SIJ status with federal immigration authorities. The court found insufficient evidence of abuse, neglect, or abandonment under Pennsylvania law and questioned whether it was in the children's best interest to issue an SIJ order.The mother appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The Superior Court held that SIJ determinations could only be made in dependency proceedings, not in custody proceedings where one parent is awarded sole custody.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Court clarified that under federal SIJ law, a child involved in custody proceedings resulting in sole custody being awarded to a parent in the United States can seek SIJ determinations in that context. The Court held that the Superior Court erred in limiting SIJ determinations to dependency proceedings and that the record supported the children's entitlement to predicate SIJ determinations.The Supreme Court directed the custody court to enter orders consistent with its opinion, including findings that reunification with the father is not viable due to abandonment and neglect, and that it is not in the children's best interest to return to Guatemala. The case was remanded to the custody court for entry of these orders. View "Velasquez v. Miranda" on Justia Law